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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
By Brian M. Jenkins
Contemporary terrorists have made public transportation a new
theater of operations.  Algerian extremists set off bombs on the
subways of Paris in 1995 and 1996; the Irish Republican Army has
waged a long running terrorist campaign against Britain’s
passenger trains and London’s subways; Palestinian terrorists have
carried out suicide bombings on Israel’s buses; and an individual
or a group calling itself “Sons of the Gestapo” derailed a passenger
train in Arizona in 1995.  Islamic extremists planned to set off car
bombs in New York’s tunnels and bridges in 1993 and in 1997
they plotted suicide bombings in New York subways.  The nerve
gas attack on Tokyo’s subways by members of the Aum Shinrikyo
sect in 1995 raised the specter that terrorists in the future might
resort to weapons of mass destruction to which public
transportation is uniquely vulnerable.
For those determined to kill in quantity and willing to kill
indiscriminately, public transportation offers an ideal target.
Precisely because it is public, and used by millions of people daily,
there is necessarily little security with no obvious checkpoints, like
those at airports, to inspect passengers and parcels.  The passengers
are strangers, promising attackers anonymity and easy escape.
Concentrations of people in contained environments are especially
vulnerable to conventional explosives and unconventional
weapons.  Specifically, attacks on public transportation, the
circulatory systems of urban environments, cause great disruption
and alarm, which are the traditional goals of terrorism.
As the accompanying Chronology of Terrorist and Other
Significant Attacks on Surface Transportation Systems indicates,
terrorist attacks on surface transportation systems have increased
over the past 25 years.  Two-thirds of these attacks are intended to
kill, 35 percent of them have resulted in fatalities, and of the fatal
attacks, 30 percent involve 10 or more deaths.
Terrorists pose unique challenges to those responsible for security.
The nation is familiar with the terrorist bombings at the World
Trade Center, the Oklahoma City federal building, and Centennial
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Park in Atlanta, and a number of terrorist bombings have been
thwarted by vigilant authorities. These incidents indicate that the
terrorist threat in the United States is real, although there is no
consensus on the nature and magnitude of that threat.  The United
States has not experienced on-going terrorist campaigns like those
waged by the Irish Republican Army in the United Kingdom or by
various Palestinian extremist groups in Israel.  Incidents here have
been isolated and statistically rare but sometimes of great
consequence.
Because terrorist threats are not easily quantifiable, it is difficult to
determine the “right” level of security.  Using cost-benefit analysis
as the sole criterion to determine the level of security is not very
helpful.  The risk of death to any individual citizen from terrorism
is minuscule, making it difficult to argue for any security measure
on the grounds that it will save lives.  The problem is exacerbated
by the fact that the perceived burden of security is not determined
by the number or capabilities of the potential attackers, but by the
size and number of targets to be defended.
Since the threat of terrorism is murky and security measures are
costly, it is hard to justify the expenditures before an attack.
Security against terrorism therefore tends to be reactive.
Scope of the Work
In order to effectively meet the threat posed by terrorism and other
forms of violent crime, it is essential that transportation system
operators have a thorough understanding of the security measures
employed by other operators and especially by those transportation
entities that have suffered terrorist attacks or that confront high
levels of threat.  The objective of this project is the creation of a
“best practices textbook” describing the most effective security
measures and response procedures.
This volume reports on the first phase of the effort to define which
practices are best. It includes four original case studies
commissioned by the Norman Y. Mineta International Institute for
Surface Transportation Policy Studies (IISTPS) on behalf of the
U.S. Department of Transportation.  The four case studies address
transportation security measures in Paris, Atlanta, New York, and
on the Amtrak rail system.  The Paris case study focuses on the
immediate aftermath of the 1995 terrorist bombing in the St.
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Michel Station.  Further terrorist bombings occurred in France in
the fall of 1995 and in December 1996 obliging authorities to
increase security.  The Atlanta case study focuses on the security
preparations connected with the 1996 Olympics and the aftermath
of the Centennial Park bombing, although this bombing was not
directed against public transportation.  The Amtrak case study
focuses on the response to the deliberate derailing of the Sunset
Limited in Arizona in November 1995.  New York was included
because of the size and complexity of its transportation system and
the various incidents and threats that have affected it, including the
1993 World Trade Center bombing, the subsequent plot to blow up
bridges and tunnels, and the 1996 explosion at the Battery Park
subway station.  As these case studies were being completed,
police discovered a terrorist plot to carry out suicide bombings on
the city’s subways.
Each case study examines three issues:
• policies and practices in effect prior to the incident (pre-
incident preparedness);
• the response to the event or heightened threat environment; and
• the recovery efforts.
To facilitate comparisons, we have developed a common format,
which can be used as further case studies are added to the effort.
The format allows for a broad interpretation of security.  It
includes:
• a description of the transportation system itself;
• all aspects of existing security:
-  threat assessment
-  security organization, personnel, procedures, and training
-  environmental design
-  security technology
-  emergency communications
-  the role of the public
• crisis management planning;
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• liaison with authorities;
• and the immediate response to attacks or threats including:
-  additional security measures,
-  emergency response,
-  restoration of services,
-  lessons learned
-  problem areas identified
Although the order in which these topics are addressed varies
somewhat from one case study to another, all of these elements are
examined to the extent that information is available and can be
discussed in a widely-disseminated document.
All of the case studies were conducted with the full cooperation of
the operating entity and are based on reviews of plans and after-
action reports, interviews with company officials and public
authorities, and media accounts of events.
During the course of this research, an additional task was added.
In 1996, the Federal Transportation Agency (FTA) examined
existing security practices at nine public transportation systems in
the United States.  The systems included multi-mode transportation
systems, medium and large bus systems, and small and rural bus
systems.  The reviews were not based on case studies but surveys
and they did not focus exclusively on terrorism and other
significant violent crime but included a broader spectrum of crimes
against property (e.g., Objects thrown at vehicles, arson, and hate
crimes), crimes against persons (assaults on passengers, attacks on
operators or drivers, weapons offenses, and homicides), and
dramatic impact crimes such as bomb threats and terrorism.
We were asked to review and reformat the material compiled in the
nine surveys so that it could more easily be compared with the four
case studies.  As the information gathered in the surveys did not
permit a detailed narrative, we have presented the FTA material in
chart form using the same list of key topics used for the case
studies.  The charts are included in Appendix A.  The results of the
nine FTA surveys are then compared with the four IISTPS case
studies in Appendices B, C, and D.
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In addition to the four case studies and the results of the nine
surveys conducted by the FTA, we were able to gather further
material from public sources and briefings by British, Israeli, and
Japanese transportation officials, which were particularly relevant
given their experience with terrorism.  However, it is anticipated
that detailed case studies of these experiences will be part of the
next phase of research leading to the “best practices” textbook
mentioned earlier.  The final phase of the effort will be to present
the results to operators at various national and regional symposia.
Desirable Attributes of Security
Before summarizing the specific security measures identified in the
case studies and surveys, some of the broader issues that emerged
should be identified.  First, it is clear that effective “security”
includes not just the deterrent and preventive measures that
normally come under the heading of security practices, but all
efforts to mitigate casualties, damage, and disruption and to rapidly
restore operations after an attack. Given the inherent advantages
that terrorists always have, and the inherent vulnerability of public
transportation, in most cases the operating entity and authorities
will be reacting to a communicated threat or an actual incident.
The point can be illustrated by comparing commercial aviation
security with that of surface transportation.
Historically, airlines have been among the favorite targets of
terrorism.  The extraordinary security measures implemented over
the years in response to this threat have greatly reduced the
incidents of airline hijacking and sabotage, though much remains
to be done to increase the level of confidence among the public
that terrorists and other criminals bent upon hostage-taking or
destruction will not succeed.  In many respects, surface
transportation offers a tempting target that is far more difficult to
protect.
Commercial aviation security places great emphasis on deterrence;
however, prevention is the key element.  In contrast, surface
transportation security may try to deter potential attackers but
actual prevention is much more difficult.  There are too many
passengers entering the system at too many locations to permit the
kind of passenger and luggage screening that protects airliners.
Some mitigation measures, that is, measures taken to limit
6 Executive Summary – Brian M. Jenkins
Norman Y. Mineta International Institute for Surface Transportation Policy Studies
casualties or damage in case of an attack, are possible in aviation
security (e.g., hardening cargo container to reduce the effects of an
explosion), but realistically, possibilities are limited.  In surface
transportation, mitigation can be achieved through the design of
cars and stations and by rapid response to incidents that occur.
Restoration of service is not a major issue in aviation security.
When an aircraft is hijacked or destroyed, it is out of action, but
the overall disruption to airline travel is minimal.  In contrast,
restoration of service is often a key issue in surface transportation.
With less weight on deterrence and prevention and more on the
mitigation of damages and the restoration of surface transportation,
security is essentially reactive.  Therefore emergency response and
crisis management are the critical components of surface
transportation security. The case studies of the St. Michel bombing
and the derailing of the Sunset Limited bear out this observation.
The significant costs and the reactive nature of protecting surface
transportation systems indicate that security measures should be
flexible, that is, they can be increased rapidly during periods of
heightened threat and decreased when circumstances permit.  The
costs of manpower also demand that much of the work be done
with technology rather than personnel.
Coordination with Authorities
Security against terrorism requires cooperation and coordination
between the private and public sector and between local and
national authorities. The line between the operating authority’s
security contingent and the local authorities’ can vary.  Some large
operating entities have their own police departments while in other
cases local police may assume responsibility for all but routine
security functions.  The operating entity has primary responsibility
for security, immediate response to threats, crisis management
planning, and the restoration of operations in case of terrorist
attacks.  Local authorities often share responsibility for security or
augment the operating entities’ security force when required.
Local police also have access to intelligence not ordinarily
available to the operating entity and may assume responsibilities
for major criminal investigations, and local civic authorities
usually assist in the immediate response to threats, crisis planning,
and emergency response.
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The role of the federal government in security against terrorism is
an evolving one.  A terrorist attack within the United States is an
attack on America and not necessarily just against the specific
target.  That common bond makes security against terrorism a
national concern, a part of providing for the common defense.
This notion was advanced by the White House Commission on
Aviation Safety and Security and accepted in principle by
Congress, although Congress has not always provided the funds
requested to augment aviation security.  To what extent this
principle can or should be applied to surface transportation remains
a question.  The nature of the terrorist threat makes it impossible
for the federal government to assume the entire burden and the
imperative of balancing the federal budget makes it unlikely that
the government will contribute greatly to ongoing security costs.
The operating entity and local authorities will bear the larger
burden.
The federal government, however, may contribute to security by
sponsoring research and development and by funding the
deployment of experimental security technology. Federal agencies
play a major role in the collection, analysis, and dissemination of
intelligence on terrorism and local authorities depend on the
government for this type of information.  The federal government
may also take over the task of investigating terrorist threats or
crimes, assist in emergency response, and provide specialized
equipment and material to deal with more exotic threats such as the
use of chemical weapons.
The relationship between the transportation entity and the local or
state authorities on security issues poses two questions.  First,
should the federal government set security standards for surface
transportation as it now does for commercial aviation?  There is no
indication that operating entities would welcome federal regulation
in the security area, although federally-sponsored research leading
to the identification of a textbook on “best practices” may, in a
litigious society like America, have the effect of establishing
minimum security standards.
Second, should the federal government augment security in
extraordinary circumstances, for example, the threat or use of
weapons of mass destruction?  The sheer size of this problem can
8 Executive Summary – Brian M. Jenkins
Norman Y. Mineta International Institute for Surface Transportation Policy Studies
make federal assistance almost inevitable and there are precedents,
like the carefully-crafted preparations for the Olympics in Atlanta,
but there are constitutional issues to be considered.
Dedicated Security Personnel
The case studies and surveys indicate that all of the larger
operating entities examined have dedicated security forces
comprised of company personnel, their own police departments, or
dedicated bureaus of local police departments.  Smaller systems
depend more heavily on whatever protection can be provided by
local police.  The police departments of either kind conduct visible
patrols as well as undercover surveillance.  A major terrorism
threat or attack will require the combined capabilities of both the
operating entity’s security force and the local authorities.
Security Technology
Along with personal radios and centralized electronic control
centers, closed-circuit television (CCTV) is increasingly being
used as a deterrent to crime in public areas and to facilitate
investigations.  Intrusion sensors and alarms monitored by control
centers are in place at the larger transportation systems.
Technology is also being deployed by a number of operators to
provide the accurate location of all trains, buses, and security
personnel at all times. In some cases, buses are being equipped
with global positioning systems (GPS) to quickly pinpoint the
precise location of any vehicle involved in an incident.
Advance Planning
The case studies show that advance planning is essential to ensure
a coordinated and effective response to a threat or attack.  This is
perhaps best illustrated in the case of the RATP’s (Régie Autonome
des Transports Parisiens) highly efficient response to the St.
Michel bombing.  Frequent joint exercises involving all concerned
agencies identify potential problems in advance and ensure
readiness.
Environmental Design
The case studies identify a number of examples of environmental
design to facilitate surveillance, increase physical security,
eliminate potential hiding places (e.g., in trash cans and under
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seats), reduce sources of fragmentation (bomb resistant trash
containers), combustible materials, and materials that produce
toxic fumes.  Environmental design can also facilitate emergency
evacuation and increase or prevent ventilation.
Communications
The four systems examined in the case studies all have multi-mode
communications systems to ensure communications during routine
operations and crisis situations. These systems include multiple
radio networks, cellular telephones, landlines, and public address
systems.  Issues that arise include the difficulties of radio use
underground, compatibility of communications equipment and
frequencies with local law enforcement, communications
procedures to ensure coordination with other agencies,
standardized language to eliminate misunderstandings that arise
from codes or technical jargon, and the need for multi-lingual
broadcasts on public address systems.
Training
All of the operating entities reviewed in the case studies placed
great emphasis on training.  Both regular employees and security
staff are seen as part of the security and emergency response team
and are trained to carry out their roles.  Regular drills, tabletop
exercises, no-notice responses, and full-scale simulations are
regularly conducted to ensure readiness.
Public Involvement
Several of the transportation systems examined have decided to
make the public part of their overall security effort by posting
signs and broadcasting warnings that urge patrons not to leave their
luggage or parcels unattended and to immediately notify the
authorities of unattended or suspicious parcels.  Public
involvement is highest in locations where there is a continuing
terrorist threat (the United Kingdom and Israel).  Where the
terrorist threat is not immediate, such warnings risk creating a
fearful atmosphere and provoking a high volume of false alarms.
Generally, however, the trend appears to be in the direction of
public involvement.
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Augmented Security
The easiest and fastest way to augment security following a
terrorist attack, or in times of heightened threat, is to increase the
visible presence of security personnel.  Sometimes this is necessary
if only to reassure a frightened public that something is being done.
Since the number of company security personnel may be limited,
additional personnel must come from local and national
authorities.  In an extreme case, France, faced with a continuing
terrorist bombing campaign, deployed 37,000 military personnel
and police to security functions, including 5,000 soldiers to patrol
trains, stations, bus terminals, and airports in Paris.  Mutual aid
agreements among departments can augment police strength for
short periods during emergencies.  Atlanta’s Metropolitan Atlanta
Rapid Transit Authority (MARTA), however, had disappointing
results in the response to the agreements it had negotiated prior to
the Olympics.  To reiterate, advance planning is essential.
Restoration of Services
When asked what issues are paramount in responding to terrorist
threats or attacks, surface transportation managers identified
maintenance or the restoration of operations.  This is hardly
surprising since operations are their primary responsibility and
their capacity to prevent casualties caused by terrorist attacks is
limited.  Shutting down vital public transportation to avoid
potential future attacks makes as little sense as grounding all
commercial airliners in order to prevent hijacking or sabotage.
The restoration and maintenance of operations requires the agency
to quickly reduce the disruptions caused by bomb threats or
explosions, keep the trains and buses moving during the crisis,
rapidly remove of damaged equipment, make repairs immediately,
and establish alternative routes as soon as possible.  The Paris case
study provides a dramatic example of rapid response to a major
terrorist incident.  At times the operating agencies’ desire to keep
transportation moving is in conflict with local authorities’ need to
conduct crime scene investigations.  In these cases the
transportation management must cooperate with the outside
authorities in order to achieve their goals, even though this may
involve political issues.
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Crisis Communications
Communication during a crisis is an area often overlooked or
inadequately addressed in crisis management plans.  Terrorism is
calculated to create an atmosphere of fear and alarm and it often
works.  Moreover, terrorist attacks on transportation systems may
result in large-scale casualties which heighten public alarm and
impose additional demands from the victims and their relatives.
Passengers must be assured that travel is safe or at the least, the
threat or the event must not be exaggerated.  In the immediate
aftermath of a terrorist attack there is a tremendous demand for
news in general and for specific information about the identity and
condition of the victims.  Informing and supporting anxious
relatives of actual and potential victims requires a major effort,
which, in turn, requires advance planning.  Unlike airline disasters,
terrorist attacks on local transportation systems can bring a large
number of relatives and friends to the site of the incident itself,
creating a physical problem as well as increasing traffic on the
already busy communications systems.  Few transportation
agencies or associated police forces or local authorities are able to
adequately cope with the demands of public information and
victim support.  The Paris case study offers the best example, but
even here, minor problems were identified among the lessons
learned from the St. Michel bombing.
Inter-city Rail vs. Transit
In addition to reviewing the security practices of the four systems
included in the case studies, we were especially interested in
comparing the security practices and emergency response
procedures of the three urban transit systems (Paris, Atlanta, and
New York) with those of Amtrak.  As the chronology shows, apart
from ambushes in conflict zones, the most lethal episodes in transit
systems are the result of bombs carried on board by terrorists
posing as passengers.  Transit systems have high volumes of
passengers and many access points, creating numerous potential
targets and making surveillance of passengers more difficult.
Terrorists have detonated bombs on inter-city trains but advance
bookings would theoretically permit some security measures.
Passenger identity verification upon ticket purchase or boarding,
even passenger and luggage screening, are possible but not
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currently utilized by any rail system, and they would probably be
considered extreme and unwarranted measures without an
immediate and obvious threat.
As the accompanying chronology of terrorist attacks shows, long
distance rail systems face a greater threat from derailment caused
by sabotage of the rails themselves.  Transit systems have an
advantage here resulting from the high volume of traffic, which
gives saboteurs only brief intervals between trains in which to
sabotage the rails or plant explosives.  Although technology is in
place to alert drivers to breaks in the rails ahead of the train, this
technology can be circumvented as was seen in the derailment of
the Sunset Limited.  Unfortunately, these systems cannot detect the
presence of explosives which can be detonated as a train
approaches.  The physical protection of long lines is inherently
difficult and while increased visual surveillance is possible, it
would be very costly.
Different types of emergencies require different responses.  Urban
transit systems have the advantage of being located in areas where
company personnel, medics, and police can be rapidly mobilized.
By contrast, when an emergency occurs in a remote area, like the
derailing of the Amtrak Sunset Limited, it may take company
personnel hours to reach the scene and the primary response effort
depends on local authorities.  Different situations call for different
approaches to emergency response training.  Operators of transit
systems can design training for their own employees and for
dedicated police forces which can be brought to remote locations
as reinforcements.  Operators of inter-city rail systems will need to
train personnel in local jurisdictions along the right of way.
Future case studies no doubt will identify additional differences.
However, it should be noted that while it is easy to draw sharp
distinctions between an urban system like Atlanta’s MARTA and
an inter-city carrier like Amtrak, large metropolitan systems may
contain elements of both, thus requiring an appropriate mixture of
security and emergency response and planning approaches.  For
this reason, we do not believe that it would be useful to separate
the analysis of security measures for transit systems from those of
inter-city rail.
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THE PARIS SUBWAY SYSTEM
The Paris Subway Bombing at St. Michel
by Brian M. Jenkins
The terrorist bombing of the St. Michel train station of the RER Line B in
Paris on July 25, 1995 provides an excellent insight into the security and
emergency response procedures of the city’s transportation system.  This case
study, created by the Paris authorities to deal with such crises, examines the
advance preparations, the immediate response, and the lessons learned from
the episode.  It is based upon media accounts and after-action reporting by the
regional authority, the RATP, the suburban train system.
DESCRIPTION OF THE SYSTEM
The Paris metropolitan area or “commuter zone”, an area of 70 to 100 square
kilometers around the center of the city, contains 11 million inhabitants.
Public transportation services represent 30.5 percent of all traffic in Paris.
 Régie Autonome des Transports Parisiens (RATP)
The Régie Autonome des Transports Parisiens (RATP) was created in 1948 to
manage and operate the Réseau Express Régional (RER), the Metro, the bus
and the tramway system.  This system includes 96 percent of the public
transportation in Paris and carries 80 percent of the traffic.  The French
National Railroad, Société Nationale des Chemins de Fer Français (SNCF),
carries 16 percent of the traffic in the Paris area.
The RATP reports directly to the Syndicat des Transports Parisiens (STP), a
holding company.  The system is heavily subsidized by the state with only 40
percent of its costs covered by ticket sales.  It carries 2.1 billion passengers
annually.
The RATP has nearly 40,000 employees: 25,000 in rail transport services,
12,000 in bus transportation services, 11,000 in maintenance, and 200 in
commercial and administration services.
Réseau Express Régional (RER)
The RER is the commuter train network for suburban Paris and an express
subway within the city.  It operates 978 coaches and engines on four lines
through a total of 65 stations, some of which it shares with the Metro.  RER
trains make fewer stops than Metro trains and thus offer faster service.  Only a
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portion of this network is managed by the RATP.  The other part is managed
by the SNCF and most tickets are interchangeable between the two systems.
Service usually runs from 5:30 a.m. to 12:15 a.m.
Metro
The Metro operates 3500 coaches and electric engines on 201 kilometers of
track with 368 stations on 15 lines, identified by the final destination or by
numbers.  It was designed by Hector Guimard and engineered by Fulgence
Bienvenue for a July 19, 1900 opening.  The Metro runs daily from 5:30 a.m.
to 12:45 a.m.  Trains arrive every three to five minutes, rising to a frequency
of 95 seconds between trains during rush hours.
Assessment of the Threat
The efficient response after the bombing incident indicates extensive prior
planning, which is not surprising given the long history of terrorist activity in
France.  During the war in Algeria in the late 1950s and early 1960s, both
those fighting for Algeria’s independence and those determined to keep
Algeria French carried their terrorist campaigns to the French mainland.  From
the late 1960s on, terrorists representing various countries and groups in the
Middle East seized hostages, carried out assassinations, and set off bombs in
the French capital.  The notorious terrorist Carlos conducted a bombing
campaign in France in the early 1980s which included detonating a bomb
planted in a train coach that killed several people.  In the mid-1980s, “Action
Directe”, a small group of left-wing fanatics, carried out a number of
assassinations and bombings in Paris.  In 1986, Middle Eastern terrorists set
off 12 bombs in public locations around Paris in a campaign of terror aimed at
forcing the French government to release a number of terrorists held in prison.
In all, between 1970 and 1995, the date of the St. Michel bombing, terrorists
had attacked surface transportation systems in France no less than 22 times.
With the renewed civil war in Algeria, which began in 1991, came the threat
of new terrorist campaigns in France.  Backed by the French government, the
Algerian government security forces were fighting combatants representing
outlawed Islamic elements.  Only a short time before the bombing at St.
Michel, French authorities had rounded up more than a hundred suspects in an
effort to thwart the possibility of more terrorist attacks.  Thus, the perception
of the terrorist threat at the time of the attack was very high and intelligence
activities were intense.
In France, intelligence collection and threat analysis are conducted by the
country’s intelligence services with appropriate warnings passed on to the rail
operators.  Coordination between government authorities and state-owned
companies is ordinarily very close.
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Security Organization and Personnel
Normally, 700 members of the RATP security force patrol the RER and Metro
trains and stations; these are RATP employees.  Four hundred police provide
additional security.  Because of France’s history of terrorist activity, public
awareness and tolerance of security measures are high.
Security Plans
The RATP has prepared plans that address various aspects of terrorism
including bomb threats and reports of suspicious objects, as well as actual
bombings and other terrorist tactics.  In the tense weeks following the St.
Michel bombing, any threat or report brought about extremely rapid
intervention by police and military units to evacuate the station, conduct a
search, and restore normal operations.  It is virtually certain that the RATP
and French government authorities have planned for more exotic terrorist
threats especially in the wake of the chemical attack on Tokyo’s subways but
the details of these plans are not known.  Nor is it known whether existing
security plans call for increases to predefined levels of security.  The terrorist
bombing campaign which began with the attack at St. Michel led to a special
security effort called operation “Vigipirate.” As of this writing, “Vigipirate,”
described later, continues.
Reports provided by the RATP and discussion with the French authorities
indicate that there are also a variety of responses planned to deal with the
consequences of terrorist attacks including evacuation, medical response, and
crisis communications.
Security Technology
Existing security technology includes physical barriers to protect vital
systems, intrusion alarms, and expanding use of closed-circuit television
(CCTV) surveillance with an increasing capability to record images for later
investigation and forensic purposes.  Radio positioning systems are in place to
monitor RATP security measures, police vehicles, and personnel in Metro and
RER tunnels.
Closed-circuit TV has been used in the system for many years.  In 1991, the
RATP began to increase its ability to remotely monitor the system from its
safety and security headquarters.  As of 1996 there were 4,000 television
cameras in place monitoring escalators, enabling drivers to check passengers
boarding trains, and committed to other security applications.  The video
system employs very sophisticated software that combines the television
system with other types of data input and enables the operators to instantly
summon the image from any one of the thousands of cameras.  Installation of
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additional cameras is continuing at Metro and RER stations.  A new
“Headquarters 2000” will integrate the alarm system with the CCTV network
to better coordinate the activities of police and the RATP security staff.
Personnel on foot in the tunnels are also being equipped with locating devices
that use the existing radio infrastructure.  These devices are integrated with
the vehicle locating system to provide a graphic display of the position of all
security and safety elements connected with the system.  In addition, alarms
are available for passenger use to temporarily cut power in case of
emergencies.
Environmental Design and Construction Features
Drawing lessons from fires in the Paris Metro and other urban rail systems,
the RATP has pursued an active program aimed at reducing fire hazards.
Measures include the elimination of all highly combustible materials and
potential sources of toxic fumes from underground stations, the installation of
fire doors and blinds, fire detection devices, ventilation shafts, and additional
reversible fans to provide rapid smoke evacuation. Combustible materials and
sources of toxic fumes have also been replaced on the cars.  The fire hazard
reduction efforts apparently paid off.  In the St. Michel bombing, although the
explosion generated very high temperatures, there was no subsequent fire.
In response to the bombing campaign, which continued after the attack at the
St. Michel station, trash bins were sealed.  In February 1997, the RATP began
installing devices on all RER cars that prevent people from placing bags or
packages under the seats.  These devices eventually will be installed under
80,000 seats.  A number of subway entrances were also sealed.
Communications
The RATP has two radio networks.  The surface radio network covers the city
and suburbs of Paris.  A working channel is available for operation in open
network in both a collective mode and a local mode which is divided into five
zones. A separate channel allows non-urgent service communications. The
drivers of 100 vehicles and 650 safety staff all have radios.  The underground
radio network covers Metro stations and those in the central section of the
RER. That the radios do not work in tunnels is a recognized weakness.
In addition to the radio networks, there are dedicated phone lines in the
stations and at control posts, with direct lines to outside services such as the
Fire Brigade.  There are also phones for passenger use connected to an alarm
system that displays the location of the caller, and there is a public address
system.
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Training
Training is extensive.  Each employee has a designated role in an emergency
and exercises are regularly conducted by the Paris Fire Brigade (BSPP) in the
RER and Metro in which RATP personnel participate, especially the “Rolling
Stock Lifting Team.”  Coordination is facilitated by the fact that many
members of the RATP safety team are former firemen.  In addition, the RATP
conducts 10 to 12 exercises a year involving all management and staff.  Some
of these are conducted during normal service, others are conducted at night
when the system is shut down.  At least once a year there is a “major exercise”
which simulates an explosion, fire, or collision at a station or in a tunnel.
THE INCIDENT
At approximately 5:30 p.m., in the middle of the evening rush hour on July
25, 1995, a powerful terrorist bomb exploded at the front of the sixth car of an
RER train as it was nearing its normal stopping position in the St. Michel-
Notre Dame Station in Paris.  Seven persons died and more than 80 persons
were injured in the blast, 14 of them critically.  The explosion caused
extensive damage to one coach but only minor damage to the station.
Operating according to previously-rehearsed contingency plans, RER
employees, Paris firemen, and medical personnel removed the dead and
wounded while police cordoned off the area and conducted an on-scene
investigation.  The damaged car was sufficiently repaired to allow it to be
pulled to another area while other crews repaired minor damage and cleaned
the station.  Trains were back on their normal routes and schedules the next
morning.
Emergency Response
Upon notification of the explosion at St. Michel, three plans of action were
promptly initiated.  The first was the Emergency Control Plan applicable to
serious accidents in the Metro and RER.  This plan provides procedures for
the intervention of the Fire Brigade and RATP on the scene and at the RATP
headquarters.  It creates a combined Fire Brigade-RATP hierarchy with joint
teams at the operational level.  This provides firemen with RATP interlocutors
who are knowledgeable about the layout of the installation.  It also provides
the means by which information and requests can easily be transmitted
between the Fire Brigade and the RATP.  This plan interfaces with Plan
Rouge which is implemented when, whatever the cause, the number of victims
reaches ten.  Plan Rouge mobilizes the Fire Brigade and Civil Defense
Brigades.  Its counterpart is Plan Blanc, which mobilizes the emergency
medical services and local hospitals.
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The second plan initiated after the explosion was the Crisis Communications
Plan.  This plan provides RATP management with procedures for setting up a
crisis center and for activating a telephone information service, and for
determining company policy for public communications.
The third plan covers measures to be taken in the event of terrorist attacks.  It
is concerned primarily with security and therefore remains confidential.  All
of these plans are regularly reviewed and rehearsed.  (See the Training section
of this study.)
CLEAN-UP AND RESTORATION
Although the bomb caused only superficial damage to the station itself, the
explosion destroyed a portion of the overhead contact line and damaged the
signal systems.  Electrical arcs from the damaged power line, in turn,
disrupted the communication system.  Fortunately, the bomb caused no
subsequent fire to delay or complicate rescue operations and restoration of
service.  In addition to the removal of the dead and injured, which was
completed within three hours after the blast, the biggest problem was the
removal of the damaged coach.  The force of the explosion caused the sides
and roof of the car where the bomb exploded to bulge out making it too large
to pull through the tunnel.
The duty desk of the Electrical Systems and Equipment Department received
notice of the explosion within 20 minutes and promptly dispatched personnel
to survey electrical and signaling equipment and assess damage to the station.
(See the Appendix of this case study for a Chronology of the response.)  The
Rolling Stock Lifting Team responded rapidly, although in a subsequent
review, it was noted that the “working bus,” a mobile tool-shed and workshop,
arrived at the scene somewhat late.
Initial efforts focused on the rescue of the victims and the police investigation
of the crime.  Within five hours, work crews were able to begin replacing the
overhead contact line.  The Rolling Stock Lifting Team removed blown-out
doors and bent the bulged metal in sufficiently to permit the damaged car to
be towed through the tunnels.  Police finished their on-scene investigation
within six hours and permitted the damaged car to be towed to another
location where investigative activities could be continued without interrupting
train service.  The explosion had interrupted service on the one RER line but
by shifting trains to alternate tracks and advising passengers to use the Metro
lines, the RATP was able to keep moving passengers.
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Minor repairs and cleaning at the St. Michel Station were completed during
the night permitting the RER to restore normal service the next morning, all
things considered, a remarkable achievement!  However, in the weeks
following the explosion, passenger service was frequently disrupted by bomb
alerts and the discovery of suspicious objects.  At their peak, these
interruptions occurred at the rate of 50 a week.
Public Relations
In the St. Michel bombing, a local contact center was set up at a café near the
entrance to the station.  This provided a site that was easy for people to find,
near the scene of the disaster, yet far enough away from the station to prevent
its activities from interfering with rescue efforts.  The center, which became
operational within 15 minutes of the explosion, was manned by six regular
RER employees plus two persons from the RER’s legal department and two
government social workers.  The contact center offered information and
assistance to family members of victims.  People at the scene could also use
the center to call their homes to provide worried families with information.
Over 1,000 requests for information were handled on the spot; in addition, 500
people were later called back by the center as information on the victims
became available.  The contact center was closed at 11:00 p.m., five and a half
hours after the bombing, but the RER continued to provide information
updates from its headquarters.
In addition to this practical assistance, the RER’s Public Relations Department
also managed media inquiries and provided continuous information to RER
and Metro passengers and employees.
Augmented Security
Authorities correctly suspected that Algerian terrorists had carried out the
bombing.  The attack was part of an ongoing bloody civil war in which foes of
the Algerian government sought to punish France for its support of the
regime.  Since bombings in previous years had been part of terrorist
campaigns, most notably in 1986 when Middle Eastern terrorists carried out
12 bombings in Paris and the surrounding area, it was prudent to expect
further attacks.  Immediate measures including sealing all 8,000 trash
containers in the RER and Metro stations to deny terrorists easy hiding places
for bombs. Both overt and covert surveillance were increased and posters
were put up urging public cooperation.  Passengers were requested to
carefully mind their parcels, cooperate with searches, and alert authorities to
suspicious objects.  The RATP’s 700-person security contingent was
reinforced by an additional 3,000 agents.  They coordinated their activities
with police and later with the French military.  As a further measure, 50 Metro
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and RER entrances and exits were closed for security reasons.  Additional
security measures were implemented as terrorists set off more bombs, the next
one only 23 days after the St. Michel bombing.
Following a third bomb found on a rail line between Paris and Lyon on
August 26, 1996, police began a large scale round-up of suspects in southeast
France.  After a bomb exploded in front of a school near Lyon, the seventh
bomb in the terrorist campaign, the government initiated operation
“Vigipirate,” which mobilized 37,000 soldiers and police, stepped up security
on France’s frontiers and around likely targets of terrorism within the country.
In Paris, 5,000 soldiers and additional policemen were mobilized to patrol the
city’s regular train stations, Metro and RER trains and stations, bus terminals,
airports, commercial malls, government buildings, schools, power plants,
waterworks, telecommunications facilities, and other potential terrorist targets.
Identity checks were stepped up. All public gatherings were required to have
government authorization and approved security plans.  Public restrooms were
closed and thousands of public garbage cans were sealed or removed.
The extraordinary security measures appeared to have some effect from the
very beginning.  The first bomb had been detonated in a train coach.  The
second bomb went off on August 17 at the entrance to a Metro station.  After
the second bombing, no further bombs were detonated on trains or in stations,
although a third bomb was found on the track of the high-speed train (TGV)
that runs between Paris and Lyon, a less risky location for a bomber.  After
that, terrorists shifted their targets to outdoor markets, public restrooms, and a
school.  Operation Vigipirate appeared to have been successful and security
measures were relaxed somewhat until December 3, 1996 when, 15 months
after the previous bombing, another bomb exploded in the RER station at Port
Royal in Paris.  This resulted in a renewed security effort.  As of May 1997,
Vigipirate continued.
LESSONS LEARNED
While RATP management and employees and government agencies
responded rapidly and efficiently, which is a testimony to extensive prior
planning and training, inevitably some problems arose.  These were identified
in a candid after-action report.
• There were some delays in the initial communication within the RATP.
• Local control centers were not properly notified that a family contact unit
and toll-free telephone number had been established.
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• It was not clear during the crisis, who (government or RATP) starts what
actions with regard to informing the public.
• The RATP had a problem getting information from the scene of the
explosion in the underground station to others on the outside at street
level.
• Some RATP staff involved in emergency assistance were unable to reach
the scene due to strict police surveillance.  In the future, some RATP
managers will be deployed at the scene to serve as contacts with the
police.
• Evacuation broadcasts in French should also have been broadcast in
English.
• Radio communications were poor owing in part to damage caused by the
explosion.
• Disclosure of information to the families was incomplete because the dead
had not been identified, a problem in all disasters.
While organizational problems revealed during the incident cannot be ignored,
reaction to the bombing was fast and effective.  The RATP has a history of
dealing with terrorism so plans were in place and personnel were prepared.
Remarkably, just twelve hours after the explosion, regular train service was
restored and the terrorists’ goal, to create an atmosphere of uncertainty and
turmoil, was denied.  The experience of the St Michel bombing proves that
planning and training pay off.
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Chronology of the Response
The Paris Subway Bombing at St. Michel
July 25, 1730 A terrorist bomb explodes in an RER coach at
the St. Michel underground station killing 7
and injuring 80 people.
1730 The driver provides initial information
indicating casualties.
1732 The Safety Headquarters notifies the safety
engineer on duty.
1733 Members of the Network Safety Unit go to the
scene; the on-duty manager goes to the Safety
Headquarters to coordinate the response; teams
patrolling the network are also sent to the
scene; the Headquarters supervisor notifies
members of the crisis response team.
1737 The Paris Fire Brigade arrives at the scene;
Plan Rouge (fire and rescue) is implemented;
all Railway Police are alerted; Plan Blanc
(medical) is implemented.
1745 A crisis communications center is established
at a nearby café.
1745 The crisis communications center becomes
fully operational.
2030 Evacuation of the injured and removal of the
dead from the wreckage are completed.
2230 Employees begin work on replacing the
overhead power line. The on-scene
investigation is completed; work crews repair
the damaged coach to enable it to be towed
through the tunnels to a site where police can
conduct further investigations without
interrupting RER traffic.
July 26, 0530 Repair and clean-up crews have completed
work and normal train operations are restored.
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AMTRAK
The Derailment of Sunset Limited
by James Graebner
Amtrak’s Sunset Limited was derailed early on the morning of Monday,
October 9, 1995 at Hyder, a desolate spot in the Arizona desert. This event
provides an insight into the security and emergency response capabilities of
Amtrak. This case study demonstrates the vulnerability of rail systems to
sabotage. It examines the preparations involved in detecting and counteracting
such incidents, and in emergency response, and it examines the lessons
learned from the episode.
DESCRIPTION OF THE SYSTEM
Inter-city rail passenger transportation in the United States dates back over
150 years. Initially provided by the privately-owned railroads, these services
fell victim to the post World War II growth in private automobile travel and,
to a lesser extent, of commercial air transport. The result has been the decline
in passenger volumes and an emphasis  on freight transport services.
In 1970, Congress created the National Railroad Passenger Corporation
(Amtrak) as a quasi-public entity to provide continued national rail passenger
service.  Trains and routes with long histories, which might have disappeared,
continue to operate under federal management.
Initially, Amtrak’s equipment was a mixture of second-hand cars and
locomotives purchased from the railroads.  Although generally built to
common standards as regards strength, clearances, and other regulatory norms
established by the Association of American Railroads and the Interstate
Commerce Commission, there were many variations dictated by the operating
conditions of the individual carriers.  By the time of the Sunset incident,
Amtrak had replaced most of its old equipment and had developed and applied
common standards to its fleet.
In 1995, Amtrak operated approximately 220 inter-city trains over some
24,000 miles of track in 45 states.  However, with the exception of certain
corridors (notably between New York and Washington, and between Los
Angeles and San Diego), traffic density was generally limited to one train per
day in each direction. The passenger trains share tracks with freight trains
operated by the railroads which owned and maintained the tracks in most
cases. In particular, the tracks over which the Sunset runs belong to the
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Southern Pacific Railroad which has since merged with the Union Pacific
Railroad.
Security Organization and Personnel
When Congress created Amtrak, it recognized the need for a dedicated police
force to protect the passengers, employees, and physical assets of the system
within its operational environment.  Statutory authority for the Amtrak Police
Department is provided under Section 104.305.45 of the United States Code
545J.  Under this authority, Amtrak spends in excess of  $24,500,000 per year
to assure the security of its passengers.  Approximately 18 million dollars of
this money are allocated to Amtrak’s uniformed police division, and some two
million dollars to criminal investigations.  The corporate budget also supports
the Office of Amtrak’s Inspector General.
Amtrak’s 346 police officers are assigned to 28 reporting locations throughout
the United States.  The vast majority, over 82%, are assigned to the intensely
populated and high service frequency line from Boston, Massachusetts to
Washington, D.C.  This territory encompasses some 621 miles of railroad
which Amtrak both owns and operates.  It also accounts for a large proportion
of the total ridership and, concomitantly, a large proportion of the total trains
operated.
Outside of the Northeast Corridor on the remaining 23,000 miles of track
comprising its routes, Amtrak maintains contractual agreements with freight
railroads to maintain tracks and to allow for passenger service.  Amtrak also
contracts with freight railroads for security through these operating
agreements. For example, the tracks on which the Sunset derailment occurred
are covered by an operating agreement with the Southern Pacific Railroad
(now merged with the Union Pacific Railroad).  A total of eight railroad-
employed police officers assigned throughout the State of Arizona provide
coverage as required.  It is important to place this level of coverage in
perspective.  There are approximately 2,000 railroad special agents and police
officers throughout the United States.  Including the 24,000 miles of track
over which Amtrak service is provided, the railroad network totals about
111,000 miles.  Statistically this means that there is about one person for each
55 miles of track.  This average is quite misleading, however, since coverage
is naturally more concentrated in locations where vandalism, the most
common crime affecting railroads, occurs most frequently.  In the sparsely
populated areas of the southwest, such as the area of the Sunset derailment,
coverage is necessarily thinner.
Nationwide, the Association of American Railroads statistics for 1994
reported a total of 12,280 incidents of vandalism.  This figure covers only
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about 61% of the railroad network, since many of the nation’s smaller
railroads do not capture or centrally report crime information.  Signal
vandalism accounted for roughly 3,000 of these offenses, while 154 were
reported in the category “vandalism resulting in derailment.”  It is important
to note that, for 1994, none of the vandalism derailments involved passenger
trains.
What these figures make clear is that there is a tremendous dependence on
federal, state, county, municipal, and other law enforcement agencies to
protect the country’s rail infrastructure.
Security Plans
Materials provided by Amtrak and discussion with the authorities indicate that
there are also a variety of response plans to deal with the consequences of
crises that may be caused by terrorist attacks.  For reasons of ongoing security
further details cannot be published.
Security Technology
Clearly, assuming the perpetrators were aware of the potential legal sanctions
at law, these were not a sufficient deterrent to their activities.  Therefore, it is
necessary to examine whether the railroad infrastructure and/or the train itself
could have been subjected to more intensive and extensive preventative
measures.
Whereas technological developments such as Global Positioning Systems
(GPS), impact-crumple zones on railcars, and target hardening techniques can
enhance the system’s security and safety, little if anything can be done to
safeguard the system’s rail tracks from sabotage.  Remote and desolate
countryside areas where trains pass over tracks infrequently remain the
system’s “Achilles heel.”
Communications
Amtrak’s trains are served by a radio network with links between all its trains
and their nearest dispatch centers. All drivers have radios and cellular phones
serve as backup communications.
Training
Amtrak police hold regular simulations of “mock-up” emergency incidents
that also involve the participation of emergency response services.  In addition
to these full-scale exercises, numerous table-top exercises are conducted every
year.
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THE INCIDENT
The ill-fated Sunset’s journey originated in New Orleans. Normally it would
have started in Florida, but a severe hurricane threat had caused annulment of
the operations east of the Crescent City, Florida.  Sunset therefore had
proceeded without incident to San Antonio, where three cars from a
connecting Chicago train were added.  The train left San Antonio at
approximately 11:30 p.m. on Saturday, October 7.  It was about an hour late
leaving El Paso and about two hours late arriving in Phoenix on Sunday night.
On leaving Phoenix, the train consisted of two locomotives and 12 cars.  It
carried 248 passengers and a crew of 20 Amtrak employees.
It was a clear moonlit night as the Sunset traveled along the single-track
Southern Pacific rails at about 50 mph through the desert of western Arizona.
About 59 miles southwest of Phoenix, on the Gila Subdivision of the Phoenix
line, the train derailed.  Sixty-five passengers were injured in the derailment.   
One Amtrak employee, Mitchell Bates, age 58, asleep in a top bunk, was
thrown to the floor and killed when his car plunged into the river.
The cause of the derailment was almost immediately identified as sabotage by
a hitherto unknown terrorist group, the “Sons of Gestapo.”  Two notes were
found at the scene, containing references to “Ruby Ridge” and “Waco,” both
incidents involving gun battles between armed groups and the US
government.  There had been no advance warning of the  derailment.
The saboteurs committed the crime by removing 29 spikes from the rails.
Nuts and bolts were removed from the rail joints which held the sections of
rail together, and the joint bars that link the rails together were removed.  A
wire was spliced to the bond wire of the signal system so that the block signal
observed by the engineer would display a “green” light, authorizing the train
to proceed at maximum allowable speed.  After the wire had been spliced, the
loosened 39 foot section of rail was moved inward, causing the track to be out
of gauge.  The rail was then re-spiked so that it would not be forced back in
gauge by the weight of the train as it passed over it.
The location of the sabotage, atop a 30 foot high trestle and some 18 miles
from a paved road, appeared to have been chosen to cause maximum damage,
thwart discovery, and hamper any rescue efforts. In the derailment, however,
while both locomotives and eight of the twelve cars derailed, the basic
structure of both cars and locomotives remained intact.  The cars did not
telescope and in general the passenger space was not encroached upon.
Similarly, both engines remained upright and were not severely damaged.
There was no fire or release of noxious gases.  Passengers were able to release
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the emergency window hatches from inside the cars, and initial self-rescue
activities were underway within minutes of the derailment
The regulatory design standards and safety devices required for the track, the
signal system, and the rolling stock were all in place and working properly.
These devices would have prevented an accidental derailment due to a broken
rail or rail joint. However, because of the deliberate work of the saboteurs in
by-passing the signal fail-safe system to give a false indication, the derailment
occurred. This resulted in damage to Amtrak equipment of $2,979,000, or
about the cost of one new railroad passenger car.
Emergency response
Immediately following the incident, police and rescue workers were
dispatched to the scene.  The Maricopa County Sheriff’s Department was the
first law enforcement agency to arrive.  In all, over 50 deputies and volunteers
assisted, in addition to many of the uninjured passengers and crew members.
Thirty-five ambulances responded from Maricopa County and numerous
surrounding communities.  Helicopters from Maricopa County, the Arizona
Department of Public Safety, the National Guard and Air Force’s Air Evac
transported the injured.  Firefighters brought in vehicles with ladders, which
were essential in getting people off the tops of cars.  A medical command post
was established about six miles away from the site.  In all, about 70
passengers and the crew were evacuated from the site by helicopter.
The question must be asked: “Once the incident had occurred, was the
response as prompt and sufficient as could have been reasonably expected?”
According to one passenger aboard the train, the first rescue helicopter arrived
at the scene 45 minutes after the derailment, and within 15 minutes thereafter
rescue personnel “really started to converge.”  Considering the remoteness of
the site, such rapid response is noteworthy.  Two more medical helicopters,
the Maricopa County sheriff’s deputy, other police and volunteer fireman all
responded rapidly.  Passengers and crew assisted at the scene. The evacuation
of the injured was completed in approximately four hours.  The Red Cross
mobilized a center in Phoenix, to which the remaining passengers were
transported.  In short, the response was rapid, thorough and organized.
Perhaps the best summation was provided by the previously quoted passenger,
who wrote:
My lasting memories of the Sunset Limited tragedy will
always focus on the way passengers, Amtrak
employees, and rescue personnel reacted after the crash.
You should have seen the way everyone pulled together
during the first hour, and the dedication and
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professionalism of our rescuers.  I was proud to have
been associated with such decent and caring people.
While the rescue of passengers and crew was clearly the highest priority, law
enforcement also responded promptly.  Within hours the site was sealed and a
nine-mile perimeter established.  FBI evidence teams were combing the area
within eight hours.  Aerial photographs were taken before the four undamaged
cars were moved.  Federal Railroad Administration inspectors and the
National Transportation Safety Board investigation team arrived at the scene
promptly.  In all, the response to the derailment appears to have been
adequate, prompt, and efficiently executed.
Assessment of the Incident
Prior to the derailment, Amtrak received no specific threats against the
railroad or Sunset Limited nor was any form of warning given.  In this section,
analysis of the Sunset derailment is considered from three aspects.  First,
could the incident reasonably have been prevented?  Secondly, was the
response to the incident sufficient and adequate under the circumstances?
Thirdly, if the incident was an act of terrorism, could the incident encourage
similar acts?
All evidence points to the conclusion that the derailment was a calculated and
deliberate act.  It was designed to cause an accident resulting in the maximum
amount of property destruction, injury, and loss of life.  The perpetrators
selected a spot that was remote from observation and detection.  The location
was on a railroad line with relatively light traffic, which provided ample time
to accomplish the work needed to damage the track and bypass the signal
system.  The last train to pass the site prior to the Sunset had gone by 18 hours
before the derailment. The Amtrak train was scheduled through the area at
nighttime.  The site was on a 30 foot high trestle, on a curve leading to the
bridge, which obscured the damaged track until the last minute.  Possibly, the
perpetrators had a radio scanner and knew the railroad frequencies, which
would have provided warning of any non-scheduled trains, inspection cars, or
“extra” movements.  The knowledge that the Sunset was running late could
have been obtained easily, although that fact would not have had any
significant impact.  Knowledge of the railroad signal systems needed to
sabotage that system could have been obtained from easily available sources.
Tests conducted after the incident showed all safety systems to be in proper
order. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that any accidental damage to the track
(such as a dislodged boulder falling or a washout of the trestle) would have
been detected.  What is important to realize is that current technology is
designed to prevent accidental harm and not as security against intentional
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acts.  This delineation between safety and security is an important one.  Safety
involves the prevention of accidental harm to persons or property caused by
unforeseen or foreseeable hazardous conditions, or inherently dangerous
activities.  Security involves the prevention of intentional acts of harm
involving criminal or illegal conduct.  In the Sunset case, safety systems
would have prevented the derailment had the contributing factors to the
derailment arisen from accidental causes.  However, the deliberate action of
wiring a shunt to bypass the signal system negated the “fail-safe” design of
that system.  Given the current technology and the deliberate determination to
commit a criminal act, the Sunset derailment could probably not have been
prevented.
Although the specific objectives of the group claiming credit for the Sunset
derailment, the “sons of Gestapo”, remain unclear; references to “Waco” and
“Ruby Ridge” indicate a goal of revenge and intimidation.  The bombings of
the Murrah Building in Oklahoma City and the World Trade Center in New
York indicate that the aim of many random acts of terrorism is to attract the
maximum amount of publicity.  This is achieved by causing the maximum
destruction of property and the indiscriminate injury and death of innocent
people.  The revulsion and horror of such attacks, and the widespread media
coverage of them, becomes in itself the immediate goal.
In this respect, and viewed strictly through the criminal and anti-social mind
of a terrorist, the derailment of the Sunset cannot be regarded as a significantly
successful terrorist act.  One innocent person was killed, and 65 more were
injured.  While this is a terrible crime, it is probably less death and injury than
that which occurs daily in highway accidents in the State of Arizona.  Property
damage to Amtrak was roughly $3,000,000 and damage to the Southern
Pacific Railroad probably less than one-third of that amount.  Media coverage,
while intense immediately after the event, fell off fairly rapidly.  Nearly two
years after the event, people interviewed at random in several cities around the
country remember the event only vaguely, if at all, in  striking contrast to the
other two terrorist acts cited above.
In this regard an observation should be made regarding the physical
construction of rolling stock.  Both the cars and the locomotives are designed
to incorporate safety features to prevent injury in the event of an accident.
Railcar strength standards are calculated to prevent the collapse of car
structures. In this instance the structures performed well.  The emergency
windows were effectively used as intended.  Electrical and plumbing systems
are specifically designed to withstand derailments and collisions. These
systems also functioned as designed.  Locomotive cabs did not cave in on the
crew.  There was no fire from spilled fuel.  In short, the safety features
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designed into the rolling stock probably played a key role in minimizing death
and injury to passengers and crew, just as they would have done were the
incident accidental.
A brief examination of the current state of signal technology in use on
American railroads is illustrative.
The Sunset derailment occurred on a single-track main line equipped with an
Automatic Block Signal (ABS) system which was arranged for train
movements in both directions. Train movement was governed by a dispatcher
through Direct Traffic Control, supplemented by the signal indications of the
ABS system.  These signals are located alongside the track and are visible to
the engineer.  In some locations signal indications are provided in the cab of
the locomotive but not the Southern Pacific line where the incident occurred.
Signals are electronically activated by track circuits.  The track itself functions
as a low voltage electric circuit using the rails as its conductor.  Whenever this
current is interrupted or compromised, the system displays a red signal to train
engineers.  Similarly, if the circuit detects the presence of a train, because the
steel wheel and axles of locomotives and cars will form a shunt to the circuit,
a red signal will be displayed to trains.
An ironclad rule of railroading for more than a century has been that a red
signal requires a stop.  Just prior to the Sunset derailment, the engineer of that
train testified that all signals had displayed green.  Accordingly, on October
12, 1995, shunt tests were conducted for the signals at the site.  These tests
showed that signals had been functioning correctly.  However, as previously
described, the perpetrators had deliberately spliced a shunt wire around the
dislocated rail section, thus bridging and preserving the track circuit and
allowing signals to display a green signal even though the track had been
sabotaged.
Signal technology and all other safety-related aspects of railroad operation are
governed by Federal regulations as well as railroad operating rules.  These
rules cover such elements as speed limits, movements of trains, rights of
trains, and the inspection of equipment.  In developing, promulgating, revising
and enforcing these rules and regulations, federal agencies and the railroads
constantly examine, analyze, and test their application against actual field
conditions.  In fact, railroad operations and physical plant are among the most
heavily and consistently regulated and inspected activities in the United States
and signal systems are subject to periodic inspection and function verification.
Among other requirements, all railroads are required to perform periodic
physical track inspections.  All tracks must be inspected a minimum of twice
within a given seven day period, with at least one day between inspections.
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The Southern Pacific Railroad had conducted track inspections in full
accordance with regulations.  These inspections utilized track geometry
measuring cars which measure and record track tolerance exceptions in
alignment, profile, gauge, cross level, and warp.  As yet another element of
track condition monitoring, railroads depend on “trip reports” completed and
submitted by locomotive engineers to note and identify potentially hazardous
conditions.  In addition to the regulations which cover track and signal
systems of American railroads, the locomotives and cars which make up the
trains are subject to industry and governmental design standards in order to
assure safety.
CLEAN-UP AND RESTORATION
The derailment site was judged to be a crime scene during the very early
stages of the rescue efforts.  The site was sealed, with Southern Pacific
Railway Police establishing a security ring in the immediate area, and the
Maricopa County Sheriff’s Department establishing a nine-mile perimeter.
Everyone within the perimeter was interviewed by the FBI or local authorities.
By 9:30 a.m., FBI evidence collection teams began searching the area and
collecting evidence.  This activity lasted throughout the following day.
Comprehensive aerial photos were taken.  Two Southern Pacific locomotives
were dispatched from Phoenix to move the four cars that had remained on the
track back to Phoenix, along with the remaining passengers. Arriving in
Phoenix about 1:30 p.m., the passengers were taken by bus under police escort
to a Holiday Inn near the airport, where the Red Cross had set up a center.
FBI agents were on hand to interview passengers and collect detailed
questionnaires.  Passengers were released later in the day.
Public Relations
Media officers were dispatched to the scene as quickly as possible.  Amtrak
maintains a policy whereby all media statements are coordinated through its
Public Affairs offices in Washington D.C.  Amtrak personnel are trained and
aware of this policy and of the necessity for coordinating all statements
relating to major events.
Investigation
A total of 16 railroad police officers, consisting of eight members from the
Southern Pacific and eight detectives from the Amtrak Police Department,
responded.  The FBI was designated the lead agency to conduct the
investigation and over 150 of their agents were involved in the effort.
32 Amtrak - James Graebner
Norman Y. Mineta International Institute for Surface Transportation Policy Studies
The Federal Railroad Administration sent inspectors to the area, and the
National Transportation Safety Board sent in a team, as per Federal
guidelines, to examine the site for cause and to ascertain that the railroad was
operating within prescribed Federal regulations.
Both the Amtrak Police Department and the FBI established 1-800 telephone
numbers for anyone wanting to call with information regarding the
derailment.  A reward fund of $100,000 was established for any information
leading to the arrest and conviction of the perpetrators.
LESSONS LEARNED
Under the circumstances and given the desolate location of the incident site,
Amtrak management, employees and government agencies responded rapidly
and efficiently, a testimony to extensive prior planning and training.
The most important lesson that this incident provided was the necessity for
Amtrak to maintain regular and closer contact with law enforcement and
rescue services.  Towards that objective, Amtrak police are placing greater
emphasis on maintaining closer links with the National Association of Sheriffs
and the National Association of Police Chiefs.
While offering little solution to the problem, the incident highlights the
vulnerability of railroad systems in remote and rural areas.  The incident also
demonstrates the need to increase the frequency of track patrols. Sensible
precautions and efficient response can minimize the effects of an attack but an
extended system like Amtrak is never absolutely safe from a determined
terrorist.  As of this date, no arrests have been made in the Sunset Limited
incident.
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THE NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY
Contingency Planning for Emergency Response
By Thomas J. Savage
Recent events around the world have underlined the growing threat posed by
terrorists and other violent criminals to public transportation systems.  To
terrorists who appear increasingly willing to carry out large-scale
indiscriminate attacks, public transportation offers concentrations of people,
enclosed environments that enhance the effects of bombs or chemical
weapons, little security, ease of escape, and the guarantee of widespread
publicity and public alarm. Extortionists driven by personal greed and
mentally disturbed individuals add to the threat.  We have witnessed an
increase in such attacks: a crazed gunman aboard an MTA Long Island Rail
Road commuter train; a bombing in the Paris Metro; an explosive device in
New York’s subway; suicide attacks on buses in Tel-Aviv; the deliberate
derailment of a train in Arizona; and, a most alarming precedent, the chemical
weapons attacks on Tokyo’s subways.  Assuming that these attacks will
continue and that a catastrophic incident is possible, The New York City
Transit Authority (NYC Transit) has developed a complex array of
contingency plans to protect the world’s largest urban transportation system.
DESCRIPTION OF THE SYSTEM
MTA New York City Transit Overview
MTA New York City Transit operates one of the world’s largest and most
complex metropolitan transportation systems,  providing 24-hour-a-day bus
and subway service throughout New York’s five boroughs: Manhattan,
Queens, Staten Island, Brooklyn and the Bronx. The agency carries 1.5 billion
passengers annually with the largest bus fleet in North America and the largest
subway fleet in the world.  Every weekday more than five million bus and
subway journeys are undertaken by commuters.  Nationwide, approximately
four out of every ten mass transit journeys occur in New York City. NYC
Transit’s primary goal is to operate and maintain the system in a state of good
repair.  Towards this end, the state and federal governments have expended
billions of dollars in one of the largest public work efforts ever undertaken.
The mission of NYC Transit is to achieve excellence in providing a safe,
orderly, customer-oriented, and cost-effective, public transportation system.
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The NYC Transit system is comprised of two primary operating departments:
the Department of Subways and the Department of Buses.
About Subway Service
The Department of Subways is comprised of approximately 24,600 employees
distributed between two primary divisions: Service Delivery and Maintenance
of Way.
The Division of Service Delivery includes:
Car Equipment, responsible for the maintenance and cleaning of NYC
Transit’s more than 5,800 revenue subway cars and 450 non-revenue work
cars;
Rapid Transit Operations, which operates more than 570 trains per day,
carrying about 3.5 million customers each weekday; and,
Station Maintenance and Operations, responsible for token and MetroCard
sales, cleaning, maintenance, and the quality of life in the system’s 468
stations.
The Division of Maintenance of Way includes:
Track, which maintains almost 850 miles of mainline and yard track;
Infrastructure, which maintains the subway’s tunnels, elevated structures,
buildings and other facilities; and,
Electrical, which operates and maintains Transit’s power substation and third
rail power distribution system, and signal and communications networks.
About Bus Service
The Department of Buses operates 207 local and 30 express-bus routes out of
19 depots with a staff of 12,000 employees.  The bus system’s 3,554 buses
carry about 1.4 million customers daily and 451 million annually.  Each rush
hour about 3,100 buses are in operation, picking up customers at more than
14,000 bus stops.
INCIDENT RESPONSE
Assessment of the Threat
The international profile of New York City, together with the very magnitude
of the NYC Transit system and its inherent vulnerability, makes it an ideal
choice for a terrorist.  Political motivations lay behind one series of terrorist
acts that were planned but never accomplished. On June 24, 1993, a team of
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FBI agents and NYC Police raided a garage in Queens and arrested five
persons who were in the act of mixing chemicals for a bomb.  An additional
ten arrests were carried out during the course of the next few months in
connection with a plot to bomb the United Nations headquarters, the main
federal office building in New York City, and the Lincoln and Holland
tunnels.  All of these incidents were connected with Islamic extremists.
In addition to the terrorist threat, the actions of deranged individuals also
present a risk.  In December 1993, Colin Ferguson began firing randomly at
passengers travelling from New York on a crowded Long Island Rail Road
train during rush hour.  Ferguson, who was finally overpowered by passengers
while reloading, killed six passengers and wounded 17 others.  In December
of 1994, Edward Leary detonated two gasoline bombs on subway trains. The
first was on December 15, at 145th Street and Lennox Avenue in upper
Manhattan, injuring three people.  In the second incident, on December 21 at
Fulton Street and Broadway, the device exploded prematurely and 48 people,
including Leary, were injured.  He was then apprehended.
In November 1995, three criminals attempted to rob a subway token booth at
Kingston and Throop Avenues in Brooklyn.  In an attempt to intimidate the
token booth clerk, they sprayed a flammable liquid through the change
aperture of the Halon system-equipped booth. The clerk was badly burned and
died from his injuries several days later.  Media coverage of this incident
resulted in a number of copycat attacks and threats.
In general, threats to the New York City Transit system can be categorized as
follows:
• terrorism by either conventional weapons and weapons of mass
destruction
• accidental disasters such as derailments
• natural disasters like hurricanes, floods, and winter storms causing power
outages
Security Organization and Personnel
The size of New York City precludes the transit authorities from developing
anti-terrorist policies and procedures in a vacuum.  NYC Transit works
closely with the city’s emergency services such as the New York Fire
Department (NYFD), the New York City Police (NYPD), the International
Red Cross, and the Salvation Army’s Emergency Services.  Managing the
overall coordination of the city’s emergency services is the Mayor’s Office of
Emergency Management (OEM).  The common goal of these services is to be
prepared for, and able to coordinate, rapid and effective responses to a wide
range of emergency situations.
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The Mayor’s Office of Emergency Management (OEM)
Mayor Rudolph W. Giuliani, by Executive Order, established the Office of
Emergency Management (OEM) with responsibility for interagency and
intergovernmental coordination of NYC’s responses to emergencies.  This job
includes the development of all emergency plans, training, preparation, and
response to all emergencies.  The OEM is directly responsible for the
coordination of all emergency services but does not govern their operational
activities. The OEM was born out of the need for clear lines of command and
control when responsibility and accountability can become blurred as a result
of the dynamics of a complicated and urgent situation.  For example, if an
explosion occurs on a railway track and the NYFD is the first emergency
service to respond, it will take the operational lead. However, should a
suspicious object be found to have caused the blast, the NYPD will assume
control of the situation until it is satisfied that no crime has been committed or
until their investigations have been completed. Once the NYPD has declared
the area safe, the control may switch back to the NYFD or the NYC Transit as
circumstances dictate.
Security Plans
NYC Transit actively participates in the planning, training, and response to
any emergency.  To aid in combating  terrorism, a task force was created to
develop a Chemical/Biological Incident Contingency Plan.
Chemical/Biological Incident Contingency Plan
In 1996, the OEM established a committee to develop a Chemical/Biological
Incident Contingency Plan.  The Sarin gas attack in the Tokyo subway system
and a no-notice test of New York’s response to terrorist use of nerve gas in the
subway system prompted officials to accelerate the contingency planning
process.  A review of the no-notice test identified four key areas of concern:
communications, training, logistics, and, planning.  In addition, five areas of
special attention were identified:
• coordination with the FBI
• being prepared for mass casualties
• treating incident as a crime scene
• need for speedy response actions to save lives
• need for specialized training, equipment, and supplies
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The committee established four focus groups, all with mass transit
representation, to prepare contingency plans.  The four groups are:
• law enforcement
• hazardous materials
• communications
• medical
The Law Enforcement Focus Group includes representatives from Federal,
state, city, the Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA), the parent
company of MTA NYC Transit,MTA Long Island Rail Road, MTA Metro-
North Railroad, MTA Bridges and Tunnels, and neighboring state
transportation authorities.  They are divided between criminal justice agencies
and mass transit agencies, as shown below.
Criminal Justice Agencies Mass Transit Agencies
New York Police Department (NYPD) MTA NYC Transit
FBI MTA Long Island Rail Road
US Secret Service MTA Metro North Rail Road
US Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) MTA Bridges and Tunnels
US Coast Guard NY/NJ Port Authority
New Jersey Transit
Amtrak
Con Rail
The Law Enforcement Focus Group developed plans and policies for
interagency protocols to identify the “incident commander” and for:
• site security
• traffic control
• crime scene preservation and integrity
• identifying additional active devices
• first responder awareness
The last item, first responder awareness, is a critical training issue due to the
possible lack of previous experience.
The Hazard Materials Focus Group includes representatives from the
Federal, State, MTA, and neighboring state transportation authorities, and
includes first responder agencies and mass transit agencies.
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First Responder Agencies Mass Transit Agencies
NYPD MTA NYC Transit
New York Fire Department (FDNY),
includes Emergency Medical Services
MTA Long Island Rail Road
New York Department of Environmental
Protection (NYDEP)
MTA Metro North Rail Road
US ATF MTA Bridges and Tunnels
US Coast Guard NY/NJ Port Authority
US FEMA New Jersey Transit
Amtrak
Con Rail
The Hazard Materials Focus Group made recommendations on to the
following issues:
• hazard identification process
• the establishment of hazardous material incident management procedures
and protocols
• the use of detection equipment and training
• and, first responder awareness protocols
The Communications Focus Group includes these representatives:
First Responder Agencies Mass Transit Agencies
NYPD MTA NYC Transit
FDNY – EMS MTA Long Island Rail Road
NY OEM MTA Metro North Rail Road
NY Department of Information Tech-
nology and Telecommunications (DoITT)
MTA Bridges and Tunnels
NY/NJ Port Authority
New Jersey Transit
Amtrak
Con Rail
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The Communications Focus Group concentrates on implementing the best
practices regarding:
• initial emergency incident notification
• on scene interagency communications and joint interagency entry team
communications systems
• command and control communications; and
• media and public information issues
The Medical Focus Group includes representatives from:
First Responder Agencies Mass Transit Agencies
NYPD MTA NYC Transit
FDNY – EMS MTA Long Island Rail Road
NY OEM MTA Metro North Rail Road
NY DEP MTA Bridges and Tunnels
NY Department of Health NY/NJ Port Authority
NY Health and Hospitals Corporation New Jersey Transit
NY Office of Chief Medical Examiner
Greater NY Hospitals Association
American Red Cross
The Medical Focus Group has identified a triage and treatment strategy that
includes the utilization of casuality collection points to minimize risks of cross
contamination of hospitals and medical facilities. Consideration has been
given to critical issues such as symptom recognition and antidote selection,
the availability and delivery of medical materiel, and first responder
awareness and training.
Security Technology
The New York City Transit has recently developed a Computer Assisted
Design (CAD) Fire and Safety System. The system is a computerized database
capable of depicting the rail track network with corresponding street grid,
emergency exits, access points, and ventilation fans in selected sectors of the
rail track system.  The operations control center monitors the movement of all
trains and maintains constant communication with train operators and line
dispatch officers.  An emergency mobile command center equipped with a
duplicate CAD system as well as other communications facilities is dispatched
to the scene of all major emergencies.
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Environmental Design and Construction Features
The NYC Transit suffers from a disadvantage due to the sheer size of the
system because its 468 stations were constructed over a span of 120 years.
Security was not previously a major consideration in design and construction
and the cost of system-wide remedial construction would be enormous.
Communications
Radio communications are in some instances limited. Each train operator and
train supervisor is in radio contact with the command center by radio but the
radios are not always powerful enough to penetrate the physical structures.
To supplement the radio network, land-lines have been established at regular
intervals along the tracks.  To improve police and other emergency
communications in the subway, NYC Transit is completing the design of a
130 million dollar radio system.
Training
In anticipation of major emergencies, NYC Transit conducts regular
emergency response and rescue exercises. These vary from desktop
simulations to organized, planned drills to “no-notice” simulations. The
primary objective of these exercises is to identify deficiencies in the
emergency plans and coordination and communication problems.
Contingency Planning and Emergency Response
The evaluation process of terrorist contingency plans is an ongoing activity.
In conjunction with the Mayor’s Office of Emergency Management, NYC
Transit constantly evaluates its emergency management principles, plans, and
procedures.
NYC Transit is active in the development and implementation of its
emergency contingency plans and procedures.  For example, following the
Sarin gas attack in Japan, the NYPD and the NYC government formed a task
force to review security issues on New York City mass transit systems. The
objective of this task force was to develop their response capabilities and to
reduce the vulnerability of the system. The committee made five pertinent
recommendations, the details of which are confidential, but information and
guidance about gas attacks have been distributed to relevant employees and
ventilation procedures for cars and stations were reviewed. These initiatives
have been supplemented by contingency planning and regular inter-agency
simulations and training exercises that focus on responding to chemical or
biological incidents.
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On November 8, 9, and 10, 1997, NYC OEM coordinated the largest series of
terrorism response drills ever conducted by the city.  Officials emphasized to
the public that the exercise was not prompted by the possibility of an attack
but toward reducing the potential danger of a terrorist chemical incident.  The
drills included testing the reactions of emergency responders in 41 city
hospitals; 600 city, state, and federal law enforcement officers and emergency
workers, limiting damage from a hypothetical chemical attack in a two-block
area, and a tabletop exercise reviewing infrastructure issues.
CLEAN-UP AND RESTORATION ISSUES
A full range of emergency procedures designed for all foreseeable emergency
situations has been developed and distributed and is regularly updated. NYC
Transit detaches a track maintenance crew to respond to emergencies.
Research conducted among a number of transportation authorities reveals that
after the immediate safety and security of public, transportation, and
emergency personnel, the primary concern of any transportation authority is
the speedy restoration of operations.  This makes sound business sense and is
vitally important for any public utility because a quick return to normality has
the important psychological advantage of restoring public confidence. This
action sends a signal to the public that despite the efforts of terrorists, the
public infrastructure and general population remain resilient and capable of
withstanding such assaults.  It is an enormous morale booster.
Public Affairs
For all public transit authorities the perception of competence is crucial.
Statements concerning the reaction, response, and attitudes to the problem
should reflect the appropriate degree of concern, support, reassurance, and
empathy for the victims.  It is imperative that these concerns are expressed
quickly and through a single authority or official spokesperson.
During major emergencies, the OEM is responsible for providing coordinated
information to the public.  Information about service continuation and the
restoration of operations is provided by the NYC Transit’s public affairs
office and the necessary service announcements are broadcast through the
media, on the system’s public address system at station platforms, and in
subway cars.
Augmented Security and Essential Initiatives
In major emergencies, the NYC Transit is able to call upon the law
enforcement resources of the New York City Police.  With the recent
appointment of the OEM as the overall coordinating body during
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emergencies, the OEM is able to muster the additional services under the
jurisdiction of the mayor.
There are characteristics common to all major transportation disasters,
including terrorist attacks.  Disasters can result in numerous injuries and
disruption of transportation and they call for a large-scale response.  This
similarity of characteristics implies that there are several essentials common to
all emergency responses.
Accurate and Timely Intelligence
One of the first steps in preventing terrorism is having knowledge about
potential terrorist activity.  It is equally important to be able to assess the
scope and the validity of any threats received.  An ongoing dialogue with a
variety of agencies and sources in order to be fully apprised of all situations is
important.  At the national level, the sources include the FBI, the ATF, and the
State Department. Local examples include the Intelligence Division of the
NYPD.  At the scene of a genuine emergency much valuable information
should be obtained from the first responders to determine the type and level of
response required .
Rapid Deployment
Getting emergency responders to the scene quickly can be the most effective
way to minimize the amount of death, injury, and destruction caused by both
terrorist acts and natural or accidental disasters.  Proper usage of the incident
command system in the deployment of personnel is invaluable in
accomplishing rapid response.
Effective Tactics and Training
All first responders need to know both their own and each other’s emergency
response functions.  This is achieved through the cross-training of personnel.
As an example, the NYC Transit and the New York City police share basic
knowledge of transportation, track safety, and the recognition of switches and
signals that have been tampered with.  Emergency response drills with
scenarios drawn from recent incidents are also useful for practicing
procedures and recognizing areas for improvement.  Transportation agencies
must also have proper plans and procedures in place that are constantly
adapted to new threats.  For example, after the Sarin gas attacks in Japan, New
York City Transit developed new procedures regarding the movement of
trains through tunnels and the use of ventilation equipment during such
incidents.
New York City Transit Authority – Thomas J. Savage 43
Norman Y. Mineta International Institute for Surface Transportation Policy Studies
Coordination
Coordination procedures must be in place before a disaster strikes.
Emergency agencies must work to establish effective channels of
communication and to standardize procedures in emergency response.
Procedures were tested recently  with a  mock gas attack drill in New York.
The exercise revealed that unnecessary confusion was caused by the colors of
protective clothing used by the several different agencies involved. One color
was used by one agency to identify personnel with a specific function; the
same color was used by another group to indicate workers with a completely
different assignment.  The importance of cross-agency standardization in this
otherwise overlooked area became readily apparent.  Another source of
miscommunication was the interpretation of the words “victim” or “stretcher.”
The terms have different meanings depending on whether one is a member of
the Fire Department’s Emergency Medical Service, NYPD’s Rescue Unit, or
New York City Transit.  Again, standardization would appear to be an answer.
Proper Equipment
The increase in the numbers and types of hazardous materials which may be
encountered in disasters have made the requirement of having proper
equipment more important than ever.  In addition to the tools hitherto used to
extract victims or to fight fires, emergency response agencies now have
equipment and garb that will protect the rescuers as well.
LESSONS LEARNED
To an overwhelming degree the type of emergency response to the scene of a
terrorist attack will be the same as that required for emergencies and disasters
from natural or accidental causes.  Derailments and explosions occur
accidentally as well as intentionally, as do hazardous material incidents, and
every agency should have in place emergency response procedures that can be
adapted to such incidents.  Nevertheless, it is regrettably true that in numerous
cases of emergency response, by even the most experienced agencies, certain
common errors appear time and again.  The New York City Transit Police
Department (the predecessor to NYPD’s Transit Division) developed a
Critical Incident Manual in 1993 that considered a number of these common
errors in an effort to discover methods of preventing their occurrence in future
incidents. Some of those lessons will now be considered.
Dispatch Adequate Resources
Emergency response units requested and dispatched to the scene should resist
the temptation to jump in and try to correct the condition before conducting a
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thorough assessment of the conditions surrounding the incident.  The results
of their assessment must be communicated immediately and appropriate and
adequate resources dispatched.  First responders at the scene should have the
authority to request additional units without having to request authorization
because this results in wasted time.  Redundant units or resources can always
be returned to base or to service.
Direction to Responding Units
Emergency workers often fail to remember that other personnel responding to
an incident may not be familiar with the facilities at the scene. Time is lost
during those critical first minutes when responding units park in the wrong
place, go to the wrong entrance and cannot find the cause of the emergency.
It is wise to invest some resources to provide preliminary instructions.
Between emergencies, public utility agencies and emergency response
services should allocate the time needed to understand the operational
procedures of each institution. A striking example of what can go wrong was
seen in the response to the Avianca plane crash on Long Island in January of
1990.  The site of the crash was a wooded area on a peninsula with a single
two-lane access road.  Numerous units from all over Long Island responded
but the lack of directions resulted in a massive snarl of emergency equipment
heading toward the site.  Essential equipment could not get to the site and
ambulances and other vehicles that had already arrived could not get out.
Much of the confusion could have been avoided with better preliminary
information being made available to and by the first responders.
Establish Perimeters
The stabilization of the immediate area where the incident has occurred must
be one of the first priorities.  To accomplish this, an inner perimeter, located a
safe distance from the incident, must be established using either personnel or
natural barriers.  All non-essential individuals, including those in uniform,
must be kept outside this area.  An outer perimeter must also be established.
Between the inner and outer perimeter, staging areas, command posts,
treatment areas, and other facilities can be established.  Frequently perimeters
are established in the wrong places or effective perimeters are not established
at all.  In addition, emergency responders must remember that the site may
also be a crime scene.  After initial responders have rendered aid to victims,
all non-essential personnel must be cleared from the scene to preserve as
much of the remaining evidence as possible.
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Establish a Single Unified Command
The hive of activity that characterizes mass casualty scenes often creates
confusion.  Without a single unified command with established and
recognized control, units frequently work independently and at cross-
purposes, or simply waste time duplicating efforts.  The result is
disorganization.  This mistake can be compounded when the police, fire,
emergency medical services and the transit authority establish separate
commands for their own services but with little or no communication with
other services.  Communication and coordination are therefore essential.  As
was stated earlier, proper use of the incident command system will solve
many of these problems.
Delegate Authority
Within an incident command system, sections, branches and teams are
responsible for specific functions, such as staging, rescue, field investigations,
and medical treatment.  Delegating authority to those who are responsible for
these functions permits a reasonable span of control for the incident
commander.  Section and branch supervisors manage tasks and develop and
implement tactics within their area of responsibility, which allows the incident
commander to concentrate on a strategy for providing support to those who
are actually doing the job.  The system only works, however, if the incident
commander consciously delegates authority to the appropriate personnel.
Maintain an Incident Log
It is impossible for the incident commander to keep all the information he
needs in his head especially under crisis conditions.  The incident commander,
as well as those in control of sections and branches must keep a record of
assignments, the times assignments are made, accomplishments, problems,
and other pertinent information.  It must also be kept in mind, however, that
ordinary record keeping resources will not be available at the scene of
emergencies.  An example of this point occurred  after Hurricane Andrew
struck Florida.  The lengthy disruption of electricity made the photocopying of
directives and instructions impossible, and old-fashioned carbon paper
became a scarce but vital commodity.
Wear Identifying Clothing or Emblems
The incident commander, as well as those who are responsible for specific
functions, need to be identified by vests or caps so they can be easily
identified in a crowd, but this is too often not the case.  It is far too common to
hear the complaint, “No one knew who was in charge.”
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Provide Useful Progress Reports
Decisions cannot be made without information.  The incident commander
must be kept advised of needs and of progress. The incident commander
cannot react and provide necessary resources without this information. The
branch and section supervisors are in the best position to determine what
problems and needs exist within their areas.  Problems or progress within a
given area will have an impact on other areas, and on the overall incident
operation.  Too much insignificant information, however, can be a handicap
and lead to overload.  Supervisors must exercise their discretion in
determining what information is relevant.
Supervisors Involved in Physical Tasks
During moments of stress, some supervisors try to avoid making decisions by
becoming workers instead of managers or they may just be swept up in the
urgency of the situation.  In either case, once they become involved in the
physical tasks, they lose control of their resources and responsibilities.
Establish Staging Areas
Usually incident scenes are only able to absorb a limited number of vehicles
and personnel.  Therefore, the incident commander must establish personnel
and vehicle staging areas as quickly as possible.  It is much more efficient to
direct all resources to a central staging area to await organized introduction to
the core area.  Staging areas should also be pre-planned as much as possible in
order to make their selection during an emergency simple.  In New York City,
each police precinct has identified a variety of locations in the area that would
be appropriate staging areas for any emergency response in the vicinity (e.g.,
schools with school yards or public buildings with parking lots,).
Accessible Staging Area
The bigger the incident, the more apparatus and personnel are likely to
respond and a large staging area will be required.  The staging officer must
organize the parking of all vehicles to permit easy movement out of the
staging areas.  It is also most important that the keys to the vehicles either be
left in the vehicles or with some designated person.
Parking
The congestion caused by the unorganized arrival and parking of emergency
vehicles is a recurring problem that is found even under the best
circumstances and with the most experienced agencies.  When police, fire-
fighters, or emergency medical personnel arrive on a scene, their first thought
is usually to get to the core of the incident as quickly as possible.
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Consequently little or no thought is given to how other vehicles will be able to
get in and out if the incident is a major one.  As a result, the fire trucks and
police cars frequently block the ambulances; the first ambulances to arrive
often hinder or prevent the arrival of other emergency vehicles.  To avoid the
problem, interagency protocols must be developed for emergency vehicles and
all emergency personnel must be continually retrained in these protocols so
that their use becomes automatic.  When the Lexington Avenue Express
derailed under Union Square in August, 1991, the derailment destroyed or
damaged a number of the columns supporting the tunnel.  This in turn caused
the surface of the street above to drop perceptibly.  Numerous units from the
Fire Department were among the first to respond and, not realizing that the
subway ran directly beneath them, parked their heavy equipment directly
above the scene of the accident.  Fortunately this was noticed in time and a
more serious problem was narrowly avoided.  Responses to major
emergencies are often not over quickly and thought must always be given to
how the positioning of a vehicle will affect the provision of appropriate
response further on, whether it is ten minutes later or an hour in the future.
Provide Adequate Safety Precautions
Mass casualty incidents always present safety hazards to emergency
personnel. The safety needs of rescuers as well as patients must not be
overlooked.  Wreckage may need to be secured to prevent movement or
collapse.  Rescuers may need to wear protective clothing such as helmets,
gloves, eye protection, and protective coats.
The Incident Commander and Available Personnel
Personnel should match the needs of the incident.  Heavy commitments of
personnel may be needed in the extraction area during the early stages of the
incident because most of those needing assistance will be found there.  As
rescue operations progress, many of the victims will be moved to the medical
treatment area or hospital, so fewer personnel will be required in the
extraction area and more in the treatment area.  As personnel become
available, the rescue supervisor must advise the incident commander of the
new resource.  The incident commander may then reassign those personnel to
other areas as needed.
Treat Patients Where They Are Found
Rescuers tend to treat patients where they are found rather than move them to
a triage area.  Some types of injuries (for example, blocked airways or serious
external bleeding) require on-the-spot medical assistance, but more extensive
first aid should be done at a central triage area.  A central treatment area
permits maximum use of personnel and other resources.  If the patient is
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trapped, requiring lengthy extraction, then extended treatment within the area
may be appropriate.
The Medical Treatment Area
Patients placed helter-skelter in the treatment area will compound an already
disastrous situation.  They must be placed in some organized fashion, e.g.,
critical patients to one side, delayed treatment patients to another.  First
arriving injured should be placed near the exit transportation loading area first,
then fill towards the entrance.  This eliminates the problem of having to step
over patients when carrying in new arrivals.  It is also easy to overlook
patients or not notice changes in their condition.  The medical branch
supervisor should assign at least one person (preferably someone with medical
experience) to each category of patients, with instructions to check them
frequently.
Failure to Alert or Update Hospitals on Situation
Alerting Hospitals
There are still reported cases of hospitals learning of mass casualty incidents
when the first patients came through the door.  Procedures and protocols
should require immediate alerting of hospitals when a major incident is
recognized.  Reasonably accurate information on the nature and severity of the
incident should be provided so that the hospital has time to prepare to receive
and treat the injured.
Keeping Hospitals Informed
Hospitals often call personnel back to duty and pull staff from other floors and
wards to meet the emergency room needs of a disaster.  To keep the hospital
on continued alert long after the last patient has been transported  is not only
costly but jeopardizes other patient care.  Hospitals should be informed when
the last of the injured have been taken from the scene of the disaster.
Final Comments
New York has so far escaped intense attacks like the gas attacks in Japan and
the repeated bombings in Paris.  However, as the largest urban transportation
system in the world, it is a tempting and vulnerable target.  A major attack on
New York City Transit would be seen as a blow to the United States.  New
York’s efforts to guard against this possibility is a complex and expensive
undertaking but the realities of the national and international situations make
them necessary.
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THE METROPOLITAN ATLANTA RAPID TRANSIT
AUTHORITY
Contingency Planning for the 1996 Olympics
by Shaun P. McCarthy
The biggest event that the Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority
(MARTA) has ever had to confront was the 1966 Atlanta Olympic Games.
Complex planning and costly precautions were taken to protect the transit
systems and its patrons from ordinary crimes and terrorist attack.  As it
happened, a bomb did go off during the festivities but the explosion occurred
in a public park, not within the transit system. If the bomb had exploded
within the confined space of a transit station or a train, the casualties might
have been much higher.  Perhaps the reason MARTA escaped the attack was
because of the extraordinary preventative measures that had been taken.
DESCRIPTION OF THE SYSTEM
MARTA began rail operations in 1979, beginning with its East Line.
MARTA has since expanded to five rail lines with 36 rail stations and 46
miles of heavy rail.  MARTA owns 240 rail cars and 667 passenger busses.
The Bus Division runs 150 routes and averages nearly 30 million route miles
per year.  The Rail Division runs trains every eight minutes through its
stations and averages 23 million route miles per year.  MARTA normally
carries 470,000 bus and rail riders per average weekday and parks
approximately 30,000 commuter vehicles per day.  Fares are currently $1.50
one way, with free transfers.  Magnetically coded weekly and monthly passes,
or “Transcards,” can be purchased for unlimited rides at $12.00 and $45.00,
respectively.  MARTA also receives a 1% sales tax share in Fulton and
DeKalb counties to assist with the funding of its operations.
INCIDENT RESPONSE
Threat or Special Circumstances
The 1996 Olympic Games presented MARTA and its police personnel with
unprecedented challenges.  Since the PLO attack against the Israeli athletes
during the Munich Olympics, this international event has been a high profile
target for terrorism and a high risk event for the host countries.  MARTA
made the commitment to be the Official Provider of Public Transportation for
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the Olympics.  This would entail moving over one million passengers a day to
and from competition venues, public parks, and downtown businesses.  Never
before had MARTA attempted to move such a large contingent of people over
such an extended period of time.  The estimated numbers involved were four
to five times the system’s normal ridership figures.
The Olympic schedule for MARTA’s police officers began Monday, July 15,
1996.  This was four days before the opening ceremonies on Friday, July 19.
The objective behind the early schedule was to establish a highly visible law
enforcement presence and to assist with the influx of customers into the
system.  MARTA’s Airport Station and the Five Points and Peachtree Center
Stations, which serve the downtown hotel district, experienced large increases
in riders prior to the games.
On Wednesday, July 17, a public dress rehearsal of the opening ceremony was
held at the Olympic Stadium. With approximately 80,000 spectators travelling
to one location, this proved to be the first major test of the West End Station
and the designated shuttle bus station for the stadium.  A comparatively small
station, it was not known how West End would be able to accommodate the
large crowd and how its size would affect operations.  MARTA conducted a
lengthy public awareness campaign prior to this event and informed the public
that there would be a waiting period of at least one hour to enter the system.
Under the circumstances, the system performed well and the crowds were
moved at an acceptable pace.  The key was to keep the trains moving, to
regulate queue lines, and to maintain a strong police presence.  The crowds
behaved in an orderly manner as long as they could see that movement was
taking place.  Although the trains were jammed, no problems were
experienced.  Bus shuttles were run by ACOG (Atlanta Committee for the
Olympic Games) and  OSTS (Olympic Spectator Transportation System).
OSTS experienced some problems with moving the crowds as not enough
buses were on hand.  However, this problem  was rectified before the Opening
Ceremonies on Friday night.  West End proved to be capable of handling the
crowds, provided enough police, barricades, and trains were available. During
the Olympics the station averaged over 100,000 passengers per day.
The Games proper commenced on Saturday, July 20.  The increase in
commuters was significant and immediate, with a daily average rail boarding
of  between 1 and 1.3 million, a  record for MARTA.  All MARTA parking
lots were filled by 7:30 a.m.  The punctuality of trains was an essential factor
in keeping the crowds moving. In addition, well-designed queue lines and
sufficient treasury assistance at the faregates facilitated crowd control. An
effective public address system and the use of bullhorns to keep the riders
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informed of delays were essential elements in the effective control of the
stations.
One major change that was not anticipated, however, was the huge impact the
Games had on the Peachtree Center Station.  This station serves the hotel
district and is one block from the centerpiece of the city, the new Centennial
Olympic Park. On Saturday, July 20, the crowds were tremendous, and the
public’s safety became a crucial issue.  The station was transformed into one
huge queue.  The two north entrance/exits of the station were converted into
exit facilities only, and the two south entrances/exits converted into entrances
only.  Police with bullhorns and barricades were in place to enforce access
control.  The press was notified of the change and the situation was well
publicized.  This change worked well, and the crowds were properly managed.
The Games ended on Sunday, August 4.  The crowds had moved easily and
smoothly, and the MARTA police officers had become accustomed to the
pace.  By Tuesday, August 6, ridership was back to near normal levels.  The
Police Olympic Schedule was suspended at 2:00 a.m. on August 7, and the
MARTA Police Operations Center (MPOC ) was closed.  For the most part,
comments from the public were positive.  They understood that there would
be large crowds and long waits, and accepted the conditions.
The MARTA Police Division was responsible for crowd control operations at
all MARTA Rail Stations, all law enforcement, and any emergency response
required on the bus and rail systems during the Games.  The Division was also
given the responsibility for target hardening (providing extra physical
protection against attack), employee awareness training, and the procurement
of necessary equipment for Olympic Security Operations.
Assessment of the Threat
As mentioned previously, MARTA was designated the Official Provider of
Public Transportation during the Olympic Games.  MARTA was the
backbone of the spectator transportation system as public parking was not
allowed at any of the downtown Olympic venues.  Essentially everyone who
was going to any of the Olympic stadia (the Georgia Dome, the Omni
Coliseum, or Centennial Olympic Park) had to use the MARTA system to get
there.  The sheer size of the Games complicated transportation operations.
The Atlanta Games were touted as “the largest peacetime event in world
history,” with over 12 million spectator tickets available.  The Atlanta Games
were planned to be larger than the Seoul (Korea) and the Barcelona (Spain)
Olympics combined.
Nearly 75% of the Olympic events were to be held inside the “Olympic Ring,”
an imaginary circle three miles in diameter in downtown Atlanta.  This “ring”
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is an area served by MARTA’s largest rail stations:  Peachtree Center, Five
Points and Omni/Dome Stations.  (See Map of MARTA System in the
appendix).  Never in the history of the Games had so many events been held
in such a concentrated area.
To facilitate and encourage this movement, a precedent was set by agreement
with ACOG (Atlanta Committee for the Olympic Games).  By simply
showing your Olympic event ticket at any MARTA station or bus, one would
be allowed to ride MARTA free that day.  Daily entries of up to one and a half
million riders a day were predicted.  The police services recognized that
significant planning, deployment, and logistical work had to be done to meet
this enormous challenge.
Although aware that the Olympics were a potential target for criminal and
political violence, the aggregate intelligence on hand provided no indication
of any specific, impending terrorist threat to the Olympics or to the MARTA
transportation system.
Security Organization and Personnel
The MARTA Division of Police Services consists of 217 armed, uniformed
police officers, 29 sergeants, 9 lieutenants, 5 captains, 3 majors, and a
Director/Chief of Police.  The Division also conducts its own investigations
with a Detective Unit, operates four Bike Patrol Teams, has a special Bus
Patrol Unit, and maintains a 10 member Special Operations Response Team
(S.O.R.T.) capable of tactical and chemical response.  The MARTA Police
have full police jurisdiction on MARTA property as well as in the cities and
counties in which MARTA operates.  MARTA maintains its own records
section, radio dispatch system, and Zone Monitors who staff a closed circuit
television center (CCTV) and answer customer assistance telephones.
The MARTA Police Division routinely patrols all MARTA rail stations and
facilities, adjacent parking lots, heavy rail cars, and bus routes.  Ninety
percent of the patrols conducted in the stations and on the trains are done on
foot.  Mobile patrols are conducted by marked police cars on each rail line.
There is one uniformed officer on every train from 1500 to 2300 hours each
day and plainclothes officers make regular patrols.
Planning
MARTA Police Services began preliminary planning approximately three
years prior to the event. Initial planning started with an examination of
personnel allocations and projected shift requirements.  The Division assigned
Captain T.D. Rogers to ACOG Security to assist with the overall Olympic
Security efforts.  In May 1995, Major M.A. Parker and MARTA Chief Safety
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Officer Tracy Pluff traveled to FEMA training headquarters at Mount
Weather, Virginia, where they participated in a crowd planning exercise.  In
July 1995, Lt. Joe McKinney was designated Olympic Coordinator for
MARTA Police to facilitate logistics, organize target hardening, act as inter-
departmental liaison, and to decide personnel staffing for the Department.
The first task of the planning process was to determine how to best utilize
available manpower.  The division made a commitment to have at least one
MARTA Police officer in each rail station 24 hours a day during the Games.
Variations of work hours, length of work week, and numbers of officers per
shift were examined to determine how to meet the needs of the Division,
without exhausting the officers. As larger crowds were expected to use the
system between 6:00 a.m. and 2:00 a.m., it was determined that 12 hour shifts,
with four consecutive days on duty, then one day off, would maximize
MARTA police coverage.
The shifts were from 0530 to 1730 hours, 1430 to 0230 hours, and 1800 to
0600 hours.  This schedule enabled MARTA to have the majority of its
officers on duty during the most crowded times, and maintain at least one
officer per station during the slower early morning hours.  (See the Staff
Chart)
The schedule was designed to keep individual officers in the same stations
during the entire Olympic period to assure that they were familiar with their
assigned stations and to maintain accountability.  The system was well
received and proved successful.
Personnel
MARTA Police recognized that an additional 250 to 300 personnel would be
required to ensure adequate security and crowd control on MARTA during the
Games.  The crowd projections were too large to be handled by only one or
two officers at each rail station.  Even with the police personnel working 12
hour shifts and only one rest day per week, manpower capabilities were
stretched to the limit.
The police requested the MARTA General Manager to temporarily reassign
MARTA civilian personnel from their regular duties to assist police during the
Games.  Fifty (50) to eighty (80) personnel were available to assist the police
during the games.
The MARTA Police also requested other transit agencies across America to
assign officers to MARTA for the Games.  For various reasons, only BART in
San Francisco fulfilled its commitment, sending five officers to help for two
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weeks.  While their assistance was invaluable, MARTA was not able to
muster its target of additional transit officers.
During May, MARTA Police Chief Gene Wilson took up the staffing plight
with Gil Childers, Special Assistant to U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno.  Mr.
Childers took special interest in the staffing dilemma and began working with
federal and state authorities to help rectify the situation.  This enabled
MARTA to be recognized as a “State Law Enforcement Venue” and to tap
into the resources of the 4,000 member-strong State and Federal law
enforcement contingent of S.O.L.E.C., the State Olympic Law Enforcement
Command.  This agency, set up by the Governor of Georgia and headed by
Gary McConnell to provide extra federal and state law enforcement support to
the Olympic Security effort, committed 200 sworn law enforcement personnel
to MARTA.  The allocation of these officers enabled MARTA to meet its
commitments and to manage the crowds safely and efficiently.
ACOG paid MARTA for police overtime incurred during the Games.  Early
on the Division had requested funds to offset the huge cost of overtime that
would be necessary to handle the Olympic activities.  The Division obtained
nearly $900,000 to cover the extra police coverage required before, during and
after the Games.  ACOG agreed to pay this cost, as the coverage obviously
had a direct effect of the Games coming to Atlanta.
Logistics
A great deal of logistical support was required to support the MARTA Police
efforts.  The issues of additional personnel, barricades, food, water, signage,
shelter for the public, portable toilets, bullhorns, traffic cones, and first aid; all
had to be addressed by the department.
MARTA Police were assisted and supported by the Authority’s Facilities
Maintenance division in many areas.  A total of 330 wooden barricades were
fabricated and painted to supplement the existing 200 metal barricades.  In
addition, approximately 100 signs for crowd and traffic control were prepared.
Both of these items proved invaluable in handling the huge volumes of
vehicular and pedestrian traffic using MARTA during the Games.  The
Facilities staff also arranged for the rental of 100 portable toilets, placing them
at key rail stations.
A total of  40 bullhorns, 700 traffic cones, and 100 first aid kits were
purchased by MARTA from a contingency fund.  Although the US military
had pledged to provide a number of tents and other portable shelters to
MARTA for public use, it turned out that none of these items were available.
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Security Plans
Intelligence was supplied to the MARTA system from the State Center. A
MARTA representative attended security briefings twice a day.  The Bureau
of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms maintained a bomb center with a dedicated
land-line telephone link to MARTA’s operations center.  The pipe-bomb
explosion at Centennial Park resulted in the MARTA police increasing their
security program from normal to a “heightened state of awareness.”  MARTA
developed and maintained its “Go Team” for the duration of the Olympics.
This team was comprised of representatives from the police, railroad, bus,
maintenance, and safety divisions of MARTA.  Numerous exercises and table-
top simulations were conducted prior to the event, including a simulation held
at the civic center that focused on a takeover of a train with hostages.
Security Technology
Although MARTA investigated the possibility of removing all rubbish bins
from the stations, it concluded that this step would produce more
disadvantages than advantages.  The removal would have resulted in refuse
being dumped on the platforms, causing health hazards.  This could have
resulted in more serious conditions had refuse spilled onto the tracks and
caused a short-circuit.  In the end it was decided to introduce bomb-resistant
containers at strategic stations and to implement and maintain a system
whereby all the bins were emptied and rotated promptly.
Environmental Design and Construction Features
MARTA conscientiously considered crime prevention during the architectural
stage of its planning. All stations are equipped with CCTV monitors.
MARTA’s power stations are their greatest vulnerability but they have
adequate alarm systems and have target-hardening features.  One advantage to
security is the frequency of trains.  This makes it physically impossible for
saboteurs to tamper with the rails or the signaling system.  All trains and buses
maintain radio contact with the Central Control center at Avondale.  To date,
fifty percent of the bus fleet have been equipped with Global Positioning
System (GPS) units.
The Division obtained advice from a counter-terrorism expert on target
hardening issues.  MARTA improved on many areas considered vulnerable to
tampering.  All the power station’s alarm systems were enhanced, perimeter
fences were added to critical facilities, and bomb-resistant trash containers
were placed at Olympic Ring stations.  Private vehicles were banned from rail
and bus facilities.  These measures helped to add a level of deterrence to
security preparations.  Money expended on these issues proved to be well
56 MARTA, Atlanta – Shaun P. McCarthy
Norman Y. Mineta International Institute for Surface Transportation Policy Studies
spent; although a bombing did occur in Atlanta at Centennial Park, only one
block from the Peachtree Center station.
Communications
Despite MARTA Police’s efforts to create an overall MARTA Operations
Center, it did not occur, but they created their own MARTA Police Operations
Center (MPOC).  The Center was staffed 24 hours a day, beginning a week
before the Games and continuing for two days after the closing ceremonies.
The Center was equipped with appropriate radio equipment, phone lines,
computer support, cable television for viewing news footage, and all the maps
and documents needed for the Games.  The Center acted as a communication
node between the State Command Centers, the MARTA Bus, Rail, and
Maintenance Divisions, ACOG, and specialized management agencies such as
FBI, the Department of Defense (DOD), and the Explosive Ordinance
Disposal (EOD).  It also coordinated personnel movements, S.O.L.E.C.
officers, and other logistics.  It was co-staffed with facilities maintenance
personnel, which expedited requests for maintenance from the field.  While an
overall MARTA Operations Center, with a representative from all MARTA
divisions present in the same room, would have been much more efficient, the
MPOC proved adequate.
MARTA Police personnel also staffed the State Operations Center (SOC) on
Confederate Avenue and the Joint Communications Center (JCC) at Atlanta
Police Headquarters, City Hall East.  The SOC served as the main control
center for all S.O.L.E.C. and State Emergency Management Agency
operations involved in the Games.  The JCC served as an information clearing
house for all federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies at the
Olympics.  These interfaces helped to speed communications between
MARTA and other law enforcement jurisdictions and proved to be valuable as
the Games progressed.
The State of Georgia provided all S.O.L.E.C. officers with radios tuned to
both of the MARTA Police frequencies.  To facilitate communications; the
officers were allocated a special radio number and were told to use “plain
talk” in their radio transmissions.  This procedure worked well and radio
discipline was observed.
The heads of the key law enforcement agencies started meeting every other
day one week before the Games began.  The agencies involved were the FBI,
the U.S. Secret Service, the Atlanta Police, the Conyers Police, the Fulton
County Police and Sheriff, the DeKalb County Police, the MARTA Police, the
Georgia State Patrol, the Georgia Bureau of Investigation (G.B.I.), the
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National Guard, S.O.L.E.C., and ACOG.  The discussions at these meetings
centered around intelligence issues and strategies.
Training
All MARTA Police received extensive training on controlling large crowds,
Olympic information, bomb and gas awareness, cultural sensitivity, and
diplomatic procedures.  They were informed of their role and how to
communicate with the MARTA command post.  All police supervisors were
extensively trained in crowd control procedures and were given table top
exercises on how to develop queue and the emergency plans for each rail
station.
MARTA Police dispatched its Special Operations and Rescue Team (SORT)
to the Army’s Fort McClellan for an intensive training course in biological
weapons handling to enhance their hazardous materials response capabilities.
In addition, they conducted numerous bus and train assault simulations.
Emergency Response
MARTA has developed an emergency response team. Referred to as the “Go
Team,” this organization is comprised of senior individuals from MARTA
management and operations divisions.  Its emergency response manuals
contain instructions for most foreseeable emergency situations.  A fully
equipped mobile emergency control center is also available at short notice.
Whereas MARTA’s Hazmat (SORT) team is capable of providing a first
response to a biological or chemical attack scene, it does not have the capacity
to deal with an attack on the scale of the Tokyo disaster. If a terrorist
campaign consisting of a series of simultaneous attacks were to be launched,
support would be supplied by the Atlanta Fire Department and state and
federal authorities.
The Games progressed well until early on Day 9, Saturday, July 27.  Shortly
after 1:00 a.m., a pipe-bomb exploded at a Centennial Olympic Park concert,
killing one person and injuring scores of others.  MARTA and S.O.L.E.C.
Police were placed on full alert and all stations were immediately searched for
suspicious devices.  All on-duty personnel were held over past their shift.
During the next few hours numerous alerts were called in, none of which
proved true.  The alert was eased at 0700, and the extra personnel were
released.
On two occasions transit stations were briefly closed to investigate suspicious
packages in the wake of the Park bombing, but EOD teams responded rapidly
and determined there was nothing dangerous in the parcels.  Delays in
scheduled transportation were minimal.  One train was taken out of service for
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approximately two hours after a suspicious device was found by a MARTA
employee.  It was alleged that the package was thrown onto the train by a man
at the airport, who failed to board the train.  The train was moved to a pocket
track and EOD called.  An X-ray of the package was done by EOD and
batteries and wires were seen.  EOD exploded the package and discovered a
flashlight and headphones in the case.  Investigation revealed a pilot
accidentally left the case on the train at the airport.  This was the nearest to
sabotage that MARTA experienced during the games and there were only
occasional delays due to mechanical problems.
CLEAN-UP AND RESTORATION ISSUES
After the bomb exploded, Centennial Park was closed for the next three days.
The Games themselves were unaffected and the park averaged 250,000
visitors per day.  Closing of the park seems to have caused a decline in
ridership but the venues themselves remained sold out and people continued
to ride MARTA to the events. When Centennial Park reopened on Day 12,
July 30, MARTA ridership set new records as people returned to the park. The
bombing incident had little to no effect upon the public’s confidence in
MARTA.
Public Affairs
During the Games MARTA made a conscientious effort to keep the public
informed in advance of changes to its service, entry and exit points, and
station facilities.
Augmented Security
The New York City Metro-North Railroad Chief of Police, Dean Esserman,
NYC Transit Security Chief, Tom Savage, and other key staff spent several
days assisting MARTA police with a critique of their crowd management,
emergency preparedness, and queue plans.  Their knowledge and experience
assisted MARTA to prepare detailed crowd flow models and contributed to
successes in this area.
MARTA’s police personnel were augmented during the Olympics with 220
additional police personnel from the state and city police forces.  In addition,
MARTA would have been able to call upon support from the National Guard
and other sources, had the need arisen.
LESSONS LEARNED
Overall, MARTA Police Services have reason to be proud of their
performance.  No major incidents occurred within their jurisdiction and the
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crowds were handled safely and efficiently.  There were many lessons
learned, and many theories confirmed, during the Games.  A list of them
follows.
Advance planning is essential
Start early!  Put the best people and planners on the job.  This is not an area
for problem employees or people who are seeking political or social contact.
You need hard workers, good communicators, and leaders as Olympic
coordinators.
Self reliance
Be self reliant.  Take the responsibility for what you know needs to be done,
and aggressively pursue these issues until you are sure they are resolved.
Apply creative thinking
Think outside the lines and exercise creativity.  Special or extraordinary
events require flexibility and, in many instances, deviation from routine
practices. Sound planning and sticking to that plan are essential but you must
remain flexible and innovative when it becomes necessary.
Obtain advice and seek expertise
Seek advice from experts in the field.  Look to people who have “been there;
done that.”  Be wary of people who claim to know but have no credentials.
Security is inconvenient
It is essential that the public and employees are aware that with security
comes inconvenience. Be prepared to fight for what you know is right in the
area of security.  Anticipate and manage resistance and opposition when you
decide to lock facilities, enforce security regulations such as visible I.D.
procedures, and ban private vehicles from critical areas.
Maintain a balance between safety and service disruption
More than 140 suspicious packages were reported in the wake of the
Centennial Park incident.  The MARTA system had to be cleared on two
occasions because of suspected packages.  During these incidents, the crucial
issue proved to be striking a balance between responsible public safety and
service disruption. The advantages in being able to deploy EOD teams at
major sites during large-scale events became evident.  This practice expedites
response time and investigation and facilitates quick operational recovery.  A
consequence of these incidents was MARTA’s realization of the need to
employ sniffer dogs and to train its police personnel in bomb-handling
techniques.
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Crime
In general, crimes against persons dropped during the Games although there
was a huge increase in pickpocketing incidents.  The crowded conditions were
a paradise for this type of criminal.  MARTA was able to enlist the help of
some plainclothes Georgia Bureau of Investigation (G.B.I.) agents deployed in
the Olympic Ring to help address the problem.  Even though some arrests
were made, the pickpocket problem continued until the Games ended.
Parking lot crimes did not dramatically increase, despite all parking lots being
filled to capacity.  MARTA attributed this phenomena to the constant flow of
people through the lots and to the increased police presence at each rail
station.
Communication
Train your personnel well, early, and thoroughly.  Keep them informed of
plans and objectives.  Insure that a good communication network is in place
and working.  Always keep your personnel advised and informed.
Maintain functional responsibility
Avoid allowing personnel to perform cross functions. Let the police handle
crowd control and station coordination; let rail operations personnel move the
trains; and let bus personnel manage buses.  Do not confuse the roles; let each
area perform their specialties.
Logistics and morale
Take care of employees.  Food, water and “goodies,” such as special pins and
shirts, are very important to employee morale during special events.
Final comments
One of the security problems faced by any large metropolitan transit system is
the one-time, big event such as the Olympics, which can push security
capabilities to the limit.  While Atlanta’s transit system, MARTA, was not the
target of the bombing, other transit organizations can profit from the lessons
learned while preparing for the event.
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APPENDICES
to the Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority Study
MARTA Rapid Transit System Map
Olympic Rail and Bus Entries
MARTA Police Command Staff 1996 Olympics
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Figure 1-1  MARTA Rapid Transit System Map
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Figure 1-2  Olympic Rail and Bus Entries
Notes:
1. Pre-Olympic Average: 450,000 (weekdays)
2. The Olympics began Friday July 19 and ended Sunday August 4, 1996.
3. Centennial Park was bombed on the morning of July 27 and reopened July 30.
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Figure 1-3  MARTA Police Command Staff 1996 Olympics
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CRITERIA FOR TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
By Brian M. Jenkins
Introduction
In conjunction with the Volpe Transportation Systems Center, the Norman Y.
Mineta International Institute for Surface Transportation Policy Studies at San
Jose State University (IISTPS) has been requested to report on the policy
framework and best practices currently in place for combating terrorism and
major violent crimes on surface transportation systems, including public
transit.  The objective of this document is to provide an outline of current
policies, practices, and procedures for a “minimum state of readiness.”  This
outline is neither conclusive nor exhaustive, and will continue to be developed
in subsequent tasks.
Project Approach
The approach outlined in this document categorizes current policies and
practices in three chronological categories:
• Design and Planning (Pre-Incident Preparedness)
• Response (Incident Reaction)
• Recovery (Follow-Up)
This outline and project emphasis focus on incident activity specific to public
transit operations and facilities.  Activities identified in addressing transit
vulnerabilities are further categorized by type and size of operation,
specifically problems encountered by multi-modal systems (e.g., rail and bus),
large and medium bus-only systems, and small/rural bus systems.  The
descriptions include specific examples of the precautions, responses, and
recovery measures taken in the event of specific incidents.
Policy/Procedures Framework
The general framework of preparedness progresses from planning and
mitigation measures through response and recovery.  The pre-incident
mitigation steps incorporate, at a minimum, security and detection devices,
environmental design, training, and outreach activities.  The preparedness step
focuses on the institutional capacity and capability of both internal and
external emergency-response organizations and teams. This stage also
includes:
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• emergency management and operations planning;
• direction and control;
• communication (internal and external); and
• planning for evacuation, reporting and support measures.
The response (actual incident) stage is the most visible function in the policy
and operational framework.  If the mitigation and preparedness stages are
adequate, this stage is primarily concerned with implementation of the
policies.  Finally, post-incident recovery involves the processes necessary to
return a situation back to its pre-incident state of operation.
It is worth noting that major obstacles to the policy framework include issues
such as jurisdiction over various locales and/or types of events, the costs
necessary to develop and sustain emergency programs, and the complexity
and difficulty involved in determining an “acceptable” level of risk.  These
problems, along with numerous others, can make vulnerability management a
politically salient issue as well as an administrative “hassle.”
One of the biggest issues for any transit agency in developing and
implementing an effective “crisis management” program, whether it is aimed
at criminal activity or natural disasters, is coordination with other agencies
and organizations that are expected to be part of the response scenario.
Depending on the magnitude of the problem, these external entities may
include:
Local (community, county, city) organizations/agencies
Local law enforcement (police, sheriff)
Fire departments, ambulance and emergency medical teams, and
related health services
Search and rescue services
Local government emergency management office
Red Cross
Human services (e.g., crisis counselors)
State organizations and agencies
State emergency management office
Department of Transportation
Public safety
National Guard
Federal agencies
FBI
FEMA
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Using the research done by Boyd, Maier and Associates (Perspectives on
Transit Security for the 1990s: Strategies for Success), general “best
practices” that have been identified include, among others:
Deployment Practices:
Uniformed personnel deployment/practices:
Deployment at fixed posts
Random patrolling
Directed patrolling
Saturation patrols
Undercover deployment/practices:
Directed patrolling
Surveillance
Stakeouts
System Design and Technology
Minimizing targets
Controlling corridors of movement and egress
Effective utilization of provided space
Surveillance equipment
Zero tolerance signage
Data Collection
Dispatch logs
Operators’ reports
Incident report forms
Operating Practices
Route design and scheduling
Maintenance
System policies and training
Summaries of how these practices are called into play in response to various
incidents for a range of service sizes and modes are presented in the following
tables.  Note that, while similar practices may be relevant no matter what the
size of the transit property, the magnitude of both the problem and the
resources available can vary considerably.
It should also be noted that public perception can play an important role in
crime protection and prevention.  For example, several operators have
reported that “dummy” surveillance equipment can be nearly as effective as
the real thing in deterring vandalism and property crimes.
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Description of Incidents/Problems
Law enforcement agencies generally categorize criminal activity under three
“levels”, the latter two of which include the subjects of this analysis:
Level 1:  Non-violent crime:  Transit-related incidents include smoking in
unauthorized areas, graffiti on vehicles, and avoidance of fare purchase.
Level 1 is characterized by minor crimes and vandalism on transportation
system equipment and infrastructure, including quality-of-life infractions.
Level 1 offenses are not discussed in this report.
Level 2:  Violent and destructive crime:  These are characterized by assaults
on the transit system itself or on operations equipment, personnel, or
passengers.
Level 3: Premeditated violence and destruction: These may be characterized
by violent attacks or potentially deadly assaults on operators and patrons of
the transit system.  Impacts may extend beyond the physical boundaries of the
transit agency property or equipment.  In some cases attacks may be
politically motivated and directed against the government or a specific ethnic
or racial group.
The following is a list of the categories of violent crimes extracted from Boyd,
in the order of reported severity (low to high).  It should be noted that only the
first three items are reported to occur in the top half of 28 identified
security/crime issues:
1. Objects thrown at vehicles
2. Assaults on passengers
3. Assaults on operators or drivers
4. Weapons offenses
5. Bomb threats
6. Arson
7. Hate crimes
8. Homicides
For purposes of simplicity, the following categories of offenses are reported
on in this section:
A. Crimes against property (includes objects thrown at vehicles, arson, and
most hate crimes)
B. Crimes against persons (includes assaults on passengers, assaults on
operators or drivers, weapons offenses, and homicides)
C. Dramatic impact crimes (includes terrorism, bomb threats, and some hate
crimes).
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1.  DESIGN AND PLANNING (PRE-INCIDENT)
A.  Crimes Against Property
(e.g., objects thrown at vehicles, arson, and hate crimes)
Security Organization and Personnel
• Transit Police and undercover operatives
• Visible patrols
• Station agents
• Local law enforcement officials
Security Plans and Procedures (Overall Crisis Management)
• Mandate a crisis management program
• Write emergency operations plan
• Reach mutual aid agreements
• Develop reporting forms and procedures
Environmental Design
• Protect stations, parking areas, trackage, stops (e.g., fencing, use of effective lighting)
• Select materials
• Ensure visibility
• Maintain facilities
Security and Detection Technology
• Surveillance equipment
• Silent alarms
• Emergency exits
• Intrusion sensors
Communications Equipment/ Procedures
• Emergency communication systems and backup
• Establish a clear chain of command and communication
• Surveillance at stations and yards
• Alarms
• Visible patrols
Training
• Train station agents, operators, and all staff for hostile events
• Enact simulation exercises
• Define special procedures for assistance to seniors, disabled, youth
• Develop reporting forms and procedures
Emergency Response (Planning & Arrangement)
Multi-Mode System
• Arrange for alerts to public officials
• Coordinated by police and security units
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Augmented Security (e.g., prior to special events)
• Additional security agents
• Incentives for community vigilance
Media and Multi-lingual activity
• Place large notices in vehicles and stations to warn against crime
• Encourage passenger awareness
• Outreach to schools, youth, community groups
• Arrange general public and community meetings
• Publish multi-lingual brochures
• Maintain a Public Relations and Marketing department
Small/Rural Bus System
• Liaison with local media
What “public outreach” materials are available?
• Visible security personnel
• Aggressive outreach to community
• All staff participate in public relations
• In-house and purchased materials
• Promote zero tolerance
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1.  Design and Planning (Pre-Incident)
B.  Crimes Against Persons
(e.g., assaults on passengers or operators and drivers, weapons offenses, and homicides)
Security Organization and Personnel
• Transit Police and undercover operatives
• Visible patrols
• Station agents
• Local law enforcement officials
Security Plans and Procedures (Overall Crisis Management)
• Mandate a crisis management program
• Write emergency operations plan
• Reach mutual aid agreements
• Develop reporting forms and procedures
Environmental Design
• Protect stations, parking areas, offices, stops (e.g., fencing, use of effective lighting)
• Select materials
• Ensure visibility
• Maintain facilities
Security and Detection Technology
• Surveillance equipment
• Silent alarms
• Emergency exits
• Intrusion sensors
Communications Equipment and Procedures
• Emergency communication systems and backup
• Establish a clear chain of command and communication
• Surveillance at stations and offices
• Alarms
• Visible patrols
Training
• Train station agents, operators, and all staff for hostile events
• Enact simulation exercises
• Define special procedures for assistance to seniors, disabled, youth
• Develop reporting forms and procedures
Emergency Response (Planning & Arrangement)
• Arrange for alerts to public officials
• Coordinated by police/ security units
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Augmented Security (e.g., prior to special events)
• Additional security agents
• Incentives for community vigilance
Media and Multi-lingual activity
• Place large notices in vehicles and stations to warn against crime
• Encourage passenger awareness
• Outreach to schools, youth, community groups
• Arrange general public and community meetings
• Publish multi-lingual brochures
• Maintain a Public Relations and Marketing department
What “public outreach” materials are available?
• Visible security personnel
• Aggressive outreach to community
• All staff participate in public relations
• In-house and purchased materials
• Promote zero tolerance
Criteria for Transportation Security – Brian M. Jenkins 73
Norman Y. Mineta International Institute for Surface Transportation Policy Studies
1.  Design and Planning (Pre-Incident)
C.  Dramatic Impact Crimes (e.g., terrorism, bomb threats, some hate crimes)
Security Organization and Personnel
• Transit Police and undercover operatives
• Visible patrols
• Station agents
• Local, state, and federal law enforcement officials
Security Plans and Procedures (Overall Crisis Management)
• Mandate a crisis management program
• Establish clear lines of command and communications to outside agencies
• Write emergency operations plan
• Reach mutual aid agreements
• Develop reporting forms and procedures
• Contract hostage negotiators
Small/Rural Bus System
• Local law enforcement takes lead on crisis situations including hostage negotiations
Environmental Design
• Protect all facilities with clear path of sight, travel, and access
• Select materials
• Ensure visibility
• Maintain facilities
Security and Detection Technology
• Surveillance equipment
• (Silent) Alarms
• Emergency exits
• Intrusion sensors
Communications Equipment and Procedures
Multi-Mode System
• Emergency communication systems and backup
• Establish a clear chain of command and communication
• Surveillance at all facilities
• Alarms
• Visible patrols
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Training
• Train station agents, operators, and all staff for hostile events
• Enact simulation exercises
• Define special procedures for assistance to seniors, disabled, youth
• Develop reporting forms and procedures
Emergency Response (Planning & Arrangement)
• Arrange for alerts to public officials
• Coordinated by police and security units
Augmented Security (e.g., prior to special events)
• Additional security agents
• Incentives for community vigilance
• Bring in canine units
• Aerial surveillance
• Enact simulation exercises with outside agencies
Media and Multi-lingual activity
• Large notices placed in vehicles and stations to warn against unusual occurrences
• Encourage passenger awareness
• Outreach to schools, youth, community groups
• Arrange general public and community meetings
• Publish multi-lingual brochures
• Maintain a Public Relations and Marketing department
What “public outreach” materials are available?
• Visible security personnel
• Aggressive outreach to community
• All staff participate in public relations
• In-house and purchased materials
• Promote zero tolerance
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2.  RESPONSE (INCIDENT)
A. Crimes Against Property
(e.g., objects thrown at vehicles, arson, and hate crimes)
Assessment of the Threat or Problem
• Establish a clear chain of command and communication
• Activate emergency and evacuation plans as appropriate
Security Organization and Personnel
• Transit Police
• Station agents
• Local law enforcement officials
• Emergency training for all staff
Emergency Response
• Alert public safety officials
• Organize emergency medical assistance
• Ensure attention and assistance to the disabled, elderly, and young
• Arrange for transportation alternatives (e.g., "bus bridge")
Media and Multi-lingual activities
• Set up public address system
• Arrange multi-lingual staff assistance
• Identify agency spokesperson
Clean-up activities
• Establish a clear chain of command and communication
• Transit Police
• Coordinate with local law enforcement officials
• Collect and preserve evidence if necessary
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2.  Response (Incident)
B.  Crimes Against Persons
(e.g., assaults on passengers or operators or drivers, weapons offenses, homicides)
Assessment of the Threat or Problem
• Establish a clear chain of command and communication
• Activate emergency and evacuation plans as appropriate
Security Organization and Personnel
• Transit Police
• Station agents
• Local law enforcement officials
• Emergency training for all staff
Emergency Response
• Alert public safety officials
• Organize emergency medical assistance
• Ensure attention and assistance to the disabled, elderly, and young
• Arrange for transportation alternatives (e.g., "bus bridge")
Media and Multi-lingual activities
• Set up public address system
• Arrange multi-lingual staff assistance
• Identify agency spokesperson
Clean-up activities
• Establish a clear chain of command and communication
• Transit Police
• Coordinate with local law enforcement officials
• Collect and preserve evidence if necessary
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2. Response (Incident)
C.  Dramatic Impact Crimes (e.g., terrorism, bomb threats, and some hate crimes)
Assessment of the Threat or Problem
• Establish a clear chain of command and communication
• Activate emergency and evacuation plans as appropriate
• Identify claims of "responsibility" with negotiations as needed
Security Organization and Personnel
• Transit Police and undercover operatives
• Station agents
• Local, state, and federal law enforcement officials and negotiators
• Emergency training for all staff
• Aerial and internal surveillance
Emergency Response
• Alert public safety officials
• Organize emergency medical assistance
• Ensure attention and assistance to the disabled, elderly, and young
• Arrange for transportation alternatives (e.g., "bus bridge", re-routing, and/or re-
scheduling of service)
Media and Multi-lingual activities
• Public address system: issue emergency instructions to passengers and public as
needed
• Arrange multi-lingual staff assistance
• Identify agency spokesperson; may need to relinquish "local control"
Clean-up activities
• Establish a clear chain of command and communication
• Transit Police
• Coordinate with local law enforcement officials
• Collect and preserve evidence if necessary
• Begin arrangements for counseling and support activities
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3.  RECOVERY (FOLLOW-UP)
A.  Crimes Against Property
(e.g., objects thrown at vehicles, arson, and some hate crimes)
Augmented Security
• Secure site and evidence
Clean-up and restoration
• Debris clean-up; restoration
Review and evaluation
• Assess damage
• Make a post incident evaluation
• Review policies and practices
• Devise an improvement plan
Reporting of incident
• Release public information
• Establish communications with local officials and media
• Comply with funding requirements (e.g., Sec. 15)
• Other documentation and dissemination as appropriate
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3. Recovery (Follow-up)
B.  Crimes Against Persons
(e.g., assaults on passengers, assaults on operators or drivers, weapons offenses,
homicides)
Augmented Security
• Secure site and evidence
Clean-up and restoration
• As appropriate
Review and evaluation
• Assess damage
• Make a post incident evaluation
• Crisis and trauma counseling
• Review policies and practices
• Devise an improvement plan
Reporting of incident
• Release public information
• Establish communications with local officials and media
• Comply with funding requirements (e.g., Sec. 15)
• Other documentation and dissemination as appropriate
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3.  Recovery (Follow-up)
C.  Dramatic Impact Crimes
(e.g., terrorism, bomb threats, some hate crimes)
Augmented Security
• Secure site and evidence
• Bring in canine units
• Deploy special security, as needed
Clean-up and restoration
• Debris clean-up; restoration
Review and evaluation
• Assess damage
• Make a post incident evaluation
• Crisis and trauma counseling
• Review policies and practices
• Devise an improvement plan
Reporting of incident
• Release public information
• Establish communications with local officials and media
• Respond to other law enforcement requests
• Comply with funding requirements (e.g., Sec. 15)
• Other documentation and dissemination as appropriate
• Possible peer review
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SECURITY CRITERIA AND THE CASE STUDIES
By Shaun P. McCarthy
In this section the criteria for security of transportation
systems developed by the Volpe Transportation Systems
Center is applied to the four case studies presented above.
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DESIGN AND PLANNING (PRE-INCIDENT)
Security Organization and Personnel
Security Criteria:
9 Transit Police and undercover operatives
9 Visible patrols
9 Local, state, and federal law enforcement
Case Studies:
Paris
• Paris Metro security: uniform and undercover
• Visible patrols
• Local police
NYC
• NYC Police Transit Bureau
• NYPD
• NYFD
• OEM
Atlanta
• 217 sworn, uniformed police officers
• 10 member Special Operations Response Team (SORT)
• City police
Amtrak
• Police department was created in terms of Section 104.305.45 of US Penal
Code.
• Annual Budget of $24.5 million was allocated.
• 346 uniformed police assigned to 28 reporting locations throughout the
US, of which 82% are assigned to the Boston-Massachusetts-Washington
DC line.
• Freight operators provide contract security.
• Additional support is required from local, state, and federal law
enforcement authorities.
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Design and Planning (Pre-Incident)
Security Plans and Procedures
Security Criteria:
9 Mandated crisis management program
9 Clear lines of command and communication to outside
agencies
9 Write emergency operations plan
9 Reach mutual aid agreements
9 Develop reporting forms and procedures
9 Contract hostage negotiators
9 Local law enforcement takes lead on crisis situations,
including hostage negotiations
Case Studies:
Paris
• Emergency Control Plan for serious events
• RATP and Fire Brigade intervention
• Combined RATP and Fire Brigade hierarchy and joint rescue teams
• Plan Rouge mobilization of Civil Defense and Fire Brigade
• Plan Blanc mobilization of emergency medical services and local
hospitals
• Creation of a crisis center and telephone information service
• Classified plan for emergency measures in the event of terrorist attack
NYC
• Emergency Response Plans
• Task force to deal with chemical/biological incidents
• Chemical/Biological Incident Contingency Plan established in 1996
• Established four focus groups:
• Law Enforcement: with representation from NYPD, FBI, US Secret
Service, ATF and US Coast Guard, MTA agencies, NY/NJ Port
Authority, NJ Transit, Amtrak and Con Rail
• Hazmat group: with representation from NYPD, NYFD, Emergency
Medical Services, NYDEP, ATF, Coast Guard FEMA, MTA agencies,
NY/NJ Port Authority, NJ Transit, Amtrak and Con Rail
• Communications planned with representation from NYPD, NYFD-
EMS, OEM, NY Dept of Information Technology and
Telecommunications (DOITT), MTA agencies, Port Authority, NJ
Transit, Amtrak and Con Rail
• Medical coordination designed with representation from NYPD,
84 Security Criteria and the Case Studies - Shaun P. McCarthy
Norman Y. Mineta International Institute for Surface Transportation Policy Studies
NYFD-EMS, NYDEP, NY Dept of Health, NY Health and Hospitals
Corporation, NY Office of Chief Medical Examiner, General NY
Hospitals Association, American Red Cross, OEM, NY Dept of
Information Technology and Telecommunications (DOITT), MTA
agencies, Port Authority, NJ Transit, Amtrak and Con Rail
Atlanta
• Advance planning
• Two officials underwent special FEMA training in crowd control planning
at Mount Weather, Virginia
• Lt. Joe McKinney assigned as full-time Olympics Coordinator
• Planning focused on logistics, manpower, target hardening, and inter-
departmental liaison
• 24-hour physical uniform presence at every station achieved through 12
hour shifts for four consecutive days with one rest day
• Implemented designated responsibility, area matrixes for officers
• 300 additional police officers obtained from other counties and BART
• 40 MARTA administrative personnel re-assigned to assist police
• State Olympic Law Enforcement Command (S.O.L.E.C.) provided an
additional 200 officers
• Intelligence coordination arranged through State Center
• Bomb disposal provided by the ATF
Amtrak
• Emergency Response Plans are in existence, however, details are
classified.
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Design and Planning (Pre-Incident)
Environmental Design
Security Criteria:
9 Protect all facilities with clear path of sight, travel, and access
9 Select materials
9 Ensure visibility
9 Maintain facilities
Case Studies:
Paris
• Fire hazard reduction
• Elimination of all highly combustible materials and potential sources of
toxic fumes
• Modification of car seats to eliminate concealment space
NYC
• None
Atlanta
• Extensive site protection
• Crime prevention through design planning and architecture
• Target hardening
• Bomb-resistant trash containers placed at Olympic Ring Stations
Amtrak
• Passenger railcar crumple impact zones
• Station target hardening
• Vulnerability lies in thousands of miles of exposed tracks
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Design and Planning (Pre-Incident)
Security and Detection Technology
Security Criteria:
9 Surveillance equipment
9 Silent alarms
9 Intrusion sensors
Case Studies:
Paris
• Physical barriers to protect vital systems
• Intrusion alarms
• CCTV surveillance with increased capability to record images for later
investigation and forensic purposes
• Radio positioning systems to monitor RATP security, police vehicles and
personnel in Metro and RER tunnels
NYC
• CAD Fire and Safety system
• Operations Control Center
• Emergency Mobile Command system with CAD system
Atlanta
• CCTV systems in position at all stations
• All buses equipped with GPS
• Perimeter fencing and intruder alarms for power stations
Amtrak
• Incorporated GPS for train tracking
• Regulatory track and signal defect detection technology
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Design and Planning (Pre-Incident)
Communications Equipment and Procedures
Security Criteria:
9 Emergency communication systems and backup
9 Establish a clear chain of command and communication
Case Studies:
Paris
• Two radio networks: surface channel network covers Paris and the
suburbs; a working channel in open network collective mode and local
mode
• All drivers have radios
• Dedicated phone lines situated in stations and at control posts
• Direct lines to emergency services
• Emergency phones for passenger use with alarm systems that indicate
caller location
• Public address system
NYC
• Two-way Radio network; of limited use, however, in tunnels underground
• Completion of $130 million improved radio system is imminent
• Dedicated landlines at regular track intervals
Atlanta
• 24-hr MARTA Police Operations Center (MPOC) served as
communications node between MARTA operations, State Center, FBI,
DOD, and EOD
• MARTA police personnel also dedicated to the State Operations Center
(SOC) and Atlanta City Police Joint Communications Center (JCC)
• SOLEC officers have radios  tuned to the two MARTA frequencies
• Radio protocol standardized to ‘plain talk’ to eliminate misunderstandings.
Amtrak
• Radio network
• Cellular phone backup
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Design and Planning (Pre-Incident)
Training
Security Criteria:
9 Train station agents, operators, and all staff for hostile
events
9 Enact simulation exercises
9 Define special procedures for assistance to seniors,
disabled, and children
9 Develop reporting forms and procedures
Case Studies:
Paris
• Extensive training for each employee
• Regular exercises undertaken in conjunction with Paris Fire Brigade
• 10 to 12 exercises held each year involving all management and staff
• One "major exercise" held every year simulating  fire, explosion, or
collision at a station or in a tunnel
NYC
• Emergency exercises varying from desktop, organized and regularly
planned drills, to “no-notice” response simulations conducted
Atlanta
• SORT officers trained in biological weapons handling and hazardous
materials response
• Numerous bus and train assault scenarios and simulations held
Amtrak
• Table-top exercises
• Regular full-scale "mockup" simulations held annually
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Design and Planning (Pre-Incident)
Emergency Response (Planning and Arrangements)
Security Criteria:
9 Arrange for alerts to public officials
9 Coordinated by police and security units
Case Studies:
Paris
• Three Plans of Action:
a) Emergency Control Plan, applicable to serious accidents in the RER
and Metro
Plan Rouge when the number of victims exceed 10
Plan Blanc which mobilizes emergency medical services
b) Crisis Communications Plan, applicable to management, for setting up
a crisis center
c) A third plan covers measures to be taken in the event of a terrorist
attack.  It is primarily concerned with security, the details of which are
classified.
NYC
• Periodic evaluation of emergency response plans in conjunction with the
mayor’s Office of Emergency Management (OEM) and outside
consultants
• Task Forces to examine emergency response plans after major incidents
affecting other organizations
Atlanta
• Emergency response plan and “Go Team”
• Fully equipped Mobile Emergency Control Center
• Augmented support from state and federal authorities
Amtrak
• Table-top exercises
• Emergency Response Plans in existence, however, they are classified
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Design and Planning (Pre-Incident)
Augmented Security (Prior to special events)
Security Criteria:
9 Additional security agents
9 Incentives for community vigilance
9 Bring in canine units
9 Aerial surveillance
9 Enact simulation exercises with outside agencies
Case Studies:
Paris
• Heightened  awareness since 1986 when Middle Eastern terrorists
detonated 12 bombs in Paris and the surrounding area
NYC
• NYPD City Police
• OEM can muster additional State and Federal Resources
Atlanta
• Assistance from NYC Transit Security and MTA Metro-North Police in
planning critique
Amtrak
• Amtrak depends on local, state and federal law enforcement authorities as
well as freight contractors for augmented security support
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Design and Planning (Pre-Incident)
Media and multi-lingual activity
Security Criteria:
9 Place large notices in vehicles and stations to warn against
unusual occurrences
9 Encourage passenger awareness
9 Ensure outreach to schools, youth, and community groups
9 Arrange general public and community meetings
9 Publish multi-lingual brochures
9 Maintain public relations and marketing departments
Case Studies:
Paris
• Planning arrangements for crisis communications and media center
NYC
• Emergency plans identify responsibility for public and media
communications
Atlanta
• Contingency planning included provisions for concerted efforts to keep
public informed of service schedules and changes
Amtrak
• Standard media policy whereby all media statements are coordinated
through the Public Affairs office in Washington D.C.
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Design and Planning (Pre-Incident)
Availability of “Public Outreach” material
Security Criteria:
9 Visible security personnel
9 Aggressive outreach to community
9 All staff participate in public relations
9 In-house and purchased materials
9 Promote zero tolerance
Case Studies:
Paris
• Information unavailable
NYC
• Public awareness of general safety issues
Atlanta
• Local media
Amtrak
• Information unavailable
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RESPONSE TO INCIDENT
Assessment of the Threat or Problem
Security Criteria:
9 Establish a clear chain of command and communication
9 Activate emergency evacuation plan as appropriate
9 Identify claims of "responsibility" with negotiations as needed
Case Studies:
Paris
• Extensive prior planning
• Previous terrorist activities provided prompt recognition of the nature of
the problem and what was needed to respond effectively
• Threat perception at the time of the attack was high
• Intelligence activity and coverage was intense
• As a rule, intelligence analysis and warning from government agencies to
commerce and industry in France is good
NYC
(Not a specific incident-related comparison)
• World Trade Center bombing
• In 1993 the NYC Police and the FBI arrested Islamic extremists plotting to
blow up the Lincoln Tunnel and the United Nations Headquarters
• Ferguson shooting in 1993
• Petrol bombing by Edward Leary in 1994
• Suicide bombers plot to blow themselves up on the NYC transit system
• Chemical attacks on the Tokyo subway increase perception of threat
(These incidents have all elevated threat perception. Like Paris, NYC remains
in a constant state of "high alert".)
Atlanta
• Assessment of the Olympics as a "high risk" event
• With estimated number of 12 million spectators, a four to fivefold increase
in passenger numbers was expected
• MARTA was the backbone of spectator transport system
• Centennial Park bombing, although not affecting MARTA itself, resulted
in increased security awareness following the incident
• Despite threat expectation, no specific intelligence provided any warning
of any planned attacks against the MARTA system
Amtrak
• No prior threat assessment or warnings were received
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Response to Incident
Security Organization and Personnel
Security Criteria:
9 Transit Police and undercover operatives
9 Station agents
9 Local, state, and federal law enforcement officials, and
negotiators
9 Aerial and internal surveillance
Case Studies:
Paris
• Patrols by 700 RATP security force on RER and Metro trains and stations
• Augmented by 400 National Police
• French troops mobilized and deployed in Paris when bombings continued
NYC
(Not a specific incident-related comparison)
• NYC Transit Bureau
• NYPD uniform and undercover patrols
• Law Enforcement Focus Group
• Hazardous Materials Focus Group
• Communications Focus Group
• Medical Focus Group
Atlanta
• Following the Centennial Park bombing, MARTA and S.O.L.E.C. Police
were placed on full alert
• Additional police presence was provided by keeping existing shift officers
on duty at stations, augmented by new shift officers
• All stations were immediately searched for suspicious devices
• On two subsequent occasions stations were closed while suspect objects
were investigated
Amtrak
• Eight railroad police officers were available in the state of Arizona
• Maricopa County Sheriff’s Department was the first law enforcement
authority on the scene
• Over 50 deputies and local law enforcement officers responded
• FBI agents were on the scene within eight hours and a nine-mile perimeter
was established
• Federal Railroad Administration inspectors and NTSB arrived promptly
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Response to Incident
Emergency Response
Security Criteria:
9 Alert public safety officials
9 Organize emergency medical assistance
9 Ensure attention and assistance to the disabled, elderly, and
young
9 Arrange for transportation alternatives (e.g., "bus-bridge",
rerouting, and/or rescheduling of service)
Case Studies:
Paris
• Initiated three emergency plans
• Initiated Crisis Communications Plan
• Implemented "Vigipirate"
NYC
(Not specific incident related comparison)
• NYC Transit Emergency Response Plan
• Mayor's Office of Emergency Management (OEM)
Atlanta
• No additional measures beyond the full alert were in place for a number of
hours after the Centennial Park bombing
Amtrak
• First rescue helicopter arrived within 45 minutes after the derailment
• Helicopters from Maricopa County, the Arizona Dept of Public Safety, the
National Guard and the USAF Air Evac transported the injured to hospital
• The Red Cross mobilized a center in Phoenix
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Response to Incident
Media and Multilingual Services
Security Criteria:
9 Install a public address system: issue emergency
instructions to passengers and public as needed
9 Arrange multi-lingual staff assistance
9 Identify agency spokesperson; may need to relinquish
"local control"
Case Studies:
Paris
• RER public relations department managed media inquires and provided
information to passengers and employees and their relatives
NYC
(Not a specific incident-related comparison)
• OEM has the primary responsibility for communication with the public
• Information pertaining to service operations and train or bus schedules is
the responsibility of the operating agency
• NYC Transit Public Address System broadcasts train and service
announcements as well as general safety advice
Atlanta
• MARTA maintained a consistent effort to keep public informed of
changes to entry and exit points at stations
Amtrak
• Media officers were dispatched to the scene immediately
• All public policy statements were issued through Amtrak Washington,
D.C.
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Response to Incident
Clean-up activities
Security Criteria:
9 Establish a clear chain of command and communication
9 Use the Transit Police
9 Coordinate with local law enforcement officials
9 Collect and preserve evidence if necessary
9 Arrange for counseling and or support activities
Case Studies:
Paris
• Initial efforts focused on:
a) immediate treatment and rescue of victims: dead and injured removed
and treated within first three hours
b) police investigation completed within six hours
c) operational recovery: damage surveys were initiated within 20 minutes
of the blast; Rolling Stock Lifting Team deployed immediately; minor
repairs completed overnight
NYC
(Not specific incident related comparison)
• Implementation of the incident command system
• CAD fire and safety system
• Operations Control Center
• Emergency mobile command system with CAD system
Atlanta
• Not applicable
Amtrak
• Derailment was classified as a crime scene during the early stages of the
investigation
• Site was sealed and a nine-mile perimeter was enforced
• Southern Pacific Railway Police enforced perimeter security and access
control
• By 9.30 a.m. the FBI evidence gathering teams were operational and
everyone within the perimeter was interviewed by FBI investigators
• Passengers were taken on buses with a police escort to Phoenix and
housed in the local Holiday Inn where they were interviewed by the FBI
• Aerial photographs were taken before the four damaged cars were
removed
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RECOVERY AND FOLLOW-UP
Augmented Security
Security Criteria:
9 Secure site and evidence
9 Bring in canine units
9 Deploy special security as needed
Case Studies:
Paris
• Government launched Operation "Vigipirate", mobilizing 37,000 soldiers
• In Paris 5,000 soldiers and additional police were mobilized to patrol
trains, stations, bus terminals, and airports
• Identity checks were stepped up
• Immediate sealing of over 8,000 trash containers in RER and Metro
stations
• Public restrooms were sealed
• Increased covert and overt surveillance
• Posters were put up enlisting public cooperation
• RATP’s 700 personnel were augmented by 3,000 additional agents
• 50 RER and Metro station entrances were closed for security reasons
• City and national police initiated a round-up of suspected terrorists
NYC
(Not a specific incident-related comparison)
• NYC Transit Police
• NYPD Transit Bureau
• Local, state, and federal law enforcement authorities provide additional
security if needed
Atlanta
• No additional security measures subsequently implemented
Amtrak
• Sixteen railroad police officers
• 150 FBI investigators
• Federal Railroad Administration (FRA)
• National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)
• Investigation revealed the necessity of increasing track security measures
and patrols
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Recovery and Follow-up
Clean-up and restoration
Security Criteria:
9 Debris clean-up; restoration
9 Operational recovery
9 Restore public confidence
Case Studies:
Paris
• Dead and injured removed and treated within three hours
• Work crews replaced the overhead power line within five hours
• Police investigation on the scene was completed within six hours
• Operational recovery was completed overnight
NYC
(Not a specific incident-related comparison)
• After immediate rescue and treatment of victims, operational recovery is
considered the most important objective
Atlanta
• Not applicable as Centennial Park explosion was not on MARTA property
Amtrak
• Prompt evaluation of the cause of derailment
• Prompt establishment of incident site security and perimeter access control
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Recovery and Follow-up
Review and evaluation
Security Criteria:
9 Assess the damage
9 Make a post incident evaluation
9 Initiate crisis and trauma counseling
9 Review policies and practices
9 Devise an improvement plan
Case Studies:
Paris
• Some delays in initial communications within the RATP
• RATP had problems with communication between rescue teams at the
scene and operational command at street level due to explosion damage
and a subsequent electrical arc
• Local control centers were not properly notified that a family contact unit
and toll-free number had been established
• No clear delineation of authority between the government and the RATP
with regard to public notification
• Some RATP staff were prevented from reaching the scene due to stringent
police access control and no liaison RATP official assigned to police
• There were no public address broadcasts in English
• Disclosure of information to families was incomplete because victims had
not yet been identified
NYC
(Not a specific incident-related comparison)
• Not applicable here as no specific incident has been addressed
Atlanta
• Necessity for advance planning as an essential step in planning for major
events
• Self-sufficiency as far as possible
• Self-reliance
• Operational flexibility
• Seek advice and support
• Security is inconvenient, however, it is a necessity
• Strive for a balance between optimal security and service disruption
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• Ensure that a good communications system is in place and that a common
communication language is used
• Maintain functional responsibility and avoid cross functions
• Logistics management
• Provide security and rescue personnel with support to maintain morale
Amtrak
• Vulnerability of tracks in remote and desolate areas exposed
• Necessity for a closer relationship between Amtrak and law enforcement
and local authorities was highlighted
• Closer relationship with National Association of Sheriffs and National
Association of Police Chiefs is being developed
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Recovery and Follow-up
Reporting of incident
Security Criteria:
9 Release public information
9 Establish communications with local officials and media
9 Respond to other law enforcement requests
9 Comply with funding requirements
9 Publish other documentation and disseminate as appropriate
9 Arrange for possible peer review
Case Studies:
Paris
• RATP established a public information center at a café close to the station
entrance which was kept open for five and a half hours following the blast
NYC
• Not applicable
Atlanta
• No problems with reporting were identified at the Centennial bombing
incident
Amtrak
• No changes to communications procedures were identified or
implemented
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A CHRONOLOGY OF TERRORIST ATTACKS
ON SURFACE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS
1920-1997
(Including Other Significant Incidents)
By Brian M. Jenkins
KEY OBSERVATIONS
• Terrorist attacks on surface transportation systems have increased over the
past 25 years.
• Bombing (not counting bomb threats) is the most common tactic and, in
the industrialized nations, bombing is the deadliest form of attack.
• Israel has had the most attacks on surface  transportation.
• India and Pakistan head the list as the countries where the most incidents
with fatalities and deaths overall have occurred.
• Terrorist attacks on public transportation are often intended to kill; 35
percent involve fatalities; more than two-thirds of the attacks are clearly
intended to kill.
• While slaughter is not the primary goal of terrorism, large scale deaths are
becoming an acceptable way of spreading fear, as confirmed by the fact
that 80 percent of the attacks on surface transportation with deaths involve
multiple fatalities and 30 percent of these involve 10 or more fatalities.
• Western Europe, North America, and Japan account for 27 percent of the
total number of incidents but only nine percent of these incidents involve
fatalities.  This indicates that alarm and disruption, and not fatalities, are
the principle threat faced by industrialized nations.  However, incidents
with large-scale casualties have occurred in the industrialized world (i.e.,
the Bologna train station bombing, the attacks on Paris subways, and the
Tokyo nerve gas attack.)
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INTRODUCTION
The following chronology of attacks on surface transportation systems was
compiled by the Kroll-O’Gara Company to support an ongoing Department of
Transportation-sponsored project to identify "best practices" in security
against terrorist attacks on surface transportation.  This chronology
accompanies the first formal report of that study, Protecting Surface
Transportation Systems And Patrons from Terrorist Activities.
The chronology is intended to offer a thorough understanding of the terrorist
threat to surface transportation systems by reviewing the incidents that have
occurred during the last three-quarters of this century.  Entries derive from
three principal sources:  The first is the book, Railway Disasters of the World,
(1994) by Peter Semmens.1  Although limited to major rail disasters, this
source provides a useful historical background to incidents that occurred
before 1968.  (Entries from this source are indicated by the initials P S.)
The second source is a chronology of incidents of international terrorism
originally compiled by the Rand Corporation as part of its research program
on sub-national conflict, and in recent years maintained by the Center for the
Study of Terrorism and Political Violence at St. Andrews University in
Scotland.  The author wishes to note the excellent and important research
being done and valuable assistance provided by these two institutions.
The third source is a computerized chronology of armed conflicts, significant
incidents of terrorism, and other major crimes maintained by the Information
Services of the Kroll-O’Gara Company (KINS).  The KINS database provided
most of the material on the incidents that occurred in the 1990s.  All of the
information in the chronology originally comes from public domain sources.
No government classified or proprietary information is included and the
Department of Transportation provided no input.
The chronology includes guerrilla attacks, terrorist attacks, and incidents of
serious crime where the transportation system or passengers were the principal
target.  It excludes conventional warfare (e.g., aerial bombings of railroad
yards) and acts of wartime sabotage. Admittedly, the boundary between
wartime sabotage and guerrilla or terrorist attacks is blurred.  Armed conflict
is not easily bounded.  Guerrilla warfare may ascend to levels approaching
conventional war (e.g., the civil war in Angola) and terrorists often assert that
                                               
1
 Peter Semmens, Railway Disasters of the World: Principal passenger train accidents of the
20th century, (Patrick Stephens Limited, Somerset,1994)
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they legitimately wage war and thus ought not to be separately categorized as
terrorists or criminals.
On somewhat arbitrary grounds, the chronology includes the IRA's campaign
in the United Kingdom, the Palestinian campaign against Israel, and armed
assaults and acts of sabotage carried out by guerrillas throughout the
developing world.  It excludes the historically more distant campaigns
conducted by partisans, guerrillas, and resistance fighters in China in the early
years of the century, Spain during the Civil War, Indochina during the first
Indochina war, and Algeria during its struggle for independence.
Although this chronology may at the moment be the most complete chronicle
of attacks on surface transportation systems, it is certainly not comprehensive.
It includes some of the more serious bomb threats but certainly not the total
number of bomb threats which, for example, averaged 50 a week in France
following the detonation of a terrorist bomb in the Paris subways.  It cannot
possibly include all of the incidents of sabotage that have occurred during
periods of labor strife.  It should be seen as broadly representative of the
threat.
The chronology lists 631 incidents.  Some of these include multiple events,
i.e., bomb threats or bombings.  As a result, and in some cases owing to
incomplete information requiring judgments about categories, the numbers
indicated in the following charts may not precisely match.  The entries include
threats and attacks on trains and subways, train and subway stations and the
rails themselves, buses and bus terminals, bridges and tunnels, and other
transportation targets.  (See Figure 2-1, Targets)  The incidents are almost
equally divided between attacks on rail transportation (trains, subways,
stations, and rails) and bus transport (buses and terminals).
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Figure 2-1  Targets
Targets of Attacks on Public Surface Transportation Systems (1920 – 1997)
Figure 2-2  Tactics
Used against Surface Transportation Systems (1920 – 1997)
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Bombing is the most common tactic, accounting for 61 percent of the attacks.
This is generally true of terrorism overall.  Ambushes and armed assaults
account for 10 percent of the attacks.  These include incidents when guerrillas
or terrorists set up road blocks, ambush buses, derail or block trains, and then
murder passengers.  Seven percent of the incidents are standoff attacks when
guerrillas or terrorists fire rockets, machineguns, or rifles at passing trains or
buses.  Five percent involve hostage situations and four percent mechanical
sabotage, usually against rails.  (See figure 2-2, Tactics.)
Are terrorist attacks on surface transportation increasing?  They appear to be.
However, the increase is difficult to quantify precisely and it is not as
dramatic as the totals for the most recent years suggest.  The chronology lists
only 17 incidents for the period 1920 to 1970, a growing number of incidents
in the 1970s and 1980s (217 attacks for the period) reflecting the overall
increase in terrorist activity during this time.  There is a significant jump in
the 1990s when 312 attacks are recorded in the five years from 1991 to 1995
and 118 attacks are recorded for the 18 months from January 1996 to June
1997.  However, much of this rise is due to the differences in criteria which
governed the original sources used in the compilation of the chronology.
The first 50 years of this chronology derive exclusively from Peter Semmens’
Railway Disasters of the World which focused on incidents involving
significant casualties and excluded attacks on bus systems.  Entries for the
next two decades derive mostly from the Rand Corporation's chronology,
which includes only incidents of international terrorism, that is, incidents
where terrorists have crossed national frontiers to carry out attacks or have
attacked foreign targets within their own country.  It thus excludes attacks on
indigenous targets by local terrorists.  More complete recording comes from
the Kroll-O’Gara database which covers the 1990s and includes all significant
attacks: terrorist and criminal, trans-national and local.
Nonetheless, we have seen an increase in attacks on public transportation as
terrorism has increased over the past quarter century and more recently as
terrorists have demonstrated greater willingness to kill indiscriminately.  The
Irish Republican Army's long-running terrorist campaign in the United
Kingdom has included numerous attacks on rail lines, trains, subways, and
stations.  Palestinian terrorists have carried out numerous attacks on Israeli
buses and bus stations.  Algerian extremists directed their 1995 terrorist
campaign in France against the subway and rail system.  The first large-scale
terrorist use of chemical weapons was carried out in Tokyo's subways, an
ideal environment for chemical attack.  Islamic extremists in New York
planned to attack the city's bridges and tunnels in 1993 and its subways in
1997.
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These events clearly indicate that contemporary terrorists have made public
transportation a new theater of operations.  For those determined to kill in
quantity and willing to kill indiscriminately, public transportation offers an
ideal target.  It is public, used by millions of people daily.  There is
necessarily little security with no obvious chokepoints (like those at airports)
to inspect passengers and parcels.  The passengers are strangers promising
attackers anonymity and easy escape.  Concentrations of people in contained
environments are especially vulnerable to conventional explosives and
unconventional weapons.  Also, attacks on public transportation, the
circulatory systems of urban environments, cause great disruption and alarm
which are the traditional goals of terrorism.
The statistics support the observation that terrorists see public transportation
systems as a killing field.  Most terrorist violence is symbolic, intended to
cause alarm rather than casualties.  Historically, only about 20 percent of all
international terrorist incidents have involved fatalities, although that figure
has risen in recent years, reflecting an erosion of the self-imposed constraints
that traditionally limited terrorist mayhem.  In contrast, more than 35 percent
of the attacks on surface transportation systems involve fatalities and more
than two-thirds of the attacks clearly were intended to kill.  Serious injuries
were caused when bombs went off in crowded passenger terminals and when
speeding trains were derailed.  The reporting has been generous in the
definition of incidents not clearly intended to kill: these incidents include
bomb threats, attacks on property, sabotage of rails and bridges where no
crash occurred, all hostage situations where no one died, and bombs defused
because a warning may have been given.  When in doubt, the incident was
counted as not intended to kill.
Further evidence of the rise in violence is provided by the proportion of
incidents with multiple fatalities.  (See Figure 2-3 Total Incidents With
Fatalities)  For terrorism in general, the vast majority of all fatal terrorist
attacks involve a single death, although again, in recent years, the proportion
of incidents with multiple fatalities has moved upward, reflecting terrorists'
growing willingness to escalate their violence.  However, more than 80
percent of the attacks on surface transportation with any fatalities involve two
or more deaths, and 30 percent involve 10 or more deaths.  The median fatal
incident involves four deaths and the deadliest incidents more than 100 deaths.
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Figure 2-3  Total Incidents With Fatalities
On Public Surface Transportation Systems (1920 – 1997)
Figure 2-4  The Deadliest Cases
(25 or more fatalities)
of Attacks on Public Transportation Systems (11920 – 1997)
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How do the deadliest incidents occur?  Armed assaults on trains, that is, when
a train is derailed or sabotaged and the passengers are attacked and killed,
account for the two deadliest incidents in the chronology.  Bombs on trains are
the most frequent cause of incidents with 25 or more fatalities, followed by
train derailments and armed assaults on buses.  (See Figure 2-4, The Deadliest
Cases)
Armed assaults on trains or buses are a feature of rural guerrilla warfare.
They are not likely to occur in the industrialized nations or in urban areas
where the deadliest threat comes from bombs.  This difference is borne out by
examining where the most fatalities have occurred: India, Pakistan, Cambodia,
Angola, and Israel head the list.  (See Figure 2-5 Countries With the Most
Fatalities)  The areas where the most incidents with fatalities occur gives a
similar picture:  India, Pakistan, Israel, Algeria, and Egypt are at the top.  (See
Figure 2-6, Location of Attacks With Fatalities)
Israel ranks high in both lists due to the deadly campaign of terrorist
bombings on buses and in bus terminals.  Israel also heads the list in suffering
the most attacks overall followed by India, the United Kingdom, Pakistan, and
Egypt.  The United Kingdom's record reflects the IRA’s terrorist campaign,
which includes numerous incidents of sabotage, bomb threats, and bombs with
warnings but few incidents with fatalities.
This data reflects the general pattern for the countries of Western Europe,
North America, and Japan.  Although a total of 176 attacks are recorded for
these countries in the chronology, representing 27 percent of the total number
of incidents, only 20 of the incidents since 1970 involve fatalities.  (See
Figure 2-6 Location of Attacks With Fatalities)  The median number of
fatalities in the industrialized nations is two.
This suggests that the threat faced by the industrialized nations is primarily
one of alarm and disruption, the traditional goals of terrorism, and not deaths.
It also suggests that it will be difficult to make persuasive arguments for
costly and potentially disruptive security measures unless these are absolutely
necessary and promise to be effective in preventing even costlier and more
disruptive interruptions of service.  These measures must also contribute
significantly to reducing ordinary crime, or must be psychologically and
politically necessary to reassure an alarmed public that something is being
done.
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Figure 2-5  Countries with the Most Fatalities
in Attacks on Public Surface Transportation Systems (1920 – 1997)
Figure 2-6  Location of Attacks With Fatalities
on Public Surface Transportation Systems (1920 – 1997)
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At the same time as we have witnessed large-scale attacks in the industrialized
countries (84 killed in a train station in Italy; an alarming first use of chemical
warfare in Tokyo's subway); we have seen thwarted plots, narrow misses, and
fortunate outcomes like the foiled plan to detonate truck bombs in New York's
tunnels, the discovery of a potential suicide bombing in New York's subways,
and the derailment of a speeding passenger train in which only one person
died.  These are dangerous indicators of future trends.  The challenge will be
to define the appropriate level of security against such statistically rare but
high consequence events.  It is a recurring problem in dealing with terrorism.
A Chronology of Terrorist Attacks – Brian M. Jenkins 113
Norman Y. Mineta International Institute for Surface Transportation Policy Studies
CHRONOLOGY
OF TERRORIST ATTACKS ON SURFACE
TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS
(The initials PS following an entry indicate the source to be Railway Disasters
of the World, (1994) by Peter Semmens.)
India - October 7, 1920 - Train derailed by disgruntled workers
The "Madras-Bangalore Mail" train was derailed by disgruntled workers,
who removed a section of the railroad.  Thirteen people were killed and 15
others were injured in the incident. (PS)
India - July 8, 1920 - Train derails killing 25 people, injuring 60 others
On July 8, a train was derailed in Belur resulting in 25 deaths and at least
60 injuries.  It was the eighth sabotage attempt on the Indian railways in
recent months. (PS)
China - December 27, 1930 - Train sabotaged near Beijing
On December 27, bandits caused the explosion of the boiler of a train on
the south-west Manchuria railroad, causing 80 deaths and many other injuries.
The bandits robbed the train and kidnapped 20 passengers for ransom. (PS)
Hungary - September 13, 1931 - Train attack kills 25 people
On September 13, a bomb exploded on an international express train en
route from Budapest to Vienna, Austria, killing 25 people on board.  A note
found near the explosion site stated, "Brother Proletarians.  If the capitalist
state cannot provide work, we shall get it ourselves.  We have plenty of petrol
and explosives." (PS)
India - January 12, 1939 - Train sabotaged, 21 people killed
On January 12, the "Dehra Dun Express" train from Howrah was sabotaged
when missing rail tracks caused the train to derail, resulting in 21 deaths and
71 injuries.  Two more attempts against the railways were staged in the
following two months, and a total of 131 incidents of wrecking or attempted
wrecking was reported in the previous 10 years. (PS)
United States - August 12, 1939 - Saboteurs derail train, killing 24 people
The Union Pacific Railroad's streamlined express, "City of San Francisco",
was derailed while traveling at 60 miles per hour, 16 miles west of Carlin,
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Nevada, as a result of sabotage.  A section of rail track was taken out of place,
causing the derailment, which resulted in 24 deaths and 115 injuries. (PS)
India - May 16, 1942 - Train derailed by extremists, resulting in 22 deaths
A Sindh sect known as the Hurs attacked the "Punjab Mail" train en route
from Karachi to Lahore, some 140 miles from Karachi.  The assailants first
derailed the train by moving tracks from the railroad, then attacked the
passengers who survived the crash with guns and axes, killing 22 people and
injuring 26 others.  Four days later, another train narrowly averted a similar
attempt.  In August 1942, 258 train stations were destroyed and 40 trains were
derailed by saboteurs when leaders of the Indian Congress were arrested. (PS)
France - December 3, 1947 - Saboteurs derail train, killing 21 people
On December 3, saboteurs derailed a night train en route from Paris to Lille
by removing a section of the railroad, killing 21 people on board.  This attack
followed a general railway strike declared a week before.  More derailment
attempts were made on the same day but none had such serious consequences.
(PS)
Indonesia - May 8, 1959 - Train derails killing 92 people
An express train en route from Bandjar to Bandung derailed and fell into a
ravine near Tasikmalaja, killing 92 people and injuring 14 others.  Police
suspect the train was sabotaged. (PS)
Myanmar - March 26, 1961 - Mine bomb under train kills 23 people
Karen rebels planted and exploded a mine under a Mandalay-Rangoon
train on March 26, killing 23 people and injuring 100 others.  The rebels also
took 60 other hostages.  The passengers were mainly government officials and
soldiers. (PS)
India - April 19, 1961 - Train derails killing 23 people
A passenger train was derailed near Siliguri, West Bengal, killing 23
people and injuring 77 others, some 28 seriously.  Police suspect the train was
sabotaged. (PS)
India - February, 1966 - Three attacks on trains by Naga tribesmen
In first of three attacks on trains by Naga tribesmen, 37 people were killed
when a bomb exploded on the Assam Mail train.  The exact location and the
date were not reported. (PS)
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India - April 20, 1966 - Naga tribesmen bomb train
Naga tribesmen detonated a bomb on a train standing in Lumding station,
killing 57 people. (PS)
India - April 26, 1966 - Naga tribesmen bomb another train
In a similar attack to the one on April 20, Naga tribesmen bombed a train
near the borders of Nagaland, killing 39 people and injuring some 60 others.
(PS)
Germany - February 10, 1970 - Grenade attack on bus at Munich airport'
Three Arab terrorists killed an Israeli citizen and wounded 11 other Israeli
passengers in a grenade attack on a bus at the Munich airport.  The three were
arrested.  Two Palestinian organizations -- the PFLP and the AOLP -- were
responsible for the attack.  The terrorists were set free after the September 6,
1970, hijacking of one Swiss and two U.S. airliners.
Israel - February 23, 1970 - Guerrillas ambush tourist bus
Guerrillas ambushed a tourist bus near the occupied town of Hebron in the
West Bank and killed an American woman.
Israel - November 6, 1970 - Bombing at the central bus station in Tel Aviv
A bomb exploded in the central bus station in Tel Aviv, followed by
another explosion there 20 minutes later.  Two people were killed and 34
wounded in the attack which was credited to Al Fatah.  On November 8, Abu
Iyad of Fatah issued a statement in Amman saying that these were "the start of
more and bigger operations within our occupied homeland."
Austria - January 27, 1972 - Croatian terrorists bomb train
Croatian terrorists were suspected of placing a bomb that exploded on a
train en route from Vienna to Zagreb, Yugoslavia, injuring six people.
Israel - July 11, 1972 - Bombing at Tel Aviv bus terminal
In reprisal for Kanafani's death on July 9, the PFLP threw a grenade in a
Tel Aviv bus terminal, wounding nine.
United Kingdom - September 8, 1973 - Bombing at King's Cross and Eus-
ton stations
Two men and a woman were injured seriously when terrorists exploded
two bombs in King's Cross and Euston railway stations in London.  At least
ten other persons suffered lesser injuries in the explosions.  It was believed
that the IRA was responsible for the bombings.
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United Kingdom - September 8, 1973 - Bombing at Victoria Station
A bomb exploded at Victoria Station in London, injuring four people.  A
caller with an Irish accent telephoned a warning four minutes before the
explosion.  The IRA was responsible for the attack.
United Kingdom - February 3, 1974 - Bombing on bus kills 11 people
A 50-pound bomb that was apparently concealed in a suitcase smashed a
bus which was carrying soldiers and their families back from leave to their
camp in County Durham, as the bus was traveling through Yorkshire.  Eleven
people were killed and 14 injured.  Officials in London attributed the attack to
the IRA.
United Kingdom - April 6, 1974 - Bombing in railway station, shops
Blasts attributed to the IRA damaged an office building and railway station
in Birmingham, England, and stores in suburban London, and injured two
policemen in Manchester.
Austria - April 17, 1974 - Bomb threat on train bound for Rome
Vienna police received an anonymous call from a man claiming to
represent the "Justice Guerrillas" with a message that radioactive material had
been placed aboard a brain bound for Rome.  Police found a substantial but
not lethal amount of radioactive material, Iodine 131, under the seat of a first-
class compartment of the Vienna-Rome Express in Vienna.  There were no
threats made to life or property.  The contamination was suspected to be the
result of an unattended shipment by a Vienna drug company of medical Iodine
131 which was intended for a hospital in Linz for use in medical diagnosis.  It
was reported missing after the railroad car was contaminated.  This shipment,
consisting of three packages, remained unattended on a baggage truck in
Vienna main railroad station for approximately two hours on April 12, in spite
of existing regulations for safe handling of radioactive material.  It is not clear
from the sketchy reports on the incident whether the packages were marked to
indicate their contents.  The incident attracted widespread publicity.  Hoax
callers with threats caused alerts, and these brought about delays as Geiger
counter checks were made of trains leaving Vienna.  On April 22, the Austrian
police offered a reward for the capture of the "Justice Guerrillas."  They later
announced the arrest of an individual with a history of mental illness.  His
actions, he said, were meant to be a protest against the treatment of mentally
ill patients in Austrian hospitals.  The political consequences appear to have
been minimal.
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France - July 16, 1974 - Bomb attacks destroy 13 buses
A series of bomb attacks destroyed 13 buses in a parking lot and along the
route of the Tour de France bicycle race near Lourdes and Saint-Lary, in
which Spanish riders competed.  GARI claimed responsibility for bombings.
Italy - August 4, 1974 - Train bombing kills 12 people, injures 48
On August 4, a bomb exploded on a train passing through La Direttissima
tunnel en route from Florence to Bologna, killing 12 people and injuring 48
others.  Right wing extremists were blamed for the attack.
Israel - March 28, 1975 - Bombing injures 13 people
Bomb blasts wounded 13 persons traveling on a bus in Jerusalem.
Palestinian guerrillas in Beirut claimed responsibility for the action.
Israel - May 14, 1975 - Parked Arab-owned bus burns
A parked Arab-owned bus was burned in Jerusalem.  A new group called
"Terror for Terror, and Eye for an Eye" reportedly burned the bus in
retaliation for the burning of a Jewish-owned bus in Ramallah, in Israeli-
occupied territory on the West Bank of the Jordan.
United Kingdom - October 9, 1975 - Bomb explosion kills 1 person, in-
jures 20
A bomb exploded near a bus stop at the entrance to Green Park subway
station in London, causing one death and 20 injuries.  The IRA was held
responsible for the attack.
Netherlands - December 2, 1975 - Armed extremists kill passengers and
take hostage on train
Seven armed extremists, calling themselves the "Free South Moluccan
Youths" and demanding independence for the Indonesian Island of South
Molucca, seized a passenger train near Beilen in the Northern Netherlands,
killing at least three people and taking about 64 hostages.  Twenty-six of the
original 64 hostages either escaped or were released, leaving a total of 38
hostages on the Beilen train.  The terrorists demanded a bus to Schiphol
airport near Amsterdam, and a plane to fly them to an unknown destination.
Later, in another note, they demanded the release of five Moluccans held in
Dutch prisons on charges of terrorist actions, and Dutch recognition of what
they called their "government in exile."  An explosion aboard the hijacked
train injured one of the extremists and slightly wounded a passenger hostage.
The young Asian terrorists surrendered to police on December 14, releasing
the remaining hostages after a 12-day siege of the train.  The terrorists were
tried and sentenced to 14 years in prison.
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In an apparently separate coordinated terrorist action by South Moluccans in
their struggle for an East Indian homeland, six armed South Moluccans shot
their way into the Indonesian Consulate in central Amsterdam and took a
reported 47 persons hostage.  At least three consulate staffers were injured by
gunfire or fell as they climbed out of consulate windows and down a rope
from the roof of the building in order to escape.  One consular official, injured
when he jumped from an upper floor, died later in a hospital.  Three other
staffers inside the consulate were believed wounded in the initial gunfire.  The
last of 16 children originally captured in the consulate school were released on
December 8 by the South Moluccans in return for certain concessions, leaving
27 adult hostages in the building.  Gunmen at both sites, the Indonesian
Consulate and the Beilen train hijacked on December 2, sought independence
for the Moluccan Island group ruled by Holland for nearly three centuries, and
presently part of Indonesia, the  release of 25 comrades in Dutch jails, and
safe passage.  The six terrorists surrendered, ending the 16-day siege on
December 19.  The remaining 27 hostages were released unharmed.
United Kingdom - February 12, 1976 - IRA bomb defused
A twenty-pound IRA bomb was defused by police during rush hour at
London's busy Oxford Circus subway station.
United Kingdom - March 4, 1976 - IRA bomb explodes on commuter
train
A 10-pound IRA bomb placed under a seat exploded in a commuter train in
the morning, minutes after hundreds of rush-hour passengers disembarked at
Cannon Street Station in London.
United Kingdom - March 15, 1976 - Explosive on subway
An explosive device was set off in a London subway train at West Ham
station, injuring eight people.  The perpetrator shot the engineer of the train to
death and wounded another man before shooting himself.  The IRA was
suspected.
United Kingdom - March 18, 1976 - Subway station bombing
A bomb exploded in an empty subway car as it pulled out of Wood Green
Station in London.  One person was injured in the blast.  The IRA is held
responsible for the attack.
Israel - July 18, 1976 - Bomb on bus injures 11 people
A bomb exploded on a bus near Tel Aviv injuring 11 people.  Three Arabs
who were injured by the explosion in the Tel Aviv suburb of Ramat Gan were
among the suspects.  The bombing was the first since the Israeli raid to rescue
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more than 100 hijacked hostages in Uganda, which brought threats of reprisals
from Arab guerrillas.
Egypt - August 14, 1976 - Bomb on train kills 8 passengers
A time bomb exploded on an Alexandria train killing eight passengers and
wounding 59.  There were four perpetrators of the incident.  It has been stated
that the perpetrators were all Libyan intelligence agents, recruited by the
Libyan intelligence service to carry out sabotage.
Egypt - March 9, 1977 - Police arrest five bombing suspects
Police arrested five people for planting bombs on railway tracks west of
Al-Alamein.  The group confessed to working for Libyan intelligence, which
had given them military training.
Israel - April 24, 1977 - Bombing on bus
A bomb exploded on board a bus on its way to Beersheba, injuring 28 an
dripping out seats and smashing windows.  Arab passengers going to their
jobs had left the bus ten minutes earlier and were suspected in the bombing.
Netherlands - May 23, 1977 - South Moluccan terrorists seize express
train
South Moluccan terrorists, in two separate actions, seized an express train
near Groningen and occupied a school in Bovensmilde.  Fifty-six people were
taken hostage in the train and 110 children and teachers at the school.  The
terrorists demanded the release of 21 South Moluccans from Dutch prisons
and air transport out of the country.  All 105 children and one teacher were
released on May 27 after a virus infection struck the hostages at the school.
The four terrorists in the school continued to hold the four remaining teachers.
Three train hostages were freed between 4 and 8 June because of possible
health problems.  After several days of stalemated talks, on 11 June, Dutch
troops stormed the train and the school in simultaneous operations and two
hostages were killed in the assault on the train.  There were no casualties at
the school.  The seven surviving terrorists were taken into custody by Dutch
authorities.  After trial they were sentenced in September 1977 to prison terms
ranging from six to nine years.  An eighth defendant, charged with assisting in
planning the operations, received a one-year sentence.
United States - September 2, 1977 - Bombs protesting the Panama Canal
Treaty
Bombs placed on Route One in Florida by the Luis Boitel Commandos
between Homestead and Key West exploded.  The bombs were in protest to
the Panama Canal Treaty signing being held in Washington, D.C., and also for
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the opening, six days earlier, of Cuba's first diplomatic offices in Washington,
D.C. in 17 years.
France - October 19, 1977 - Buses bombed
Firebombs were thrown at three West German tourist buses in Paris and
two in Nice.
Italy - October 22, 1977 - Buses bombed
A bomb slightly damaged a West German tourist bus parked in Bolzano.
Austria - December 4, 1977 - Bomb aboard train
A bomb exploded in the lavatory of the Belgrade express train after it had
left the Austrian border station of Spielfeld and crossed into Yugoslavia.  No
one was reported injured.
Yugoslavia - December 5, 1977 - Bomb aboard train from West Germany
Police discovered a bomb aboard an international train traveling from West
Germany.  All 140 passengers were evacuated before the bomb was
detonated.  The bomb had been planted in the last coach of the West German
Railways train.  No details were available as to the extent of the damage.
Israel - December 7, 1977 - Guerrilla members arrested
Israeli security forces arrested eight members of an Arab guerrilla group
that had been active in the area, and seized arms and explosives found in their
possession.  The arrested men were all members of Al Fatah, the Arab
guerrilla organization.  They were suspected of trying to sabotage the railway
line near Jerusalem in April and placing a bomb in a village near Jerusalem.
France - December 26, 1977 - Bombs explode in Christmas attack
Two bombs exploded in Paris, the latest in a series of Christmas attacks,
one damaging the Villepinte railway station and the other ripping through a
cafe in Pantin in the suburbs of Paris.  An organization calling itself the
Revolutionary Anti-Racist Group claimed responsibility for the blast at
Pantin, and the Corsican National Liberation Front said it had blown up the
Villepinte railway station.
Israel - April 26, 1978 - Grenade kills West German citizens
Two West German citizens were killed and several others injured when a
grenade which was thrown through an open bus window exploded.  They
were returning to Jerusalem from an outing in Galilee when the attack took
place.   Several Arabs were taken into custody during the search for the
perpetrators.
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Czechoslovakia - May 25, 1978 - Attempted school bus hijacking
Czech border guards shot three gunmen who hijacked a school bus carrying
45 children and attempted to force it across the border into West Germany.
About 25 Czech soldiers, using at least one armored vehicle, killed one of the
gunmen and wounded the other two in a gun battle near the Muehlbach border
crossing.  A young girl on the bus was slightly injured.
Israel - June 2, 1978 - Five killed in bus explosion
Five persons were killed and at least 20 injured in an explosion on a bus in
Jerusalem.  The bus was en route from the Arab section in East Jerusalem to
the Jewish section in the west.  The police suspected that the explosive device
had been left in the bus by one or more Arab terrorists.  Mayor Teddy Kollek
of Jerusalem said he thought that the explosion was linked to plans for the
forthcoming celebrations of the 11th anniversary of the unification of
Jerusalem.  A news agency in Beirut reported that Palestinian guerrillas
calling themselves the General Command of the Palestinian Revolution's
Forces had claimed responsibility.
Israel - September 20, 1978 - Terrorists captured
Terrorists aiming to plant a bomb aboard a bus in Tel Aviv were captured
before they could execute their plan.
Iran - November 14, 1978 - Bus explodes
Two explosive devises rendered a company bus inoperable in Semnan.  No
injuries were reported to the U.S. citizens who used the bus to travel 40 miles
to and from their residences.
Israel - March 4, 1979 - Rail service suspended
The rail service between Jerusalem and Tel Aviv was suspended for several
hours following an explosion on the railway line in which a train was derailed.
A second mine found on the line was dismantled.  A Palestinian military
spokesman claimed responsibility, claiming that a number of Israelis had been
killed or wounded.
Israel - March 8, 1979 - Tourist buses bombed
Palestinian terrorists planted three bombs on Israeli tourist buses to protest
President Carter's weekend Mid East peace mission.  Twelve persons were
injured.  The Pro-Moscow Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine
claimed credit for the incident.  The guerrilla groups said orders had been
issued to its fighters "to step up the military operations against Israel to protest
Carter's visit."  Time bombs planted at Tel Aviv's Plaza Hotel exploded,
gutting the upper stories and wounding an unspecified number of Israelis.
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Israel - April 16, 1979 - Bomb explodes on bus
A bomb apparently planted by guerrillas exploded on a bus minutes after a
13-year-old boy spotted a satchel and the driver ordered his passengers off.
The blast totally wrecked the bus.  The PLO dissociated itself from the attack.
France - July 2, 1979 - Train attacked
The Paris-Madrid express was ambushed and machine gunned south of St.
Jean de Luz in the French Basque region.  The train was stationary when the
shooting broke out because the driver had stopped to avoid a barrage of tires
which had been placed across the line.  When he heard the gunfire, the driver
set the train going and smashed through the barricade, arriving 20 minutes late
at Hendaye on the Spanish border.  No one claimed responsibility for the
incident but authorities believe that the Basque separatist movement (ETA)
was to blame.  More than 15 bullet holes were found in the first three cars.
Afghanistan - September 9, 1979 - Rebels attack tourist bus
Afghanistan rebels ambushed a tourist bus chartered by a British firm, the
Masic Bus Company, on a trip from Istanbul to New Delhi.  A young
Canadian was shot dead; a Swiss man was killed as he crouched for cover on
the floor.  Another tourist was in critical condition in a hospital in Herat with
multiple bullet wounds.  Survivors among the 40 European, American and
Canadian passengers said that the bus had no business being in Afghanistan
where a savage guerrilla war has raged for more than a year.   The Turkish bus
driver apparently cut across the countryside in order to save fuel; after the
attack he disappeared and a Swiss tourist took over the bus and drove it back
to Herat.  The attack brings to eight the number of Westerners murdered in
Afghanistan during the past week.  The cause of the guerrilla war is
apparently a Moslem revolt against the Soviet backed government of
President Nur Mohammed Taraki.
Israel - November 2, 1979 - Passenger train explosion
An explosion under the engine of an Israeli passenger train ripped up a
section of track but caused no injuries.  The engineer managed to bring the
train safely into Tel Aviv; if the train had derailed, it would have plunged into
a river.  Police blamed Palestinian guerrillas.
Israel - November 19, 1979 - Bomb on train injured thirteen people
Thirteen people waiting to board a bus in Jerusalem were injured when a
bomb exploded on the bus.  The driver of another bus escaped injury while
trying to drive to safety after a bomb had been discovered and the passengers
evacuated.  The PLO claimed responsibility.
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Israel - April 22, 1980 - Grenade thrown at bus
A grenade was thrown at a bus between Jerusalem and Ofra.
France - April 26, 1980 - Right wing group attacks train
A commando group of the extreme right composed of some 20 young
people set fire to two cars of the Paris-Moscow express train with the help of
several Molotov cocktails.  The cars were severely damaged.  Fortunately the
train was almost empty.  The group painted "National Youth Front," and
"Boycott" on the side of the train.  Later the Agence France Presse received an
anonymous letter adding that the demonstration was to persuade the French to
boycott the "Jeux (games) de Goulag."
Cambodia - June 10, 1980 - Train attack results in at least 150 deaths
Guerrillas supporting the Khmer Rouge regime attacked a train carrying
civilians between Battanbang and the capital Phnom Penh, some 40 miles
northwest of the capital.  A missile or a mine brought the train to a stop and
guerrillas opened fire on the train, killing at least 150 people and injuring 250
others. (PS)
Italy - August 2, 1980 - Bologna train station bombed
On August 2, 84 people were killed and 200 more injured when a bomb
exploded in Bologna train station.  In 1981, seven people were arrested in
London and held responsible for this bombing.
Switzerland - October 21, 1980 - Attempted bombing of train
A time bomb was placed aboard a train en-route from Paris to Interlaken in
Switzerland, but failed to explode.  Authorities believed the bomb was planted
by the October 3 Organization.
China - October 29, 1980 - Bomb at Beijing
A bomb exploded in a building near a second floor escalator at around 6
p.m. in Beijing, causing 9 deaths and 81 injuries.
United Kingdom - November 20, 1980 - Attempted bombing foiled
On November 20, police arrested a man who had parked his car on the
Westminister Bridge in London.  A bomb was found inside his car.  He was
protesting against nuclear weapons.
United States - December 21, 1980 - Pipe bombs in Pennsylvania Station,
New York City
Two pipe bombs exploded in Pennsylvania Station lockers ten minutes
apart, spraying shrapnel but injuring no one although the lockers were close to
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waiting areas.  An anonymous caller told UPI that the previously unknown
Puerto Rican Armed Resistance (RAP) was responsible and that the blasts
were in retaliation for crimes "against Puerto Rican nationalists" in Puerto
Rico.  He directed police and reporters to a one-page message typed in
Spanish, hidden in a trash container in mid-town Manhattan.
United Kingdom - January 27, 1981 - Bombings on Belfast-Dublin rail
line
On January 27, three bombs exploded on the Belfast-Dublin rail line,
causing closure of the rail line.  It was part of a six-city attack by the IRA.
South Africa - June 29, 1981 - Bomb explodes on Richards Bay rail line
On June 29, a bomb exploded on a section of the Richards Bay rail line in
Natal Province, causing freight traffic delay for three hours.  It was the fourth
bombing of rail links in Natal Province in the previous three months and the
second on the main line linking the country's northern coal fields in the
previous two weeks.  Police blamed the ANC for the bombings.
India - July 18, 1981 - Train sabotaged, 35 people killed
On July 18, a passenger train was derailed half a mile from the station at
Dangarva, killing 35 people.  The cause of the derailment was believed to be
an act of sabotage. (PS)
Switzerland - July 22, 1981 - Bomb in Geneva railway station
A bomb left in a coin-operated locker at the main railway station in Geneva
exploded late in the afternoon, injuring four people.  This was the fourth
bombing in Switzerland in four days.  Responsibility for the first three was
claimed by the Ninth of June Organization and authorities named them as the
perpetrators.
Switzerland - July 22, 1981 - Second bomb left in Geneva railway station
A second bomb left in a coin-operated locker at the main railway station in
Geneva exploded about one hour after the first one had caused several
injuries.  The second bomb caused no injuries because police had cordoned
off the area.  These were the fourth and fifth bombings in Switzerland in four
days.  The first three were claimed by the Ninth of June Organization and
authorities named them as the perpetrators of the last two.
Pakistan - July 31, 1981 – Train derailed
An Awam express train en route from Karachi to Lahore and Peshawar,
and carrying Muslim passengers celebrating the month of Ramadan, was
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derailed, killing at least 30 people on board.  It was suspected to be an anti-
Muslim or racist motivated act of sabotage. (PS)
United Kingdom - August 6, 1981 - Bombings at several locations
On August 6, bombings at stores, offices, and garages in six cities in
Northern Ireland and the bombing of a section of the Belfast-Dublin rail line
caused property damage.
Germany - September 16, 1981 - Time bombs on rail line defused
The Red Army Faction is believed responsible for two time bombs set on a
rail line supplying the U.S. Air Force Rhein-Main Air Base.  Two alert
American soldiers found the bombs ticking away hidden in 13-pound fire
extinguishers.  Explosives experts defused the bombs.
France - November 5, 1981 - Bomb explodes in train station
A bomb exploded at Paris' Gare de Lyon train station injuring at least one
person and destroying more than two dozen luggage lockers.  Officials said
the explosion occurred in an underground level of the station, which houses
the suburban subway line.  Later, responsibility for the attack was claimed by
the previously unknown Orly Organization, an Armenian group.
France - November 16, 1981 - Bomb in train station
A bomb placed in a luggage locker exploded in the Gare de l'Est railway
terminal, wounding two people.  Thirty lockers were destroyed.
Responsibility for the attack was claimed by the Orly Group of Armenian
extremists.
France - November 18, 1981 - Bomb threat at Paris Gare du Nord
A bomb threat received from the Orly Group sent police searching for a
bomb at the Paris Gare du Nord.
United Kingdom - February 14, 1982 - Bomb damages rail station
On February 14, a bomb at Portadown rail station on the Belfast-Dublin
line severely damaged the station.  No injuries were reported.
United States - February 16, 1982 - Explosive discovered under Bay
Bridge
Police discovered on February 16 some 40 pounds of a powerful liquid
explosive left in a car parked beneath the Bay Bridge on the San Francisco
side.
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France - March 29, 1982 - Bomb exploded on train, killing five passengers
A high explosive tore up the second coach of the Paris -Toulouse express,
killing five passengers and injuring 27 others.  The police believed the
explosion was caused either by a deliberately set bomb or by explosives being
transported clandestinely.  The engineer was able to stop the train without a
derailment; then the train proceeded slowly to Limoges where the injured
were taken off the train.  No claim for responsibility was received from any
terrorist group operating in France.  In the absence of other evidence, the press
and public probably linked the incident with terrorist Ilyich Ramirez Sanchez,
known internationally as Carlos, who had threatened a campaign against
France if colleagues of his were not released from prison.
On March 31, the ultra-rightist group opposed to the Basque separatists, the
Spanish Basque Battalion (BBE), said it carried out the bomb attack.  An
anonymous telephone caller told the daily DEIA that the BBE "would attack
in France every time that the military wing of the ETA (Basque Autonomous
Movement) carried out an attack in Spain."  According to DEIA, extreme
right groups in Spain frequently claim that ETA militants carry out terrorist
attacks against police and army officers and then obtain refuge in southern
France.  The police do not consider the claim credible since the group has
often made unfounded claims.  Some other groups, such as the Terrorist
Internationale, the Delta Commandos (far right) and the far-left movement
called the Groupe Bakounine-Gdansk-Paris-Guatemala-Salvador also claimed
responsibility for the attack on the "Capitole."  One claim was from the
"Friends of Carlos", and though it was no more credible than other claims, the
possibility that Carlos might really have been involved was not ruled out.
Lebanon - April 30, 1982 - Embassy official's car hijacked
A U.S. embassy official had his car hijacked by gunmen in the largely
Moslem west Beirut area.
United Kingdom - August 11, 1982 - Bombing at railroad
A freight train was slightly damaged when a bomb exploded on a section of
the main railroad in County Armagh, Northern Ireland.  Train services were
disrupted due to the incident.
China - October 1, 1982 - Man attempted to hijack tourist bus
A man carrying what he claimed was a bomb tried to flee the mainland by
attempting to hijack a busload of tourists and use them as hostages to get a
plane flight to Taiwan.
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Israel - January 11, 1983 - PLO claimed responsibility for attack on bus
The PLO claimed responsibility for a grenade attack on a Tel Aviv bus.  A
PLO communiqué related that the attack had been made against troops along a
military road leading to Tel Aviv.  It said that the attack had resulted in the
killing or wounding of all the occupants of the bus.  Israeli spokesmen,
however, had said the attack had been mounted on a civilian bus in Tel Aviv
and that 12 civilians were injured.  No deaths were reported.
France - July 28, 1983 - ASALA threats against French government
ASALA threatened more attacks against French territory and government
organizations.  The Perrache railway station in Lyons was evacuated
following a bomb threat by a telephone caller who said he was part of the
terrorist group.
France - July 28, 1983 - Bomb threat at railroad station
The railroad station of Lyon Perrache was partially evacuated by police last
Wednesday when a warning of an imminent explosion was transmitted by
someone speaking on behalf of the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation
of Armenia.  Security men conducted a wide search of the railroad station but
failed to turn up any bombs or explosives.  Police regarded the incident as a
false alarm.
India - September 14, 1983 - Bomb thrown at crowded platform injures
19
On September 14, a bomb was thrown by suspected Sikh separatists onto a
crowded platform in New Delhi's main train station, injuring at least 19
people.
Israel - December 6, 1983 - Jerusalem bound bus bombed
A bomb demolished a Jerusalem bus, killing six people and injuring 43
others, some of them critically.  Responsibility for the attack was claimed both
by  Yasser Arafat's wing of the PLO and by anti-Arafat PLO rebels.
Israel - December 30, 1983 - Grenades explode in two mosques
Booby-trapped hand grenades exploded in two mosques in the Israeli-
occupied West Bank and a potentially lethal bomb was planted on a Jerusalem
bus in a new escalation of a furtive war being waged by Arab and Jewish
terrorists.  There was one casualty, a Muslim clergyman injured by one of the
mosque blasts.  The bus bomb was discovered by an alert passenger and
police defused it harmlessly.  The Jewish extremist group Terror Against
Terror admitted planting the grenades in the mosques, but no organization
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claimed responsibility for the bomb on the bus in the predominantly Jewish
western part of Jerusalem.
France - December 31, 1983 - Bombs in Marseilles railroad station killed
six people
At least six people were killed and score more injured when bombs went
off in the Marseilles railroad station and aboard a speeding train 120 miles
north.  The international terrorist known as Carlos sent a letter taking
responsibility for both bombings.  The letter was signed by the Arab Armed
Struggle Organization but West German specialists concluded that the
handwriting was that of Carlos, a Venezuelan whose real name is Ilyich
Ramirez Sanchez.
France - February 15, 1984 - Basques sabotage Paris-Madrid Express
train
Basques on the French side of the border sabotaged a stretch of track which
caused a Paris-Madrid Express train with 110 aboard to derail at 60 miles per
hour.  There were no serious injuries.
Israel - March 4, 1984 - Gunmen attack bus carrying Arab workers
Six Palestinians were wounded when gunmen attacked a bus carrying Arab
workers north of Ramallah in the Israeli-occupied West Bank.  Four masked
gunmen opened fire on the bus with automatic weapons believed to be
American-made M-16s.  About an hour after the attack the Jewish terrorist
group Terror Against Terror (TNT) claimed responsibility for the attack,
stating it was to "avenge Jewish blood," probably in reference to the explosion
the previous week at a clothing store in Jerusalem.
Israel - March 7, 1984 - Bomb rips through civilian passenger bus
Three people were killed and nine wounded when a bomb ripped through a
civilian passenger bus in the Israeli port city of Ashdod.  Abu Nidal claimed
responsibility.  The bombing followed an attack the previous week on an Arab
bus on the Israeli-occupied West Bank of the Jordan River in which six Arab
laborers on their way to work were wounded by submachine gun fire.
United Kingdom - March 11, 1984 - Bomb explodes in nightclub
A bomb exploded in a nightclub catering to Arabs injuring 23 people,
minutes after a device blew up at an Arab newsstand.  Police warned that the
blasts may have been set by Libyan hit squads hunting expatriates.  No one
was injured in the newsstand incident.  Two bombs destroyed a car and
injured a couple and their child in an attack that came less than twenty four
hours after the bomb in the nightclub.  As of 3/14/84 one Libyan businessmen
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was being held on conspiracy charges in the bombing blitz and 22 other
Libyans were being detained.  The government of Libya was denied any
involvement, however.
Israel - April 12, 1984 - Team of PFLP members hijack bus
A four-member team of the PFLP armed with hand grenades staged a raid
in the Gaza strip, hijacking a bus to the border with Egypt.  The group held all
30 passengers hostage demanding in exchange the release of imprisoned
terrorists in Israel, including Palestinians, a Jewish collaborator, and a
member of the Japanese Red Army.  An Israeli army unit stormed the bus,
killing two of the four terrorists and freeing all but a few of the hostages
unharmed.  The other two terrorists were killed while in custody.
India - April 15, 1984 - Multiple arson attacks
A Sikh terrorist group torched 37 railroad stations in the Punjab region.  A
Sikh group called "Dashmesh Regiment" claimed responsibility for the
attacks.
India - April 26, 1984 - Bombs exploded along northern railway sections
On April 26, bombs exploded along three major sections of the northern
railway in the Punjab region.  A series of bomb blasts completely disrupted
railroad traffic.  Sikh separatists are suspected.
Israel - April 28, 1984 - Bombs on 4 buses discovered; 20 Jewish extrem-
ists arrested
Authorities announced that 20 Jewish extremists had been arrested on
suspicion of plotting to blow up Arab-owned buses in Jerusalem.  Bombs
weighing over 6-1/2 pounds each had been placed on four buses.  The bombs
were timed to go off during rush hour.
United States - May 9, 1984 - Bomb threat on bridge
On May 9, an anonymous caller claimed to have planted a bomb on
Sunshine Skyway Bridge linking St. Petersburg and Bradenton-Sarasota,
Florida, and that it would explode some time between 7 a.m. and noon.
Traffic shut down for five hours while police searched the area.  No explosive
was found.
Spain - June 13, 1984 - Members of ETA set fire to truck
Several individuals of ETA set fire to a French truck at Oyarzun in the
Basque province of Guipuzcoa.
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Spain - July 11, 1984 - ETA attacks five French trucks
ETA attacked five French trucks near the Spanish/French border.  Small
explosive devices were placed in the motor compartments which when they
exploded ruined the engine but did not destroy the truck.  One driver who was
asleep in the cab of his truck was injured.
France - August 13, 1984 - Bomb explodes in railway station in Lyons
A small home-made bomb exploded in a coin-operated locker at the central
railway station in Lyons, but a defect in the bomb casing limited the extent of
the damage and probably prevented casualties.  Responsibility for the blast
was claimed by ASALA.  The bomb consisted of about 200 grams of
explosive packed into a metal tube, the end of which was welded shut with a
plug containing an electronic detonator.  The weld on the plug apparently
came loose with the explosion, appreciably reducing the force of the blast.
Responsibility for the blast was also claimed by the group M-5, which is
trying to extort the government for over $3 million dollars in return for their
ceasing bombing efforts.
France - August 19, 1984 - M-5 group bombs Grenoble train station
A group calling itself M-5 claimed responsibility for bombing Grenoble
train station on August 19.  The bombing caused minor damage.  The group
demanded nearly $3.75 million to stop its attacks.
Canada - September 1, 1984 - Bomb explodes in Montreal main railroad
station
A bomb exploded in the Montreal main railroad station on Labor Day,
killing three French tourists and wounding 29 others.  A rambling, barely
coherent note had been turned over to police three days earlier by a ticket
agent at the station.  The letter threatened the life of the Pope who is due to
visit Canada in mid-September.  Shortly after the bomb detonated an
anonymous caller warned a second bomb had been planted in the railroad
station.  A search failed to locate a second bomb.  An American named
Thomas Brigham, 65, from Rochester, New York, was ordered held in
connection with the bombing.
Israel - September 17, 1984 - Israeli bus shot up in occupied West Bank
An Israeli bus was shot up in the occupied West Bank.  Five persons were
injured, none seriously.  Some of the Israelis on the bus were armed and
returned fire.
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Israel - October 28, 1984 - Four Israeli soldiers held in connection with
attack on Arab bus
Four Israeli soldiers are being held in connection with an anti-tank rocket
attack on an Arab bus in Jerusalem.  An 18-year old draftee will be charged
with actually firing the rocket that killed one and injured another ten
passengers.  The group which executed the attack identified itself as the
"Avengers" but Jewish terrorists cells operate under a variety of names.  They
form part of a loosely knit underground led by quite prominent rabbis.
Israel - December 1, 1984 - Hand grenade thrown at bus injures three
A hand grenade was thrown at a bus in Jerusalem which injured three
people.  In Damascus, the PFLP took responsibility for the bus attack but
claimed the target was several Israeli soldiers who were on the bus.
Germany - December 21, 1984 - Fake bomb detonated by police
On December 21, police carried out a controlled-explosion on a fake bomb
found on Peace Bridge in Frankfurt.  No group claimed responsibility, but
police suspected the Red Army Faction.
Italy - December 24, 1984 - Train bombing kills at least 15 people
In the bloodiest terrorist attack in the country in two years, terrorists
bombed a train en route from Florence to Bologna and passing through La
Direttissima tunnel, killing at least 15 people and injuring 80 more.  A number
of groups claimed responsibility for the attack.  Neo-fascist terrorists are
suspected.
Sri Lanka - January 20, 1985 - Guerrillas attack train, killing 36 people
Tamil separatist guerrillas attacked a train in the dense jungle between
Mankulam and Murukandy.  The guerrillas blew up a mine to stop the train
and fired on the passengers from both sides of the train, killing at least 36
people. (PS)
South Africa / Mozambique - January 25, 1985 - Bomb severs rail bridge
On January 25, a bomb exploded on a rail bridge that links Maputo and
South Africa.  The bridge was severely damaged.
Israel - January 31, 1985 - Two wounded when bus fired upon
A bus en route to Hebron from Jerusalem was fired upon by terrorists.
Two people were wounded.
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Spain - February 27, 1985 - Two trucks damaged by small incendiary de-
vices
Two trucks registered in France were damaged at Irun by two small
incendiary devices.  ETA was responsible and has been harassing French
interests in the Spanish Basque areas of the country.
Peru - February 27, 1985 - Bomb attacks on bridges
Three bridge bombing incidents occurred on February 27.  Shining Path
guerrillas completely destroyed Anchi bridge near Lima, using dynamite.  At
Chaupichaca bridge, also near Lima, one guerrilla was killed and another was
arrested when the two threw dynamite at police inspecting the bridge.  Also
near Lima, police discovered 15 boxes of dynamite near Infiernillo bridge.
Canada - March 26, 1985 - Threats by ASALA to bomb city's subway
system
Extreme security measures were adopted by authorities in Toronto in
connection with threats by ASALA to bomb the city's subway system.  Major
traffic delays resulted from the increase in auto use during rush hours.  The
group demanded that authorities free three terrorists arrested after the recent
assault on the Turkish Embassy which left one guard dead and the
Ambassador wounded.  The massive security alert prompted some crank calls
and hoaxes, including one fake bomb.
Israel - April 30, 1985 - Palestinian Fedayeen use grenades to attack bus
Palestinian Fedayeen used incendiary grenades to attack a bus.  The bus
was destroyed and the driver wounded.
Israel - May 30, 1985 - Bomb explodes near the central bus station in
Afula
A bomb exploded near the central bus station in Afula.  Two days earlier a
bomb had exploded in the town's center.
Switzerland - June 3, 1985 - Explosion at Geneva railway station
An explosion at a Geneva railway station has been claimed by a Palestinian
group calling itself the "Martyrs of Tel Al-Zaltar."  Several hundred
Palestinians died when the Tell Al-Zaltar camp in East Beirut was besieged by
Lebanese Christian Phalangists in the summer of 1976.  The caller said more
explosives, which had not been primed, had been planted in toilets at Geneva's
Cointrin Airport, a fact confirmed by police.  Two Palestinians were arrested
in connection with the bombings.
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Israel - June 12, 1985 - Bomb explodes at bus station in Jerusalem
A terrorist bomb exploded at a bus station in Jerusalem.
Israel - June 24, 1985 - Bomb explodes near bus stop in northern Jerusa-
lem
A bomb exploded near a bus stop in the northern part of Jerusalem,
injuring an eight-year-old boy.  The PLO claimed responsibility.
Israel - July 8, 1985 - Bomb explodes at bus station in Holon
A bomb exploded at the bus station in Holon.  Five people were wounded.
Mozambique - August 2, 1985 - Suspected train sabotage kills 58 people
A suspected sabotage on a train killed 58 people and injured 160 others.
(PS)
Germany - August 12, 1985 - Arson attempt discovered
On August 12 near Frankfurt, fuel-soaked bedding was found in sleeping
cars used by U.S. military personnel.  A faulty igniting device failed to set
them on fire.
Chile - August 13, 1985 - Two bombs explode
One bomb exploded August 13 at Penablanca station near Valparaiso while
a navy officer was trying to dismantle it.  He was killed in the explosion.
Another bomb exploded in Valencia station, also near Valparaiso, disrupting
rail service to and from Santiago.
Israel - August 20, 1985 - Bomb-laden car found in Netanya
A bomb-laden car was discovered in the central bus station in Netanya.
The area was evacuated and the device detonated by the bomb squad.  The
PLO claimed responsibility.
Israel - September 5, 1985 - Terrorists throw gasoline bombs at bus
Terrorists threw two gasoline bombs at a bus passing the area.  There were
no passengers aboard.
Israel - September 9, 1985 - Firebomb tossed at bus in Jerusalem
A firebomb was tossed at a bus in Jerusalem.
Israel - September 19, 1985 - Gasoline bomb thrown at bus stop on Mt.
Zion
A gasoline bomb was thrown at a bus stop on Mt. Zion.  It was the second
attack at the same spot within a week.
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Israel - September 25, 1985 - Bomb explodes in the Egged bus station
A bomb exploded in the Egged bus station near the Hadassah hospital on
Mt. Scopus.  One person was slightly injured by glass shards.  The DFLP
claimed responsibility.
Israel - September 26, 1985 - Bomb explodes at a bus stop near Gilo, Je-
rusalem
A bomb exploded at a bus stop near Gilo, Jerusalem.  Seven Israelis were
wounded.
Chile - November 1, 1985 - Two bridges bombed
On November 1, unidentified bombers exploded a 40-pound dynamite
charge on a Pan-American Highway bridge over Achibueno River, near the
capital, Santiago.  A second bomb exploded on another bridge one hour later.
Israel - November 8, 1985 - Explosives detonate near bus station in Kafr
Saba
The Palestinian Revolution Forces General Command claimed
responsibility for detonating explosive charges near the central bus station in
the settlement of Kafr Saba.  The station was crowded with soldiers and
settlers and casualties were reported to be high, although no estimate was
given.
Lebanon - November 13, 1985 - Israeli passenger bus in southern Leba-
non attacked
The Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine claimed that a
commando group belonging to it attacked an Israeli passenger bus in southern
Lebanon with machine-guns and that a number of passengers were either
killed or wounded.
India - November 25, 1985 - Bombing on train kills 2, injures 18
Sikh extremists planted a bomb on a passenger train in Punjab region,
causing 2 deaths and 18 injuries.
Japan - December 1, 1985 - Radical leftists cut communication cables
Radical leftists cut communication cables in 34 different locations in pre-
dawn attacks on December 1, disrupting computer systems that operate trains
and subways for some six million passengers.  Police arrested two members of
the Middle Core Faction for the attack.
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Israel - December 22, 1985 - Several explosive charges in bus station in
Erez
The Palestinian Revolution Forces General Command claimed
responsibility for placing several explosive charges in a bus station in Erez.  A
huge fire resulted.
United States - January 10, 1986 - Bomb threat on commuter bridge
On January 10, a caller claimed to have planted a bomb on a commuter
bridge over New Bedford Harbor, Massachusetts, to support striking
fishermen.  The bridge was closed for two hours while police searched.  No
bomb was found.
Spain - January 27, 1986 - French truck machine-gunned outside San
Sebastian
ETA machine-gunned a French truck outside San Sebastian.  No one was
injured in the attack.
Israel - February 14, 1986 - Bus in Jerusalem bombed
A bus in Jerusalem was bombed, injuring six passengers.  Force-17
claimed responsibility.
France - March 18, 1986 - High speed train bombed
A high-speed train was bombed 13 miles outside of Paris.  Ten people on
board were injured.  Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility and demanded the
release of five Arab terrorists currently in French prisons in connection with
an unsuccessful assassination attempt on former Iranian Prime Minister
Bakhtiar in July 1980.  The Committee of Solidarity with the Arab and Middle
East Political Prisoners (CSPPA) claimed responsibility.  Evidence has shown
that the Iranian government was directly involved in the 1986 Paris bombings.
France - March 21, 1986 - Bomb defused in commuter train in Paris
A bomb was defused in a crowded commuter train in Paris after a
passenger noticed an unattended bag and alerted police.  The Committee of
Solidarity with the Arab and Middle East Political Prisoners (CSPPA) claimed
responsibility.  Evidence has shown that the Iranian government was directly
involved in the 1986 Paris bombings.
Israel - April 8, 1986 - Firebomb hurled at bus
Nine people were injured when a firebomb was hurled at a bus on the
northern edge of Jerusalem.  The bus was passing through a Jewish-Arab
neighborhood at the time of the attack.  17 Palestinians were arrested in
connection with this.  They claimed to be members of the PFLP.
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Syria - April 16, 1986 - Explosions aboard buses in Damascus
Several people were killed and wounded in a series of explosions aboard
buses in Damascus.  Syrian state-controlled radio blamed Israeli agents for the
attacks.  The explosions took place on intercity buses and civilians were killed
and injured; however there was no report of exact casualty figures.
Bangladesh - May 15, 1986 - Train sabotaged; 25 people killed
A crowded express train was derailed near the western frontier of
Bheramara, resulting in 25 deaths and 45 injuries.  The Marxist Sarbahara
group was blamed for the incident. (PS)
Peru - June 26, 1986 - Tourist train bombed
Sendero Luminoso bombed a tourist train en route to Cuzco, killing seven
people and injuring forty.  One American was killed.
Israel - June 30, 1986 - Bomb explodes on city bus
A bomb exploded on a city bus, injuring five people.  The Fatah Uprising
took responsibility for the blast, as well as for another bomb attack on a bus in
northern Jerusalem which slightly injured one woman.
Sri Lanka - June 28, 1986 - Bombing on bridge
LTTE Tamil guerrillas bombed a bridge near Paranthan on June 28.
Sri Lanka - June 30, 1986 - Bomb on bridge kills 4 people
Four people were killed and 19 others injured when LTTE Tamil guerrillas
bombed a highway bridge outside Vavuniya on June 30.
France - September 4, 1986 - Bomb planted on subway train
In a resumption of their earlier bombing campaign, the CSPPA planted a
bomb on a crowded subway train.  The bomb failed to detonate.
Peru - September 30, 1986 - Three bombings
Two bombs north of Lima and one east of Lima near central railroad tracks
caused one injury.
Pakistan - October 20, 1986 - Explosion injures 2 people
A bomb hidden in a railroad car exploded at a rail station in Peshawar on
October 20, injuring 2 people.
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United Kingdom - October 27, 1986 - Bombing derails freight train
A bomb blast derailed a freight train and severed a section of the Belfast-
Dublin rail line on October 27.  The attack was carried out on the day the
Pope declared the "International Day of Peace."
Israel - October 26, 1986 - Palestinian tries to hijack bus
A young Palestinian tried to hijack a bus carrying schoolgirls and force the
bus over a cliff near Jerusalem.  A young female passenger wrestled with the
attacker after the assailant struck the driver with a stone.  The hijacker was
taken into custody but no other information was available.
Philippines - January 20, 1987 - 3 bridges near Iloilo bombed
On January 20, three bridges near Iloilo were bombed.  The attacks were
made on the 42nd. day of a 60-day cease-fire between Filipino government
and rebels.  Government accused rebels of responsibility, but local communist
insurgents units denied it.
Germany - February 15, 1987 - U.S. passenger train sabotaged
The Autonomous Cells claimed responsibility for an act of sabotage
against a U.S. passenger train which caused an estimated $20,000 damage.
Two ship's anchors were dropped onto the overhead cables of the Brehem-
Hannover railway in an attack the group said was "directed against the
imperialist war machine of the U.S."
India - March 15, 1987 - Bombing under railway bridge
Tamil exiles are being questioned about a railway blast in Madras that
killed 25 people and wounded about 150 others.  A bomb detonated by remote
control went off under a railway bridge as an express train was passing over it.
Tamil propaganda leaflets demanding the establishment of a separate Tamil
state in Sri Lanka were found at the scene.
India - April 15, 1987 - Police defuse bomb
On April 15, police discovered a bomb located next to a crowded waiting
room of main railway station in New Delhi and disarmed it.  Sikh separatists
are suspected to be behind the incident.
Israel - April 23, 1987 - Bomb found on Israeli bus
A bomb found on an Israeli bus in Tel Aviv was safely defused by police
explosives experts.  The incident coincided with a meeting in Algiers of the
Palestine National Council.
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Iraq - June 6, 1987 - 11 Turkish vehicles attacked
Kurdish dissidents attacked 11 Turkish vehicles in the Dehok District,
located 60km from Turkey.  All of the drivers of the vehicles were severely
wounded in the attack.
Israel - June 16, 1987 - Man killed by bomb
In Tel Aviv a man was killed when the bomb he was trying to plant in an
abandoned car detonated prematurely.  A few hours later an explosive device
was found and dismantled in a crowded bus station in the same vicinity.
Israel - July 3, 1987 - Bomb goes off on Israeli bus
A bomb went off on an Israeli bus in Jerusalem wounding two people.
Pakistan - July 5, 1987 - 3 bombings in Lahore
Three bombs exploded at different locations causing 6 deaths and at least
50 injuries.  One bomb exploded at noon in a trash can on a railroad platform.
A second bomb blasted a kiosk near a taxi stand just outside the station.  The
two bombs went off less than 10 minutes apart.  A third explosion occurred at
about 1 p.m. at the main bus station.  The attacks coincided with the 10th
anniversary of the coup that brought Zia to power.
Pakistan - August 10, 1987 - Bombs explode at bus station
Two bombs exploded at a bus station in Mardan, resulting in seven dead,
45 injured.  Afghan agents are suspected.
El Salvador - August 11, 1987 - Guerrillas bomb bridge
In what is the ninth bridge hit in less than a month, communist guerrillas
bombed Dado Marin Bridge near San Salvador August 11.  This attack is the
latest in an economic sabotage campaign being carried out by the guerrillas.
The bombers came at about 2 a.m. and laid the explosives, which blew a large
hole in center of the bridge.  Since 1981, communist guerrillas have destroyed
or seriously damaged 83 of 92 major bridges in the country.
Germany - September 1, 1987 - Bomb goes off on railroad tracks
A bomb went off on railroad tracks ten minutes before a U.S. military train
was scheduled to be crossing that section of line.  The military train was on a
regular daily trip to West Berlin carrying personnel and supplies.  Because the
train was unexpectedly delayed, the bomb instead damaged a West German
freight train and the tracks.  No other injuries were caused.  On November 11,
1989 two members of the PFLP-GC were convicted in connection with this
bombing.
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Germany - September 1, 1987 - Bomb misses U.S. military train
On September 1, a bomb slightly damaged a German freight train but
missed a delayed U.S. military train that police said might have been its target.
The trains were traveling on the Goettingen-Kassel line.
Pakistan - September 19, 1987 - Bomb at bus station kills five
A bomb at a bus station in Rawalpendi killed five and injured 16.  This is
another in a series of bombings in Pakistan which appear to have been carried
out by Afghan agents.
Brazil - September 26, 1987 - Homemade bomb injures 11 people
A homemade bomb exploded during the evening rush hour on September
26 at a station some 10 miles from downtown Rio de Janeiro, injuring 11
people.
Pakistan - October 12, 1987 - Bomb goes off in bus terminal
A bomb went off in the main bus terminal of Peshawar, wounding 13
people and causing extensive damage to the building.  The attack was blamed
on Afghan's secret agents, and occurred at a time when security had been
stepped up for the world cup cricket matches which were being held in
Pakistan.
United States - November 10, 1987 - Bomb threat on bridge
On November 10, a telephone caller issued a bomb threat on Blanchette
Memorial Bridge above Missouri River, Missouri.  No bomb was found.
Pakistan - November 18, 1987 - Bomb explodes on bus
A bomb exploded on a bus near Peshawar, killing one person and injuring
19 others.  Afghan agents have been blamed for the numerous bombings
taking place in Pakistan this year.
United Kingdom - November 27, 1987 - Bomb disrupts rail service
On November 27, a 10-pound bomb exploded on a Belfast-Dublin railroad
track, disrupting rail service.  The bomb went off in a ditch as an Irish freight
train was passing and just after 2 passenger trains had passed.  The IRA
claimed responsibility.
Pakistan - December 22, 1987 - Bomb discovered on railroad track
A bomb discovered hidden on a tie on a railroad track was rendered
harmless.
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Mozambique - December 31, 1987 - Attack on train kills 22 people
A train carrying some 1,500 migrant workers home from South Africa was
attacked by guerrillas on December 31, resulting in 22 deaths and 71 injuries.
(PS)
Pakistan - January 24, 1988 - Bomb goes off on bus
A bomb went off in a government-owned bus killing 10 and wounding 19
others.  Afghan agents are being blamed.
Israel - March 7, 1988 - Members of Al Fatah hijack bus
Three members of Al Fatah crossed into Israel from Egypt and hijacked a
bus, trying to bargain for the release of all Palestinian prisoners from Israeli
jails.  After the terrorists killed the sole male passenger on the bus, an anti-
terrorist police squad assaulted the bus, and in so doing killed all three
terrorists, as well as two female passengers on the bus.  Fatah claimed to have
conducted the attack in retaliation for the killing of three Fatah operatives in
Cyprus in February, purportedly by Israeli agents.
Israel - March 11, 1988 - Car bomb discovered near bus station
A car bomb was discovered and safely defused near the central bus station
in Jerusalem.  Officials believe the aim of the terrorists was to carry out a
major attack in a highly populated area in protest of the visit of U.S. Secretary
of State George Shultz, who was staying at the nearby Hilton Hotel at the
time.
Pakistan - March 15, 1988 - Agent of secret police caught planting bomb
An agent of the Afghan secret police was caught while planting a powerful
bomb in a crowded bus station in Islamabad.  The bomb was defused several
minutes before it was set to explode.
Pakistan - April 11, 1988 - Bomb explodes on train
Two railway workers were killed and three injured when a bomb exploded
in a train near Peshawar.
Iran - April 13, 1988 - Bomb discovered at bus terminal
A bomb discovered at a bus terminal in Teheran may have been placed by
Iraqi agents.
Pakistan - April 16, 1988 - Bomb goes off at bus station
A bomb went off at a bus station in Charaadda, killing four and injuring 11.
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Germany - April 27, 1988 - U.S. military train damaged by blast
A U.S. military train en route from Frankfurt to West Berlin was damaged
by an explosion.  The engineer of the train was slightly injured by the blast,
and the locomotive and a section of track were damaged.  On November 11,
1989 two members of the PFLP-GC (Hafez Dalkimoni and Abdel Ghadanfar)
were convicted in connection with this bombing.  Authorities believe
Dalkimoni may also have been involved in the December 1988 bombing of
Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie.
Peru - July 19, 1988 - Bombing on railway track
On July 19, a bomb destroyed a small section of the Chosica-Lima railway
track.  A train carrying workers was halted midway, stopping before reaching
the damaged track.  The incident appeared to be related to a communist-led
strike against government economic policy.
Pakistan - September 3, 1988 - Bomb goes off on train
A bomb went off on a train traveling between Islamabad and Peshawar
killing three and wounding 13 others.
Pakistan - September 4, 1988 - Bomb explodes at train station
Five people were injured when a bomb exploded at a Karachi train station.
Sri Lanka - October 14, 1988 - Bomb destroys part of railway station
On October 14, a bomb blast destroyed part of Kadugannawa Railway
Station and damaged some tracks.  No one was injured in the incident.  Police
blamed the Sinhalese People's Liberation Front for the attack.
Peru - December 1, 1988 - Guerrillas sabotage a VIP-tourist train
Suspected Sendero Luminoso guerrillas sabotaged a VIP-tourist train
between Cuzco and Machu Picchu, killing two women (including the wife of
a New Jersey mayor) and wounding nine others.
Peru - December 22, 1988 - Shining Path bombs bridge
On December 22, Shining Path guerrillas detonated dynamite on a railroad
bridge outside of Casapalca.  No trains were near the area and no one was
injured.
United Kingdom - 1988-1989 - More than 60 bombings disrupt rail serv-
ice
During the years 1988-1989, more than 60 bomb threats and attacks were
carried out on the Belfast-Dublin railway line.
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Pakistan - February 5, 1989 - Bomb explodes at bus station
A bomb at a bus station in Quetta killed three and injured five others.
Afghan agents were blamed.
Canada - April 7, 1989 - Gunman hijacks bus
A gunman of Lebanese descent hijacked a Greyhound bus en route to New
York and forced it to drive to the Canadian parliament in Ottawa.  The man
claimed to be a member of the Lebanese Liberation Front and demanded that
Syrian forces withdraw from Lebanon.  The incident ended peacefully.
Spain - April 9, 1989 - Bombs explode at railroad tracks in Navarre re-
gion
Six bombs exploded beside railroad power line posts at Cioridia in Navarre
region and two others damaged a transformer substation near Zuasti on April
9.  ETA was blamed for the bombings, which did not cause any injuries.
India - April 19, 1989 - Train derails killing at least 67 people
An express train en route from Bangalore to Delhi was derailed near the
town of Jhansi, in central India some 330 miles south of Delhi, killing at least
67 people and injuring 137 others.  Sabotage has not been ruled out.
Czechoslovakia - April 26, 1989 Bomb explodes on international express
train
No casualties were reported after a bomb exploded on an international
express train traveling through Czechoslovakia.  The explosion occurred in a
rail car belonging to the Hungarian state railway.
Israel - April 30, 1989 - Bombing at bus stop
The Abu Musa organization claimed credit for bombing a bus stop two
miles east of Tel Aviv.
Thailand / Malaysia - June 2, 1989 - Bomb explodes as train passes by
A bomb was detonated by remote control as a train neared the town of
Narathiwat, some 700 miles south of Bangkok near the Thai-Malaysian
border.  Three people were injured and four passenger coaches and a mail car
derailed as a result of the explosion.  A note found near the scene claimed
responsibility for Muslim separatist group Pulo Pattani.
China - June 26, 1989 - Explosion on train kills 20 people
An explosion in a toilet of a Hangzhou-Shanghai train killed some 20
people and injured 11 others.  Dynamite had been put in the wash-basin, but it
was not known whether this was a terrorist attack.
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France - June 30, 1989 - Bomb explodes on railway line
The Basque separatist group Iparretarak claimed responsibility for the
bombing of a Paris to Madrid railway line which stopped rail traffic for four
hours.
Pakistan - July 4, 1989 - Bomb explodes on bus
The bombing of a bus in Peshawar was blamed on Afghan agents.  Ten
people were killed and another 29 injured by the blast which was the largest
bombing in Pakistan in a year.
Israel - July 6, 1989 - Sixteen killed when bus was forced off road
An Israeli bus traveling between Tel Aviv and Jerusalem was forced off the
road and into a ravine by a Moslem fundamentalist fanatic.  Sixteen
passengers were killed (including one American) and another 27 injured in the
incident which sparked several retaliatory attacks.
Pakistan - July 17, 1989 - Afghan government accused of being part of
bombing a bus station
The Afghan government was accused by the Pakistani government of
involvement in the bombing of a bus station in Mardan and another at a
railroad workers' housing area in Lahors which injured six people.
India - July 20, 1989 - Bombing kills 8 people
A time bomb exploded in Kokrajhar Railroad Station in Assam state,
killing 8 people and injuring 22 others.  Police suspected Bodo militants are
behind the attack.
Spain - September 14, 1989 - France-Spain railway bombed
The France-Spain railway line was bombed by ETA.  Traffic was
temporarily halted.
Soviet Union - September 16, 1989 - Timed explosive kills five on bus
A timed explosive which had been placed on a bus near the Azerbaijani
city of Evlak killed five people and wounded another 27.  No group claimed
responsibility.
Pakistan - September 18, 1989 - Bomb explodes on bus
Three people were killed and two others injured by a bomb explosion on a
bus in Peshawar.  The Afghan government was blamed.
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Pakistan - October 10, 1989 - Bombing of bus terminal
Afghan agents were suspected of having bombed a bus terminal in
Rawalpindi.
Egypt - February 4, 1990 - Israeli tour bus assaulted
Terrorists used automatic weapons and grenades to assault an Israeli tour
bus near Cairo.  Eleven people were killed and another 19 wounded in the
well-planned attack.  The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-
General Command (PFLP-GC) delivered a statement claiming that the Islamic
Jihad had carried out the attack and calling the group the "heroes of our great
Palestinian people."  The Organization for the Defense of the Oppressed in
Egypt's Prisons also claimed responsibility.  More than 20 people were
arrested.
Soviet Union - February 18, 1990 - Bomb explodes on bus
Fifteen people were injured when a bomb exploded on a bus traveling
through disputed Azerbaijani territory.
Israel - March 2, 1990 - Bomb explodes at bus terminal
A bomb exploded at a bus terminal in Tel Aviv.
Pakistan - May 6, 1990 - Bomb explodes on express train
Afghan agents are suspected of having bombed an express train near
Lahore, resulting in 11 fatalities and 35 injuries.
Jordan - May 21, 1990 - Palestinian opens fire on busload of French
tourists
In retaliation for recent violence against Palestinians in the Gaza Strip, a
Palestinian opened fire on a busload of French tourists in Amman, wounding
ten people.
Israel - June 26, 1990 - Bomb explodes at bus stop
Two people were injured when a bomb exploded at a bus stop in West
Jerusalem.
Spain - August 14, 1990 - ETA announces bombing against state railway
On August 13, ETA said it would set bombs along railroad lines, and on
August 14 detonated a bomb along the Madrid-Valladolid-Leon-Gijon line.
United Kingdom - August 15, 1990 - Army defuse bomb
On August 15, army defused a 40-pound bomb on the Belfast-Dublin
railroad line, after receiving a warning from the Irish Republican Army (IRA).
A Chronology of Terrorist Attacks – Brian M. Jenkins 145
Norman Y. Mineta International Institute for Surface Transportation Policy Studies
Spain - August 15-16, 1990 - Two bomb explosions
Two bombs exploded in two days against the state railway in a week-long
ETA terror campaign.
Spain - August 20, 1990 - Railroad tracks near Leon bombed
On August 20, a fourth bomb in a week-long ETA terror campaign struck a
railroad track near Leon, causing damage but no injuries.
Turkey / Iraq - September 10, 1990 - Bomb damages Saklan bridge
On September 10, a bomb damaged one of the lanes of the Saklan bridge,
which connects Turkey and Iraq.
Israel - September 17, 1990 - Bomb explodes near central bus station
A bomb exploded near the central bus station in Tel Aviv.
South Africa - November 3, 1990 - 2 explosions cause railway damage
On November 3, two explosions seriously damaged railway lines and
halted trains at Bloemfontein, but caused no injuries.
Israel - December 2, 1990 - Palestinian attacks bus
A Palestinian attack on a bus in Tel Aviv left one dead and three wounded.
Anti-terrorist police killed one of the three assailants and injured the other
two.
France - December 3, 1990 - Three incendiary devices went off along
railway line
Three incendiary devices went off along a railway line frequented by U.S.
military trains.
Israel - February 8, 1991 - Terrorists attack bus
Three terrorists infiltrated from Jordan and attacked a bus carrying soldiers
on the Arava highway.  The terrorists fired off a grenade inside of the bus
before they were killed by gunfire from the soldiers.  Four soldiers were
injured.
Austria - February 9, 1991 - Stretch of track bombed
A stretch of track near Innsbruck used to transport U.S. tanks from
Germany to the Persian Gulf was bombed, leaving a six-foot crater underneath
the track.  A second bomb was found nearby on a parallel track.  Many
Austrians have been angered by the moving of the tanks which they feel
violates their country's neutrality.
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United Kingdom - February 18, 1991 - PIRA claim responsibility for ex-
plosions
The PIRA claimed responsibility for two explosions in the Victoria and
Paddington railway stations which killed one person and injured 43 others.
Authorities were investigating a telephone threat which had been made against
the transportation system when the rush-hour attacks occurred.
Soviet Union - February 24, 1991 - Civilians injured in terrorist attack
Several civilian passers-by were injured during an attack on a bus carrying
Azerbaijanis in Shusha, Agdam.  The attackers carried guns and explosives
United Kingdom - February 25, 1991 - PIRA suspected in railway
bombing
The PIRA was suspected of having placed a bomb which blew up a portion
of railway track near St. Albans, Hertfordshire.
Australia - March 1, 1991 - Bomb threat on subway station
A telephone caller told rail authorities that a bomb had been planted in the
Eastern Suburb underground subway station.  All services between Town Hall
and Bondi Junction stations were canceled while authorities searched.  Rail
services resumed at 4 p.m. after a search discovered no bomb.
Greece - March 3, 1991 - November 17 claim responsibility for bus
bombing
Tour buses in two Athens suburbs were damaged by explosions.  The
November 17 group claimed responsibility.  The attack was to support bus
drivers who were striking to protest government plans to privatize the state-
owned Greek Urban Bus Company.
Turkey - April 9, 1991 - Sabotaged bus kills 36 tourists
Sabotage of a Greek tourists bus in Istanbul resulted in the deaths of 36
tourists.  Seven people were injured.
France - April 4, 1991 - German tour bus bombed
An incendiary device exploded underneath a German tourist coach parked
outside a hotel in Corsica.  The FLNC was suspected.
Peru - May 29, 1991 - Shining Path torches a railroad station
Shining Path guerrillas torched a railroad station near Lima on May 29.
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Sri Lanka - June 27, 1991 - LTTE bomb tour bus
The LTTE detonated a bomb under a tourist bus, then opened fire on the
passengers.  Fourteen people were killed, including a Danish tourist, and nine
others were injured.
Italy - July 6, 1991 - Spanish tour bus bombed
A Spanish tour bus exploded in central Rome after unidentified assailants
threw an explosive device into it.  ETA was believed to be responsible.
Soviet Union - July 31, 1991 - Passenger train bombed
A passenger train traveling between Moscow and Baku was bombed.
Fourteen people were killed and sixteen injured in the attack.  The bomb had
been concealed in a briefcase and left in a reserved compartment.
Greece - August 10, 1991 - Tour bus set on fire
An empty Turkish tour bus was set on fire in downtown Athens.
Spain - August 17, 1991 - Bomb explodes on Madrid-Irun railway track
A bomb exploded on Madrid-Irun railway route, a major railroad that links
Spain and France, causing an electricity pylon to fall across the track.  A
freight train collided with the pylon soon after the explosion.  No one was
injured.  Basque separatists were suspected to be behind the attack.
United Kingdom - August 29, 1991 - Three bombs found in subway car
Three incendiary devices were discovered under a seat in a subway car in
London.  Officials suspect the PIRA.
India - September 6, 1991 - "Goodwill Train" Attacked
The "Goodwill Train" between India and Pakistan was attacked by Sikh
extremists.   A Pakistani woman was killed in the attack.
India - September 9, 1991 - "Goodwill Train" attacked again
Sikh extremists attacked the "Goodwill Train" that shuttles between India
and Pakistan.  The attack was the second in only a few days.  Three Pakistanis
were injured.
South Africa - October 24, 1991 - Train attack in Soweto
Gunmen killed at least nine people and injured 36 yesterday in an attack on
a Soweto commuter train full of workers.  The train attack is the second of its
type in a week.
148 A Chronology of Terrorist Attacks – Brian M. Jenkins
Norman Y. Mineta International Institute for Surface Transportation Policy Studies
Pakistan - October 29, 1991 - Bandits attack train in Sind
Bandits believed to be on a robbery and/or kidnapping expedition opened
fire the night of October 27 on an express train near Alahdadani in Sind
province after failing to stop it by setting fire to wooden slats supporting the
tracks.  The bullets hit several of the train's coaches but there were no injuries.
Comment:  Although no one was hurt in this latest incident, Sindi bandits
have a long history of robbing trains and sometimes harming passengers
gratuitously.  Rail and road travel are best avoided in Sind province.
Personnel should travel between cities by air.
Pakistan - October 30, 1991 - Four die when bandits fire on bus
Bandits opened fire on a passenger bus near Mirpur Mathelo in the
southern province of Sind when the driver ignored the gang's orders to stop.
Four passengers died and an unknown number were injured.  Police later
killed one of the bandits in a shoot-out.
India - November 2, 1991 - Six die in Assam bus bombing
At least six people died yesterday when a bomb exploded on a crowded bus
as it was pulling into a station in the Assam state town of Barpeta.  There were
no immediate claims of responsibility, although suspicion focused on the
terrorist United Liberation Front of Assam.
South Africa - November 5, 1991 - Bomb damages railway line as strike
continues
A bomb blast damaged a railway line east of Johannesburg today,
disrupting train service during the last day of a two-day strike to protest a new
sales tax.  No injuries were reported in the bombing, which police said was
linked to the strike.  At least 19 people died in strike-related violence
November 3 and yesterday.  An estimated 4 million South African blacks
stayed away from their jobs during the work stoppage, which closed
thousands of businesses, disrupted the transport system and emptied
downtown Johannesburg.
India - November 11, 1991 - Bomb blast on train near Bombay
A bomb explosion late November 8 killed at least 12 people and injured
some 60 aboard a commuter train about 50 miles northeast of Bombay.  The
crude device detonated in a first-class compartment just as the train pulled into
the station in the town of Kalyan.  Police were not immediately able to
attribute responsibility for the attack.
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South Africa - November 15, 1991 - Man killed in South African train at-
tack
A man was shot and hacked to death and seven other people wounded in an
attack today aboard a packed South African commuter train.  A police
spokesman said the body of the butchered man, with bullet and slash wounds,
was tossed onto the tracks.  Two wounded passengers were rescued from the
rails after flinging themselves from the train.  Three men were arrested and
guns and cane-cutting knives with long blades were seized.
United Kingdom - December 16, 1991 - Bomb explodes at rail station
A small bomb exploded just before 6 a.m. near Clapham Junction, the
busiest station in South London.  A caller to a television station claiming to be
a member of the IRA warned that a bomb had been placed at one of London's
main rail terminals, but did not say which station.  All main British Rail
depots in London and some Underground stations were closed and searched.
Incendiary devices were discovered on a London commuter train.
United Kingdom - December 23, 1991 - Incendiary devices discovered on
Commuter train
For the second Monday in a row, London's transportation network was
brought to a halt by small incendiary devices hidden in commuter trains.  Very
little damage was caused by the devices, and there were no reported injuries,
however, the entire 254-mile subway network was shut down for several
hours while searches were conducted.
United Kingdom - December 28, 1991 - IRA bombs railroad to end cease-
fire
On December 28, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) set off bombs on
Belfast to Dublin railway tracks just three minutes after the end of its
Christmas 1991 cease-fire.  No one was injured in the blast, but the train
service was disrupted.
Italy - January 6, 1992 - Time bomb aimed at mass casualty explodes
On January 6, a time bomb exploded just before an express train with at
least 1,100 passengers on board passed over the location of the explosion.  A
massacre was avoided because train left Leece station 2 minutes behind
schedule.  The explosion blew a 3-foot hole in the middle of the track and
damaged one of the rails but left the other intact.
India - January 18, 1992 - Bomb kills eight, train derailed
Suspected Sikh militants exploded a bomb at a market in the town of
Samana, near Amritsar, killing eight people.  An explosion at the nearby
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Golwar railway station derailed a train and injured seven.  The attacks may
mark the beginning of a stepped-up Sikh militant campaign before provincial
elections are held on February 19.
United Kingdom - January 29, 1992 - IRA bomb causes Belfast train
chaos
The Irish Republican Army (IRA) plunged Belfast rail travel into chaos
today with a bomb blast on the track near the city's central station.  The IRA
admitted responsibility for the blast and then warned that other bombs had
been planted along the line.  Railways have become favorite IRA targets this
year with attacks on lines in Belfast, Londonderry, and near the province's
border with the Irish Republic.
India - January 30, 1992 - Bomb explodes on New Delhi bus
A bomb exploded in a bus near Delhi University in the old part of the city
yesterday, killing one and injuring 26.  Police believe militant Sikhs
campaigning for independence in Punjab state planted the timer-activated
explosive, which was hidden in a bag of cereal.
United Kingdom - January 30, 1992 - Unexploded firebomb
Cleaners found an unexploded firebomb at about 1:30 a.m. today under the
seat of a subway train at the Elephant and Castle depot in London.  Some
commuter services were disrupted this morning while police searched for
more devices.  Police said the device, similar to others set by the Irish
Republican Army, may have been there for 24 hours.
Pakistan - February 5, 1992 - Bandits attack train near Larkana, abduct
passengers
About 50 bandits firing rockets and automatic weapons attacked a train at a
station near Larkana in Sind province February 4, killing one of its eight-
strong police guard and abducting 50 passengers.  The bandits, known as
dacoits, later released 32 of the hostages before escaping with the remainder
into the forest along the Indus River.
Comment:  The area between Larkana and Dadu is one of Sind's worst for
banditry.  Larkana district -- site of the Moenjodaro ruins and once a popular
tourist destination -- should be avoided.  All travel in Sind province outside
Karachi is perilous and requires a security escort.
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United Kingdom - February 7, 1992 - Incendiary device on east London
track
An incendiary device ignited this morning on a subway track at Barking in
east London, causing minimal damage and no injuries.  Some rush-hour train
services were delayed by security checks following the firebombing.  The
incendiary device was similar to others used in recent attacks in London and
other British cities by the Irish Republican Army (IRA).
India - February 8, 1992 - Six die, 50 hurt in train blast
A bomb exploded on a train traveling from Punjab State to New Delhi
today, killing six people and injuring at least 50.  The explosion occurred as
the train was passing the town of Narwana in Haryana State.  Police suspect
Sikh militants planted the explosive device.
Peru - February 10, 1992 - Lima bombing wave
Maoist Shining Path (Spanish initials: SL) guerrillas killed at least two
people and wounded 35 during a wave of bombings in Lima on February 7.
One of the bombs, placed near the door of the National Superintendency of
Tax Administration, detonated as a bus passed, killing the driver and
wounding 28 passengers and passersby.  Three employees were also hurt.  The
building is located just 50 yards from the U.S. Embassy.  Another bomb went
off at the offices of the National Institute of Public Administration, killing one
of the SL guerrillas who planted the explosive and wounding four others.
Bombs also exploded at five banks in Lima, and SL dynamited three electrical
pylons, blacking out most of the city.
Guatemala - February 11, 1992 - Gunmen kill five on bus on southern
highway
Armed men wearing military-style uniforms stopped a bus on a southern
Guatemalan highway in Solola department February 9 and opened fire on
passengers at random.  Five people were killed and 15 wounded in the attack,
which the Guatemalan interior minister said may have involved security
forces.  Defense Minister Jose Garcia Samayoa insisted, however, that leftist
rebels are the prime suspects.  The shootings took place days before U.S.
Defense Secretary Dick Cheney and U.N. human rights expert Christian
Tomouschat are due to arrive in Guatemala City.
China - February 21, 1992 - Muslim separatists blow up bus in Xinjiang
Muslim separatists in the northwestern Chinese region of Xinjiang have set
off a time bomb in a bus, killing perhaps as many as six people and injuring
20 more.  The attack took place in Urumqi, capital of Xinjiang, on February 5,
but reports of the incident did not become public until yesterday.  There were
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also reports that another bomb went off in a bus terminal in Urumqi.  Xinjiang
is a vast desert region whose 15 million people are divided between Muslim
Turkic speakers, many of whom want to break away from China, and ethnic
Chinese.
Jamaica - February 24, 1992 - More than 12 killed in gang violence
More than 12 people have been killed so far in February in gang-related
violence in Kingston's western slums.  Because of the battles in the West
Kingston and Lower St. Andrew neighborhoods, a curfew has been imposed
in some neighborhoods and many markets and shops closed.  The fighting,
linked to a power struggle among well-armed drug gangs, or "posses," has not
affected areas that foreigners usually frequent, such as New Kingston and the
downtown.  The gang war started in early February when drug kingpin Mark
Coke was gunned down in West Kingston. Security forces have been
deployed throughout the western suburbs to prevent new gang violence.
Several bus routes were modified to avoid areas where gunmen have attacked
buses, and the Kingston Public Hospital-Victoria Jubilee Hospital complex
was shut down on February 21 after receiving bomb threats.
Kenya - February 27, 1992 - Tour groups attacked
Bandits posing as police officers attacked a tour bus on its way from
Mombasa airport to the Watamu beach resort on February 25, killing a
Kenyan tour guide and robbing a group of 11 Austrian tourists.  The attack
comes a day after seven British tourists were beaten and robbed in the Masai
Mara wildlife reserve.
Greece - February 28, 1992 - ELA claims police bus bombing
The leftist Revolutionary Popular Struggle (Greek acronym: ELA) terrorist
group yesterday took responsibility for the February 26 morning blast in
Athens that injured 15 riot policemen in a bus and a civilian passerby.  The
bomb, apparently constructed with TNT explosive, was hidden in a canister
magnetically attached to a traffic light pole.  The device was detonated by
remote-control when the bus stopped at the traffic light.  One policeman
injured in the blast is expected to lose vision in one eye, and the wounded
civilian is expected to lose one leg below the knee.  The ELA communique,
delivered to the Athens newspaper Ethnos, also announced that the group had
merged with the allied May 1 group in October.  Because of the modus
operandi of the attack, police initially blamed it on the November Seventeen
(N-17) group, which has a more lethal history than ELA.
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United Kingdom - February 28, 1992 - At least 25 wounded in London
subway blast
At least 25 people were injured, two of them seriously, when a bomb
exploded during rush hour this morning at the London Bridge subway station.
The bomb exploded in a toilet on one of the platforms at the station, located in
London's financial district, as hundreds of passengers got off a train.  A
suspected member of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) phoned in a warning
about the bomb to a Northern Ireland television station just minutes before it
went off, giving authorities no time to evacuate the underground system.  All
subway stations were closed after the blast and security measures backed up
highway traffic from London to Heathrow airport.
United Kingdom - March 1, 1992 - Bomb hoaxes delay peace trains
Trains carrying more than 1,000 Irish peace campaigners traveling to
Northern Ireland to protest against terrorist violence there were delayed
because of warnings that bombs had been planted on the railway line. The
travelers were heading for Belfast, Northern Ireland for a symbolic shopping
spree in defiance of the efforts by the Northern Ireland terrorist organization
Irish Republic Army (IRA) to disrupt Belfast's retail operations through a
wave of bombings.  The trains were able to resume their travel to Belfast after
three hours when the police declared that the bomb warnings were hoaxes.
United Kingdom - March 2, 1992 - Three IRA bombs over weekend
At least three suspected Irish Republican Army (IRA) explosive devices
were discovered over the weekend in London.  One bomb containing two
pounds of plastic explosive went off on Furnival Street on February 29 near
the Old Bailey, the principal London courthouse, slightly injuring a woman
passerby and breaking windows at a Burger King restaurant across the street.
The blast came as the area was being evacuated due to an  IRA bomb warning.
Bomb threats over the weekend forced police to close streets and subways
leading to Oxford Street and Regent Street in London's busiest shopping
district, but no device was found there.  Yesterday afternoon, a rail passenger
spotted a bomb on train tracks at White Hart Lane station in northern
London's Tottenham district.  Police defused the device hours before
thousands of soccer fans were to arrive at the station for a soccer match.  The
injury toll from a bomb February 28 at the London Bridge subway station was
raised to 28.  The IRA later announced that it planned more violence to
influence British national elections.
United Kingdom - March 10, 1992 - Bombing near train station
On March 10, a small bomb exploded along tracks near Wandsworth
Common Station in south London, causing major disruption in rail and
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subway services.  The explosion destroyed signals, slowed trains southwest of
the capital and at Victoria Station, but did not cause any injuries.  All services
were halted at other stations following other hoax bomb warnings following
the incident.
Malaysia / Thailand - March 11, 1992 - Travelers injured in bus attack in
southern Thailand
Five Singaporean passengers were injured by flying glass yesterday when
the bus they were traveling in was fired on near the Thai-Malay border.  The
assailants reportedly left a note at the scene giving the bus company 10 days
to pay protection money or risk further attacks.  The bus, carrying
Singaporean and Malaysian tourists returning home from Thailand, was en
route to the town of Hat Yai.  Police have described the incident as the work
of "insurgents."
Greece / Germany - March 26, 1992 - Bombs hit train carrying BMW
cars
Two time bombs exploded yesterday inside a freight train stopped at the
suburban Athens train station of Ath Rendis.  The blasts, which destroyed two
automobiles in a shipment of German-made BMWs on the train, were
preceded by an anonymous warning call to the station.  The Greek ultra-leftist
terrorist group November Seventeen and the affiliated "Popular Uprising" cell
have claimed responsibility for several attacks against German corporate
targets in the last year.
Russia - March 27, 1992 - Bus Hijacked
A bus in the town of Lermontov was commandeered by hijackers armed
with submachine guns and grenades to the airport at Mineralnye Vody, South
of Moscow, where the group demanded a flight to Iraq.  The three hijackers
released their hostages after winning freedom for two imprisoned burglars and
safe passage to a separatist region.
Argentina - April 1, 1992 - Bomb on train line
A bomb exploded on the Roca railway line in the Lanus district of southern
Buenos Aires yesterday.  The bomb caused slight damage to the rails and
interrupted train service.  The blast was later linked to an ongoing strike by
Argentine rail workers.  In addition to the bomb on the train line, the home of
a non-striking motorman was hit by a Molotov cocktail yesterday.  Buenos
Aires police officers are boarding trains to provide security.
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Peru - April 2, 1992 - SL attacks train near Bolivia border
About a dozen Maoist Shining Path (Spanish initials: SL) terrorists
attacked a train in Puno department near the Bolivian border March 31, killing
a railroad official and wounding four other people.  One of the wounded was
the son of the railroad official and the other three were policemen providing
security on the National Railroad train, which was traveling to the town of
Juliaca, about 450 miles southeast of Lima.
Kenya - April 3, 1992 - Explosion at train station
An explosion was reported April 1 in an unused toilet located about 50
yards from Nairobi's main rail station.  The unexplained blast caused no
injuries and minor damage.
Malaysia - April 17, 1992 - Rail lines sabotaged
Unidentified saboteurs removed rail retaining pins on tracks near the town
of Sedenak in Johor state in an attempt to derail a train carrying 600
passengers yesterday.  However, an alert engineer averted the derailing by
stopping the locomotive in time.  The incident was reportedly the fourth
attempt at rail sabotage in the country in recent days.
Pakistan - April 29, 1992 - Ten die in Sind train attack
Bandits fired on a passenger train with small arms and rockets near
Hyderabad in central Sind province on April 27, killing 10 passengers and
injuring at least 30.  The train's locomotive was hit by two rockets, but the
bandits failed to stop it.
Taiwan - May 4, 1992 - Spate of bomb hoaxes
A spate of bomb hoaxes has hit Taiwan:  two department stores, a public
housing project in Taipei, and a bus and a train station in the southern city of
Kaohsiung received false telephone warnings that bombs had been planted on
their premises.
United Kingdom - May 8, 1992 - Victoria Station in London evacuated
for bomb search
Police evacuated London's central Victoria Station, one of the British
capital's busiest train and Underground railway stations, due to a bomb alert
during this morning's rush hour. Police gave no reason for the alert.  The Irish
Republican Army (IRA) has staged several bombings, and numerous waves of
telephoned bomb hoaxes, in London this year.
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Israel - May 12, 1992 - PLO bomb bus station
The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine detonated a bomb at a bus
station which resulted in casualties.
Kuwait - May 20, 1992 - Gunmen attack Romanian circus performers
A bus carrying 20 Romanian circus performers was attacked yesterday in
Kuwait City by four gunmen wielding automatic weapons.  Two circus
performers were injured in the attack.  The attack follows reports that one of
the tents belonging to the circus was set on fire last week.  It is not clear who
was behind the attacks.
Russia - May 21, 1992 - Terrorists bomb railroad station
Suspected Palestinian terrorists bombed a Moskoviski railroad station in St.
Petersburg, killing one and injuring 12 others.  The bomb was placed in a
trash can near the ticket office, outside the station.
Peru - May 22, 1992 - SL ambush in Upper Huallaga kills 10, wounds 21
Guerrillas of the Maoist Shining Path (Spanish initials: SL) movement
yesterday ambushed an army patrol on a jungle highway near Las Vegas-
Garganta del Diablo in the Upper Huallaga Valley and then shot at a passing
bus, killing 10 people and wounding 21 others.  Ten guerrillas were also
reportedly killed in the clash, which took place some 200 miles northeast of
Lima and started when more than 100 SL guerrillas intercepted a military
truck on patrol.  Guerrillas armed with high-powered weapons killed five
soldiers and wounded five others in the truck.  In the course of the shootout, a
bus carrying some 50 passengers appeared.  The guerrillas, apparently
thinking the second vehicle was also carrying military personnel, shot at the
bus, killing five civilians and wounding 16 others.
Peru - May 29, 1992 - Bus held up in Bolivia near Peruvian border
A passenger bus traveling from La Paz to Puerto Acosta on the north shore
of Lake Titicaca, close to the border with Peru, was held up by hooded
individuals May 26.  The bus was forced to stop by rocks placed in the road.
Hooded individuals, armed with submachine guns and wearing pieces of
military uniform, shot the bus driver in the leg and robbed the passengers.
Passengers said the robbers might have been Peruvians from their accents and
the names they called each other, and one man thought they could be members
of the Peruvian guerrilla group, the Maoist Shining Path.
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Pakistan - June 5, 1992 - Two killed in bus attack as troops begin patrol-
ling Karachi
Two people were killed and 24 wounded June 4 when gunmen sprayed
bullets and tossed a bomb at a bus in the crowded Kharadar area of Karachi.
Troops began patrolling the streets of Karachi as part of the continuing
crackdown in the southern province of Sind.
United Kingdom - June 11, 1992 - London "tube" hit by IRA bomb
hoaxes
A security alert caused chaos on the London underground train system on
June 11, delaying at least a quarter of a million commuters heading home
from work.  The network reopened after searches of four of the capital's
busiest stations prompted by bomb scares at about 5:45 p.m. The search
caused a near-total shutdown of the underground network, known locally as
"the tube." The Irish Republican Army (IRA), which has staged several
bombings in London in recent months, often follows attacks with the tactic of
bogus bomb warnings timed to draw publicity and cause maximum economic
disruption.
United Kingdom - June 16, 1992 - PIRA bombing
In central London two PIRA members forced a taxi driver to drive to a
selected spot, left two explosives in the back seat, and told the cabdriver he
had 15 minutes to get away.  The explosion caused property damage but no
injuries.
Panama - June 17, 1992 - Bus hijackings near Colon
    Eight buses have reportedly been hijacked in the Colon area of Panama by
people claiming to represent the amorphous December 20 Movement (Spanish
initials: M-20).  The hijackers reportedly boarded the buses traveling between
Panama City and Colon, forced drivers to divert the vehicles to isolated areas,
and robbed passengers.  Four recent hijackers claimed they were stealing to
get money to purchase weapons.
Bangladesh - June 26, 1992 - Strikers throw firebomb into bus, injuring
passengers
More than 20 people were injured on the night of June 25 when striking
transport workers threw a firebomb into a bus in Dhaka.  The strikers want a
law allowing murder charges to be brought against drivers involved in road
accidents to be abolished.
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Cambodia - July 8, 1992 - Seven die in bandit bus ambush
At least seven people were killed and two wounded July 6 when 15 bandits
attacked a bus on Route 13 between Stung Treng City and Kratie, in Northern
Stung Treng province 170 miles north of the capital.  A United Nations
peacekeeping official said the bandits could have been "uncontrolled
soldiers", adding that, in the early stages of the U.N.'s disarmament plan,
discipline among the fighters of all four Cambodian factions was becoming
lax.
Egypt - July 14, 1992 - French tour bus fire bombed
Islamic fundamentalists threw Molotov cocktails at a bus carrying French
tourists.  The French tour guide was injured.
Chile - July 15, 1992 - Rebels torch Santiago buses
Two buses were destroyed in a terrorist attack carried out on July 13 by
suspected members of the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front (Spanish initials:
FPMR).  Four individuals entered the Villa Naciones Unidas bus station in the
capital's central station district and threatened the bus drivers with machine
guns.  The assailants machine-gunned the buses, which caught fire, and then
fled.
Peru - July 24, 1992 - 2 tourists killed
Two tourists, a German and a Colombian, were singled out and executed
July 22 when a bus in which they were traveling was intercepted by suspected
SL militants in the central Peruvian Andes.
Argentina - July 28, 1992 - Bomb defused on Mitre rail line
Police defused explosives planted on a Mitre rail line near Villa
Gobernador Galvez in Santa Fe province on July 21, 15 minutes before a
passenger train passed the spot.  Warned by an anonymous telephone caller,
police asked railway officials to delay departure of a Buenos Aires-bound
train while they defused the explosives.  They found three M5-type grenades
and 1.5 kilograms of TNT on the rails.
Russia - August 10, 1992 - Bandits rob passenger train
Some 50 bandits halted a Tbilisi-Moscow train near Gali Rayon on the
night of August 8 and robbed passengers.  Hours later a Tbilisi-Sochi
passenger train came under attack.  The same night a bomb destroyed a rail
bridge support in Poti, interrupting rail traffic.  There have been a rash of train
robberies and railroad sabotage in recent weeks.  The Georgian government
blames militant supporters of ousted president Zviad Gamsakhurdia and
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criminal gangs for the incidents, which have caused hundreds of thousands of
dollars in damage.
Pakistan - August 19, 1992 - Trains searched for bombs
On August 18, government troops searched trains in Karachi after the City
and Cantonment railway stations received a telephone threat.  Passengers from
six trains were forced to disembark while the searches were conducted.  No
explosive devices were found and police said the threat was a hoax.  The
threat came a day after three navy personnel were killed and forty-three
injured in a bomb blast near a navy base in Karachi.
South Africa - August 19, 1992 - Soweto train attack, one dead
One man was killed and five wounded in another Soweto commuter train
attack.  The incident occurred early August 19 when unidentified men opened
fire on commuters boarding a train at Nancefield station, in the Johannesburg
township of Soweto.  Later, shots were fired in the moving train.  The dead
and wounded were removed at the next station.  The assailants apparently
escaped.
Egypt - August 26, 1992 - Tourist bus attacked in Qena
Muslim militants threw two crude incendiary bombs at a bus carrying
French tourists August 21 in Upper Egypt's Qena governate.  The Egyptian
driver and tour guide were injured by broken glass, but none of the tourists
was injured.  The incident is the latest of several recent attacks by Muslim
fundamentalists against tourists in Upper Egypt.
Philippines - August 27, 1992 - Bus attacked and burned
Unidentified assailants stopped a bus en route to Mati, Davao Oriental
province, on August 23, burning the bus and its contents after removing the
passengers.  The passengers were not hurt or robbed but their belongings
burned with the bus.  The company that operates the bus line said it had
promptly paid its "revolutionary taxes" to both the New People's Army (NPA)
and the Muslim Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and knew of no
reason for the attack.
United Kingdom - August 28, 1992 - IRA bomb hits Belfast train
    A three-car suburban train was severely damaged in an Irish Republican
Army (IRA) bomb attack in south Belfast on August 20.  At 3:40 p.m. the
train stopped at Finaghy Station.  Two men, one of them armed, left the bomb
in the guard's van and raised the alarm.  The train's passengers were led to
safety and 30 minutes later the bomb exploded.  The guard's van was
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destroyed and the total damage is estimated at around $250,000.  Train
services were disrupted but by early evening were back to normal.
United Kingdom - August 28, 1992 - IRA bomb threat halts London
trains
Police reopened five of London's mainline railway stations August 20 after
a coded bomb warning brought the capital's transport system virtually to a
halt.  Thousands of commuters faced an evening of chaos after a radio station
received a bomb warning from the Irish Republican Army (IRA).  Police
cordoned off King's Cross railway station and crowds were stranded at
Victoria. London's Underground rail system was also stalled after subway
lines passing through the mainline stations were also shut down.  Police said
all stations, including St. Pancras, Charing Cross and London Bridge were
reopened after officers and sniffer dogs searched the stations for more than
four hours.  No devices were found.
Turkey - September 1, 1992 - PKK attacks multinational oil storage fa-
cility, derails passenger train
Guerrillas of the Kurdish Workers Party (Kurdish initials: PKK) set fire
August 30 to eight crude oil storage tanks owned by the Royal Dutch Shell
subsidiary N.V. Turkse Shell.  The attack took place in the southeastern town
of Kocakoy, 20 miles from the provincial capital of Diyarbakir.  The fire
caused extensive damage to the facility, but there were no reports of injuries.
In a separate incident, PKK guerrillas derailed a passenger train traveling from
Mus to the eastern city of Elazig, seriously injuring four travelers on board.
Turkey - September 1, 1992 - One killed on Istanbul bus
A teenage gunman was shot dead by security forces after killing a bus
passenger when his identity was challenged by a bus driver August 31.  The
19-year-old man ordered the bus to stop in the business district of Maslak
after a quarrel with the driver over his identity.  He opened fire before getting
off the bus, killing a woman and wounding another passenger and the driver.
Istanbul officials said the attacker was a member of the Dev Sol
(Revolutionary Left) terrorist organization.
Turkey - September 8, 1992 - PKK attacks train, robs motorists at road-
block
Guerrillas of the Kurdish Workers Party (Kurdish initials: PKK) seized a
passenger train today after it stopped at the Gecit station, east of the city of
Erzincan, killing one soldier, abducting another and terrorizing passengers.  A
separate band of rebels set up a roadblock on the main highway between the
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eastern cities of Erzincan and Erzurum, robbing passengers at gunpoint and
setting fire to two trucks.
Chile - September 11, 1992 - Leftist groups active before anniversary
Leftist terrorists have been active in the lead-up to the September 11
anniversary of the 1973 coup that ousted Socialist President Salvador Allende.
On September 10, three police guarding the house of a government official
were shot to death by terrorists in a moving taxi in the upscale eastern
neighborhood of Las Condes.  One attacker also died during the shoot-out,
initiated by a woman pretending to carry a baby who got out of a taxi and
began spraying the police car with automatic rifle fire.  The assailants escaped
in the taxi, which they later abandoned along with the body of the guerrilla
shot by the policemen.  On the night of September 9, three bombs exploded in
Santiago at offices of the center-right National Renewal party, a subway
station, and a suburban municipal building.  None of the off-hours explosions
caused injuries.  A previously unknown group calling itself the Subversive
Coordination for a Popular Fatherland claimed responsibility for all three
bombings.  The group may be related to the Guerrilla Army of the Poor-Free
Fatherland Movement.
India - September 29, 1992 - Bomb on bus kills six in Punjab
Six passengers were killed and more than 50 were injured September 28
when a bomb exploded aboard a crowded bus as it left the city of Pathankot,
northwest of Amritsar in Punjab state, en route to Jammu in the state of
Jammu-Kashmir.  Sikh militants have been blamed for the blast, which blew
the roof off the bus.
Turkey - October 2, 1992 - Bomb at Istanbul's train station
A bomb exploded at midnight October 1 at Istanbul's main Haydarpasa
train station, causing damage but no injuries.  The bomb reportedly detonated
in an empty train car.
Egypt - October 6, 1992 - Bomb explodes on train in Dayrut
A bomb exploded on a passenger train near the heavily guarded Dayrut
station October 6, killing three Egyptians and wounding ten.  Authorities said
it is unclear whether the train, which was traveling from Asyut to Cairo, was
the target or whether someone was attempting to throw the bomb into the
station.  Last month, unknown assailants hurled a bomb from a passing train at
a police station in Dayrut, which is 50 miles north of Asyut.  The militant
Muslim fundamentalist group al-Gamya al-Islamiya (The Islamic Groups) has
killed more than 60 people in attacks on the security forces and Christians in
and around Asyut this year.  Last month the group warned tourists against
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trips to historic Luxor; on October 1 suspected Muslim gunmen fired on a
Nile cruiser headed to Luxor.
United Kingdom - October 9, 1992 - IRA bombers strike again in London
The Irish Republican Army (IRA) exploded two bombs under cars parked
near railway stations late October 8, just hours after claiming two explosions
October 7 in the theater district.  The first blast at 9:30 p.m. outside the
popular London Dungeon horror museum, adjacent to London Bridge station,
slightly injured a passerby; a second bomb exploded 70 minutes later near
Marylebone station in northwest London.  The recent bombings, among a
dozen staged by the IRA in London this year, are aimed at disrupting night
life and embarrassing the ruling Conservative Party, which is holding its
annual conference this week in Brighton.
United Kingdom - October 13, 1992 - IRA continues London campaign
The Irish Republican Army (IRA) staged four bombings over the October
10-11 weekend in a campaign of intimidation that has resulted in eight
explosions in central London in less than a week.  On the night  of October 9,
a bomb detonated in a parking lot outside the British Legion Club, a hangout
for retired servicemen, and a second detonated near the Arnos Grove subway
station.  On October 10, IRA bombers set off a device in a telephone booth
outside the Metropole Hotel and close to a police station, injuring one person.
And at lunchtime October 11, a blast wrecked a restroom in the Sussex Arms,
a pub in the Covent Garden district, and injured five persons, two seriously.
The IRA had made a warning call shortly before the explosion but misdirected
police to the Leicester Square district; the tourist-packed area was being
evacuated when the device exploded on adjoining Long Acre street.
India - October 14, 1992 - Train bombing in Assam kills 25
Two bombs exploded five minutes apart October 13 in two separate
compartments of a passenger train crossing the Barpeta district of northeastern
India's Assam state.  The blasts killed 25 people and wounded at least 50.
Police suspect the bombs were planted by the Bodo Security Force (BSF), a
tribal movement in Assam that demands a separate state within India for the
animist Bodo people.  The BSF is a rival of the Maoist United Liberation
Front of Assam (ULFA), which seeks total independence from India.
Colombia - October 15, 1992 - Rebel threats halt buses
Two bus companies October 13 suspended intercity transport between
Bogota and Atlantic coast destinations.  There is also no bus service to
Barrancabermeja, Santander department, and Cucuta, Norte de Santander
department.  The company decision, which has inconvenienced tens of
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thousands of bus passengers, comes as a result of guerrilla threats.  One
guerrilla communique demanded the suspension of ground, air and water
transportation from October 7-14.  Another guerrilla communique told bus
companies to suspend operations from October 13-16.
Cambodia - October 15, 1992 - Khmer Rouge destroys two bridges
According to United Nations peacekeeping forces in Cambodia, the Maoist
guerrillas of the Khmer Rouge on October 14 blew up the Bailey Bridge, 80
miles north of Phnom Penh on the strategic Route 6 highway.  The bridge is
the main link between southern Cambodia and the central part of the country.
A smaller bridge 30 miles southeast of Kompong Thom on Route 21 was also
destroyed October 14.  The Khmer Rouge has denied any knowledge of the
incidents.  The destruction of the bridges has caused an uproar in Cambodia
because it came only hours after the U.N. publicly warned the Khmer Rouge
to abide by the Cambodian peace agreement.  If the Bailey Bridge was in fact
destroyed by the Khmer Rouge, the attack would be the nearest military action
to Phnom Penh by the Maoists in several years.  Not coincidentally, according
to U.N. observers, the bridges were blown up the same day as the return to
Cambodia from New York of Prince Sihanouk and Yasushi Akashi, the
Japanese diplomat who heads the local U.N. task force.
Turkey - October 16, 1992 - Seven kidnapped from minibus
On October 8, suspected Kurdish Workers Party (Kurdish initials: PKK)
guerrillas stopped a minibus between the villages of Yarimca and Kasimli in
Siirt province's Baykan district and forced the passengers off the bus.  The
guerrillas then set the vehicle on fire and kidnapped the seven passengers.
Security forces are searching for the victims.
United Kingdom - October 20, 1992 - IRA bombs train line in Belfast
An Irish Republican Army (IRA) bombing October 20 ripped up railway
track between Belfast's central station and suburbs to the south.  The blast
halted most trains into the city; buses ferried commuters to work.  The IRA
often targets the rail network for bombings.
United Kingdom -  October 21, 1992 - PIRA bomb railway
A PIRA bomb went off on a railway line under Harrow Road Bridge in
London.
Egypt - October 21, 1992 - Machine-gun attack on tour bus
El Gama'a el-Islamiya claimed credit for a machine-gun attack on a tour
bus.  One British female was killed and two men injured.  El Gama'a claimed
responsibility.
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Turkey - October 21, 1992 - PKK kills 18 in bus attack
Rebels of the Kurdish Workers Party (Kurdish initials: PKK) killed 18
people in southeastern Turkey on October 20 when they strafed a bus with
automatic weapons and set fire to the vehicle. Six other passengers were
critically wounded and the death toll could rise.  The bus was attacked around
5.50 p.m. as it traveled from Bingol to Solhan.
United States - October 22, 1992 - Hand grenade discovered at a rail plat-
form
On October 22, up to a dozen trains were stopped during the morning rush
hour after a maintenance worker found a grenade with the pin still in place at
a commuter railway station in south side Chicago.  Police removed the
explosive.
United Kingdom - October 22, 1992 - IRA bombs London rail lines, army
base
The Irish Republican Army (IRA) detonated three bombs in London
October 21, the 13th blast in the capital in two weeks.  Employing a tactic it
has used with crippling effect in Northern Ireland, the IRA detonated a device
on a rail track in the north London suburb of Edmonton mid-afternoon
October 21, damaging a passing commuter train and slightly injuring three
passengers.  Later that evening, a device detonated at an army base in
Hammersmith, causing extensive damage and wounding three people.  An
hour later, a third explosion ripped up tracks in north London.  Authorities are
asking the public to be vigilant but to go about their normal business.
However, Londoners had a nightmare commute the morning of October 22 as
bomb alerts closed mainline rail stations while police searched for more
explosives.  Republican sources claim the bombings this month are a
precursor to a pre-Christmas bombing campaign intended to shake up the
beleaguered Conservative government, which is under heavy fire for
economic mismanagement.
Egypt - October 22, 1992 - Al-Gamya attacks tourist bus in Dayrut, 1
Briton killed, 2 injured
The Muslim fundamentalist al-Gamya al-Islamiya (The Islamic Groups)
ambushed a tourist bus October 21 near the town of Dayrut, 170 miles south
of Cairo, killing a British tourist and wounding two other Britons.  The attack
began about 3 p.m. when a boy standing watch whistled to alert al-Gamya
gunmen of the approaching bus -- a safari-type vehicle owned by the South
Sinai Tour Company and carrying six Britons, two Australians and a
Portuguese.  When the bus came within range, the two gunmen emerged from
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fields on both sides of the road and opened fire.  It was the first time
fundamentalists had killed a foreigner.
Egypt - October 26, 1992 - Al-Gamya attacks tourists
In claiming responsibility for the October 21 attack against a tourist bus in
Dayrut, the militant Muslim fundamentalist group al-Gamya al-Islamiya (The
Islamic Groups) stated:  "Tourists are our second target after high-level
political leaders in the bid to implement Islamic law in Egypt."  Following
that warning, on October 23 five suspected fundamentalist gunmen fired on a
Nile cruiser carrying foreign tourists as the ship neared the town of Nagaa
Hammadi, 280 miles south of Cairo in Qena governate.  No injuries were
reported in the attack.  On October 25, three Russian tourists were attacked by
a knife-wielding fundamentalist as they photographed a mosque in Port Said.
All three tourists suffered stab wounds and were hospitalized.
Turkey - October 26, 1992 - Passenger train hits PKK mine, plunges into
river
A passenger train traveling between the eastern cities of Tatvan and Elazig
hit a mine October 25 planted by the Kurdish Workers Party (Kurdish initials:
PKK) and plunged into the Murat river.  At least three people were killed and
47 injured.
Egypt - November 1, 1992 - Militants attack Christian bus
Three gunmen suspected of belonging to the militant fundamentalist al-
Gamya al-Islamiya (The Islamic Groups) fired on a bus carrying Coptic
Christians on November 1, wounding 10 people.  The attack took place in
Deir Mawas, 170 miles south of Cairo in Asyut governate, not far from the
site where al-Gamya gunmen attacked a tourist bus October 21.
Colombia - November 3, 1992 - Bus hijacking affecting multinational
Two hooded and armed men hijacked a bus contracted by a multinational
company in Bogota on October 20 and set fire to the vehicle.  The hijackers
boarded the bus by mixing in with the crowd of employees waiting at a
downtown pick-up spot.  Forty employees of the multinational were on the
bus, but all of them were set free.  The armed men forced the bus company's
driver to take the vehicle to a university in Bogota, where the fire was started.
The fire was extinguished without causing serious damage.  The attack came
as leftists -- some of them linked to guerrilla groups -- set fire to dozens of
buses around Colombia as part of an October offensive against the
government.
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Sri Lanka - November 19, 1992 - LTTE bombs bridge
LTTE guerrillas bombed a bridge on November 19.
Egypt - November 12, 1992 - Terrorist fire on German tour bus
Islamic fundamentalists opened fire on a convoy of tourist buses in Qena,
injuring eight German tourists.
Peru - November 20, 1992 - Second day of armed strike includes bomb at
airport
The Shining Path guerrilla movement continued its "armed strike" in the
Peruvian capital for a second day November 19, killing at least three people,
wounding 20 and paralyzing much of the capital's transport.  One bomb was
reported near the international airport.  In an attempt to disrupt the November
22 elections to the Constituent Congress, the Maoist rebels launched a series
of attacks including the bombing of President Alberto Fujimori's Cambio 90
political party headquarters.  Two people were killed and 13 were wounded
when a guerrilla entered a restaurant on a highway north of the capital and
opened fire on customers eating breakfast.  The "armed strike," so-called
because the rebels threaten to punish anyone attempting to go about their
normal life, began November 18 and is scheduled to last for three days.  In
Lima a bus driver was killed and his conductor was seriously injured when a
rebel set fire to a bus full of passengers on the main street of the poor San
Martin de Porres area of the capital.  Another four buses were burned in other
sectors of the capital and bombs exploded in the center of Lima and San
Martin de Porres.  Two passersby were injured when the former device blew
up.  On the afternoon of November 19, a bomb exploded near Lima's Jorge
Chavez international airport injuring a 51-year-old man. Two government
ministers in the airport at the time were unhurt.  Police said the two-pound
dynamite device blew a yard-wide hole in the ground beside the fence which
separated the airport grounds from a poor barrio.
Brazil - December 1, 1992 - Bomb in Rio's train station
A bomb exploded at 5:20 a.m. November 22 in Rio de Janeiro's central
railway station which links city and suburbs.  Some 800,000 passengers use
the station daily.  Two women, one of whom was probably carrying the bomb
in a plastic bag, were seriously injured by the blast and taken to a hospital.
Three station ticket counters were damaged.  There is no speculation yet on
the motive for the attack.
India - December 1, 1992 - Sikh militants kill bus passengers in Punjab
Seven Sikh militants from the Khalistan Liberation Force (KLF) shot 16
Hindu passengers to death December 1 after hijacking a bus near the industrial
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city of Ludhiana.  The KLF has been blamed for killing 25 Hindu farm
workers in the Ludhiana area on October 30.
United Kingdom - December 9, 1992 - PIRA bomb subway station
The PIRA detonated a bomb near the Woodside Park subway station.
Peru - December 10, 1992 - Piura rebel leader captured
Security forces have identified a terrorist captured at the scene of a bomb
attack as Laura Iparraguirre Saldana, political-military leader of the Maoist
Shining Path (Spanish initials: SL) guerrilla organization in Piura department,
in Peru's far northern region.  Iparraguirre, a teacher, and two men were
captured on November 18 after throwing a bomb under a parked bus in
Chulucanas.  One of the men, also a teacher, died in the incident.  The capture
of Iparraguirre and 12 other suspected guerrillas, some of whom had weapons
and explosives in their possession, was said to be a significant blow to the
effectiveness of the SL in Piura.
India - December 18, 1992 - 4 injured in Bombay train blast
Four passengers were injured December 18 when a bomb wrapped in a
leather bag exploded in a suburban train in Bombay, near the northern suburb
of Borivli.  No one has claimed responsibility for the blast.  The explosion
follows last week's riots in the city triggered by the destruction of a Muslim
shrine in Ayodhya on December 6 by Hindu militants.
United Kingdom - December 23, 1992 - IRA bombs Hampstead tube
An explosion ripped through a subway station in London's Hampstead
district as evening rush hour began December 22, causing damage but no
injury.  The blast came as Defense Minister Malcolm Rifkind urged the Irish
Republican Army (IRA) to negotiate a permanent cease-fire with Britain.
Security forces hope that the IRA, which has staged a ruthless pre-Christmas
bombing blitz, will call a 72-hour truce over the Christmas weekend.  IRA
sources say the issue is under consideration.
Thailand - December 23, 1992 - Bombing at bus station near Bangkok
A bomb left on a bus at the Taladplu station just outside Bangkok exploded
December 23, killing four persons and injuring a fifth.  A second bomb left on
the bus failed to go off. Police in October arrested an army corporal for blasts
that month at the Interior Ministry and the Burmese Embassy.  Officials say
the bombings are intended to embarrass the government.
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Israel - January 3, 1993 - Express bus bombed
A small bomb exploded on an express bus belonging to the national carrier
Egged. No injuries were reported.  Hamas was held responsible.
Egypt - January 5, 1993 - Attack on Japanese tourist bus
Suspected militants of the al-Gamya al-Islamiya (The Islamic Groups) fired
at a bus carrying Japanese tourists from the city of Luxor to Cairo January 5,
but no one was injured.  The attack took place near the town of Dayrut, a
hotbed of Muslim fundamentalist violence located 200 miles south of Cairo
and the site of previous attacks against tourists.  Last week, al-Gamya
militants distributed a statement warning that "tourists coming to Egypt and
foreigners living here must leave the country because we fear they could be
killed in the conflict between us and the secular regime which is fighting
against Islam."  Al-Gamya generally precedes attacks against foreigners with
statements of concern for tourist safety in Egypt.
Egypt - January 8, 1993 - Al-Gamya bombs Cairo tourist bus
A militant of the radical al-Gamya al-Islamiya (The Islamic Groups) tossed
a bomb at a bus carrying German tourists near Cairo the night of January 7,
causing damage but no injuries.  The device shattered the rear window of the
bus and damaged a second vehicle carrying Egyptian workers.  The attack
occurred as the bus stopped at a red light on the Pyramids Road, the main
boulevard connecting Cairo to the Giza Pyramids on the western outskirts.
Thousands of tourists travel the road every day to visit Egypt's top tourist
attraction.  The incident marks the first time al-Gamya militants have attacked
a tourist target in Cairo.  A spokesman for al-Gamya announced "that from
now on Cairo has become the stage for holy struggle."
Thailand - January 12, 1993 - Bomb found in bus depot locker
At about 3 p.m. on January 6, police received a report from a mechanic
working at the number 72 bus garage that there was a bomb hidden in a locker
in the bus garage in Khlong Toei District, Bangkok.  Police investigated and
discovered a M-26 grenade in a locker.  The locker was an unused one in the
employee's area and the grenade did not appear to present a hazard to the
public.  The explosive was removed for destruction and police are
investigating the incident.
United Kingdom - February 3, 1993 - IRA bombs London-to-Kent train
Passengers were evacuated from a train traveling from London's Victoria
Station to Ramsgate, 60 miles east, shortly before a bomb detonated at 9:45
a.m. February 3.  The small explosion, which caused little damage, came
about 40 minutes after authorities received coded warnings from the Irish
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Republican Army (IRA) of two bombs aboard the train.  A second bomb was
not found.  British Rail said the incident delayed trains throughout the capital.
United Kingdom - February 4, 1993 - Bomb explodes on train
A small bomb exploded on a train in south London.  Only minor damage
resulted, but traffic all over the city was affected.  Talks between the British
and Irish governments had started that day in London.  The PIRA is
suspected.  Another bomb exploded on a railway platform in the South
Kensington tube station in London at 3:29 pm.  A coded warning was given at
3:15 and the station was evacuated.  There were no injuries.  The IRA is
suspected.
Egypt - February 4, 1993 - Tourist bus attacked near Pyramids
Three Muslim militants tossed a bomb at a bus carrying 15 tourists from
Cairo to the Pyramids February 4, but no one was injured.  The attack
occurred outside the Europa Hotel near the Giza Pyramids.  The militants
were waiting in a car near the hotel and threw the bomb when the tourists
boarded the bus.  It is the second attack this month against a tourist bus in the
Pyramids area.
India - February 9, 1993 - Jammu-Kashmir bus bomb kills three
Three people were killed and 18 injured when a powerful bomb exploded
in a bus in the troubled north Indian state of Jammu-Kashmir on February 9.
The bomb exploded as the bus was traveling through the Jammu section of the
state.  Note of the separatist groups fighting Indian security forces in the area
claimed responsibility for the incident.
Egypt - February 9, 1993 - Tourist bus attacked in Dayrut
Muslim militants fired on a tourist bus carrying German tourists February 9
near the town of Dayrut, 200 miles south of Cairo, causing damage but no
injuries.  The incident took place after a police escort accompanying the bus
spotted armed men lying in ambush by the road and opened fire on them.  The
gunmen then fired on the bus and fled into the bush.  Several attacks on tourist
buses have occurred in or near Dayrut, a bastion of Muslim militants.
El Salvador - February 10, 1993 - U.S. citizen kidnapped, set free in north
A U.S. citizen riding in a private bus was kidnapped by armed bandits near
the northern Salvadoran town of San Cristobal on February 5.  He was freed
unhurt a day later after his captors transmitted a ransom demand but
apparently were not paid.  The bus was stopped at a roadblock by five armed
men wearing camouflage clothing, masks and combat boots.  The American, a
longtime resident of El Salvador, and three teenage Salvadorean girls were
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taken.  Such assaults by demobilized former guerrillas and soldiers are
becoming more common throughout El Salvador, especially at night.
Successful for-ransom kidnappings are still rare.
Myanmar - February 11, 1993 - Rebels blow up train, nine dead
The New Mon State Party rebel group and anti-government students
known as the All Burma Students' Democratic Front on February 8 blew up a
cargo train traveling between Ye and Moulmein in southeastern Burma,
killing nine people and injuring 18 others.
Azerbaijan - February 12, 1993 - Bomb destroys bridge
A bomb demolished a bridge in Kazakh region on February 12.  Azeri
officials held Armenians responsible for the bombing.
Egypt - February 17, 1993 - Gunmen fire on bus convoy
Two Islamic militants opened fire February 16 on a convoy of four buses
carrying 100 German tourists near Manfallout, Asyut governate, but did not
hit any vehicle.  Police escorting the buses returned fire and engaged the
gunmen in a lengthy shoot-out that left one militant dead. The convoy was
traveling to Cairo from the city of Luxor when it was attacked.
Russia - March 1, 1993 - Baku-bound train bombing kills 13
A package-bomb exploded February 28 in a sleeping compartment of a
train bound for the Azerbaijan capital of Baku, killing 13 passengers and
wounding 12.  The train had just left the village of Gudermes in the southern
Russian republic of Chechen.  The blast may have been in retaliation for
recent bombings by Azeri militants against Armenian interests, including the
bombing of a passenger train February 26 in Georgia.
Pakistan - March 3, 1993 - Rocket fired at Sind train
On February 27, bandits -- known locally as dacoits -- reportedly fired
shoulder-held rockets to stop a Lahore-bound train near Lakha, north of
Karachi in Sind province.  The dacoits, who are believed to have mistaken the
freight train for a scheduled passenger train they planned to loot, fled empty-
handed.  Twelve suspects were later arrested.
Pakistan - March 12, 1993 - Bomb blasts in Bombay kill 300, injure many
others
As least 300 people were killed and scores of others  injured March 12 in a
series of explosions in Bombay, India.  All of the blasts took place in a 90-
minute time frame, and many are thought to have been car-bombs.  One
explosion was in the basement of the Bombay Stock Exchange during trading,
A Chronology of Terrorist Attacks – Brian M. Jenkins 171
Norman Y. Mineta International Institute for Surface Transportation Policy Studies
and some people in the building were hurt in a stampede while trying to
evacuate and others were hurt by flying shards of glass.  Witnesses said some
of the floors of the new building, opened only a few months ago, were
sagging.  Another blast at the Air India building, one of the city's major
landmarks on the edge of the business district, shattered windows.  Other
blasts were reported on a train in Victoria Railway Station, Bombay's main
terminal, a shopping complex in the Worli district of central Bombay, and a
gas station near the headquarters of the Hindu-fundamentalist Shiv Sena
Party, widely accused of stirring up Hindu-Muslim violence in December and
January.  It is unclear which of the bombs caused the casualties.  "We suspect
an international conspiracy," Home Minister Shankarrao Chavan told
Parliament earlier in a statement echoed by Sharad Pawar, chief minister of
Maharashtra state, of which Bombay is the capital.  Chavan did not say who
might be behind the alleged conspiracy, but such statements are usually aimed
at Pakistan, predominantly Hindu India's Islamic neighbor.
Egypt - March 16, 1993 - Bombs found on train
On March 15, Egyptian railway guards seized a suitcase containing four
homemade bombs on the Cairo-Aswan train as it stopped in the town of Abu
Tig near Asyut.  The passenger carrying the suitcase escaped.
Philippines - March 17, 1993 - Time bomb found on bridge
Authorities who received a telephoned warning discovered and defused a
time bomb -- reportedly minutes before it was due to explode -- on a bridge
leading to the 1993 National Games in Ilagan in the northeast of Luzon Island
on March 12.  No one has claimed responsibility for the bomb, but the
Communist New People's Army had earlier warned it would sabotage the
sporting event.
Egypt - March 18, 1993 - Al-Gamya claims tourist bus blast
Muslim militants of the al-Gamya al-Islamiya (The Islamic Group) claimed
responsibility March 16 for a bomb which damaged five tourist buses outside
the Cairo Museum.  "Al-Gamya al-Islamiya announces that the unit 'Just
Retribution' planted a number of time bombs at noon today and that the bombs
exploded as planned,” said a faxed statement by the group.  The statement
said the blast was in revenge for a police raid on a mosque in the town of
Aswan last week which killed nine people and injured over 40.  The statement
warned of "a future violent response" in Cairo if what it termed a police siege
on the southern area of al-Badari was not lifted.
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India - March 22, 1993 - Railway terminus blast in Calcutta
A bomb exploded the evening of March 19 at the Sealdah railway terminus
in central Calcutta, killing one person and injuring 12 others.  The blast took
place soon after an express train from the northern city of Jammu in Jammu-
Kashmir state pulled into the station.  A man disembarked from the train
carrying a suitcase that exploded, killing him and injuring bystanders,
including five policemen.  Police say the blast was caused by a crude device.
Jammu-Kashmir is the site of a Muslim insurrection widely thought to be
supported by Pakistan.
South Africa - March 22, 1993 - Police kill four as mob loots train
Police shot dead four men and wounded five others March 18 when they
opened fire on about 30 blacks trying to loot a freight train.  A police
spokesman said the mob raided the train when it stopped at a red light near the
notorious Katlehong township east of Johannesburg.  Police were reportedly
tipped off about the planned raid and had officers on the train.  They jumped
off when the looters struck and opened fire when their warnings to stop were
ignored.
Mexico - March 26, 1993 - Blast at Guadalajara station
A package containing an unknown explosive substance exploded at the
downtown "El Refugio" electric train station at midnight, March 21, gravely
injuring a policeman.  The policeman was preparing to close the station when
he picked up the package from the floor near the entrance; the package
exploded in his hands.  Authorities announced an exhaustive review of
security at all train stations.  They said they did not believe the incident was a
terrorist attack and that it was not likely to be repeated.
India - April 6, 1993 - Blast on bus in Punjab kills five
Bags of firecrackers in luggage on the roof of a bus exploded April 5
outside the Sikh holy city of Amritsar in the state of Punjab, killing five
people and injuring 26.  Police first thought the blast was caused by a bomb
hidden by Sikh militants.
Pakistan - April 7, 1993 - 13 bus passengers murdered
On April 6, bandits -- known locally as dacoits -- stopped a bus about 300
miles north of Karachi in central Sind province, forced the passengers to
disembark and identify their tribal affiliation.  They then killed nine members
of the Mehr tribe and four members of the Mangrio tribe.  Police say the
incident was the result of a long-standing dispute between the Mehr and
Bozdar tribes.
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Egypt - April 12, 1993 - Bombs on tourist bus in Cairo
A member of the al-Gamya al-Islamiya (The Islamic Group) planted five
gasoline bombs inside a tourist bus carrying 50 German tourists in Cairo April
11, but the devices were removed before they could explode.  A guide aboard
the bus spotted the extremist placing a bag under a seat and alerted police who
then arrested the man and removed the bombs.  The bus was parked outside
Cairo's famous medieval Citadel when the incident occurred.
Greece - April 16, 1993 - ELA warns of unexploded bomb
A police dog sniffed out an unexploded bomb on a bus April 15.  The
discovery was made after Revolutionary Popular Struggle (Greek acronym:
ELA) sent a letter claiming to have planted seven bombs on Athens buses to
protest the privatization of the bus company.  Four bombs exploded in a bus
parking lot April 9, and two others were defused.  However, an anti-terrorist
unit failed to discover the seventh device.  ELA's warning prompted another
search.  Hundreds of commuters had used the bus before the device was
discovered.
Philippines - April 20, 1993 - Suspected MNLF rebels kill three
Muslim bandits machine-gunned a bus near Dipolog, 450 miles south of
Manila on April 20.  The rebels were dressed in army uniforms and attacked
the bus from the side of the road where they were standing.  Police suspect
that the men may have been renegade members of the Moro National
Liberation Front (MNLF).  The attack killed three and left eight wounded.
United Kingdom - April 24, 1993 - Terrorists hijack taxis for car bombs
Fourteen hours after the bombing in the financial district of London, two
taxi cabs blew up simultaneously in two parts of London after being hijacked
with orders for one to drive to Downing Street and the other to New Scotland
Yard.  There were no injuries.
Cambodia - May 6, 1993 - Khmer Rouge attack train
Khmer Rouge guerrillas on the night of May 5 bombed a train on
Cambodia's main rail link with the northwest, then opened fire on passengers,
killing at least 13 civilians and wounding about 80.  It was the latest attack by
the fanatical movement to disrupt May 23-27 elections.  Attacks earlier this
week left at least 10 people dead and 34 injured.  The United Nations said the
group's recent assaults would not prompt them to call off the vote, but one
diplomat warned that terrorist attacks by the group in Phnom Penh might
shake U.N. resolve.
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Philippines - May 12, 1993 - Rail bombings in metro Manila
Bombs exploded within minutes of each other on an overhead commuter
train car in Manila and a terminal in suburban Pasay City during evening rush
hour May 11, wounding 23 people.  Police said the devices, grenades attached
to timers, damaged three train coaches and disrupted one of the capital's most
popular modes of transportation.  Authorities suspect Muslim extremists,
believed responsible for the April 27 explosion at Manila airport and
bombings at airports in the southern Philippines, their home base.  The May
11 blasts came a few hours after the military claimed 46 Muslim militants had
been killed during a five-day assault on the remote hideout of the Abu Sayyaf
group on Basilan Island.  Police have tightened security at railway stations,
banks, and some businesses.
Peru - May 17, 1993 - SL armed strike begins May 17
Peru braced May 17 for the start of a three-day "armed strike" by Shining
Path (Spanish initials: SL) terrorists to mark the 13th anniversary of their
insurgency.  SL armed strikes threaten death for anyone who goes to work in
defiance of the stoppage.  A pre-strike car-bomb and shooting attack May 14
at a police station in Lima's El Agustino district killed two civilians, and other
weekend attacks injured at least 10 people.  SL terrorists car-bombed a bridge
near a Lima military hospital early May 15, wounding several people and
damaging nearby buildings.  On May 16, guerrillas dynamited a private bank
in Lima's financial district of San Isidro, causing damage but no casualties.
The government of President Alberto Fujimori has deployed security forces in
the capital and the Andean cities of Ayacucho and Huancayo, where
bombings also took place over the weekend.  President Fujimori on May 15
urged Peruvians to ignore the strike and promised compensation for damage
to public transport vehicles.  The U.S. Embassy has urged Americans in Lima
to avoid commercial districts, shopping centers, Peruvian government
facilities, and diplomatic missions, especially at night.
India - May 17, 1993 - Grenade on Jammu-Kashmir bus kills three
Unidentified extremists threw a hand grenade into a bus in the city of
Jammu in Jammu-Kashmir state late May 15, killing three passengers and
seriously wounding seven others.  The city has been the scene of several
major bomb attacks on passenger buses in recent months, blamed variously on
Muslim radicals fighting for a separate state in Jammu-Kashmir or Sikh
militants operating from the neighboring state of Punjab.
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Peru - May 20, 1993 - SL armed strike ends, car-bomb at Chilean Em-
bassy
The three-day "armed strike" called in Lima by the Maoist Shining Path
(Spanish initials: SL) expired May 19.  Multiple terrorist attacks in the capital
since May 16 failed to bring the city to a halt:  Business and transportation
activity in Lima was visibly down on May 17 but returned to near-normal by
midday May 18.  At 8:00 a.m. May 19, an SL car-bomb detonated in front of
the Chilean Embassy on Avenida Javier Prado in southern Lima, damaging
the building's facade and nearby houses; no one was injured.  The damage
could have been much worse, but the fuel-oil component of the 100-kilo
device failed to ignite.  SL terrorists also dynamited an empty bus in a poor
southern suburb of Lima early May 19, slightly injuring five waiting
passengers.  Later in the day, police killed one SL militant and captured two
others as the terrorists prepared to rocket a military base.
Egypt - May 24, 1993 - Bomb near Cairo train station
A bomb planted under or inside a car exploded May 21 near Cairo's Masr
train station, killing seven people and wounding at least 20 others.  The train
station, located on Ramses Square across from a police station, is one of the
busiest intersections in the Egyptian capital.  Police immediately accused
Muslim militants of staging the attack, but a spokesman for the al-Gamya al-
Islamiya, the largest and most active Muslim terrorist group, denied
responsibility.  The bombing is the most severe attack in Cairo in recent years.
Egypt - May 25, 1993 - Five tourists wounded in shooting
Five tourists were wounded May 25 when the bus they were traveling in
came under gunfire on the road to the famous temple of Abu Simbel in
southern Egypt.  When news of the attack surfaced, Egyptian security forces
said Muslim militants were to blame.  Shortly after, authorities changed their
story saying that Egyptian border guards fired on the bus when it strayed into
a restricted military area and did not stop when ordered to do so.  Three
Australians, one Briton, and a Dutch woman were injured in the incident.
Egypt - May 25, 1993 - Bomb found in subway
Police discovered a powerful time bomb May 23 on the tracks of the al-
Marj subway station in northern Cairo.  The bomb was concealed in a bug
spray canister attached to a timer and was about to explode when it was found
and deactivated.  Muslim militants are suspected of planting the device.
Greece - May 25, 1993 - Bus attacked in Athens
On May 22, several men threw three firebombs at a bus in the Gizi area of
Athens causing damage but no casualties.  Police suspect the attackers are
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members of the Orse student organization, which had been discussing
Marxism at Matsovion Polytechnic.
Angola - May 27, 1993 - Rebels attack train, 100 dead
National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (Portuguese
acronym: UNITA) rebels reportedly attacked a passenger train in southern
Angola May 27 and more than 100 people are believed to have been killed,
with another 100 seriously injured.  The incident occurred on the Lubango-
Matala railway line in Huila province, about 62 miles east of Lubango.
India - June 7, 1993 - Two blasts in Bombay, security concerns
A bomb exploded in an empty local train parked in a railway yard in
Bombay's western suburb of Andheri early June 7.  Earlier, another bomb
detonated in a mailbox at the busy Bombay Central station, panicking waiting
passengers but causing no injuries.  No one has claimed responsibility for the
blasts. The city has seen a spate of violence in recent months.  Security was
tightened around local politicians in Bombay on June 4 after the assassination
of a third Hindu-nationalist leader in the space of a week.  Raju Risaldar, a
leader of the Hindu ultranationalist Shiv Sena party, was killed while trying to
escape from police custody in Baroda, north of Bombay.  He had been
arrested for the murder last month of a newspaper editor.
Egypt - June 8, 1993 - Tourist bus bombed near Pyramids
A suspected Muslim militant threw a bomb at a tour bus carrying 49
British tourists near the famous Giza Pyramids June 8, killing one Egyptian
motorist and wounding 14 people, including five Britons.  The bus was
entering an underpass on the main road between Cairo and the Pyramids when
an assailant dropped a bomb on the vehicle from the bridge above.  The
explosion wrecked a Mercedes-Benz car traveling in front of the bus and blew
out the windows of the bus, which then crashed into the Mercedes.
United States - June 29, 1993 - Nine Muslim fundamentalists caught in
plot
On June 29, police arrested nine Muslim fundamentalists who were
planning to blow up the George Washington Bridge and Holland and Lincoln
Tunnels in New York.
Turkey - June 29, 1993 - PKK attacks train with tourists
PKK guerrillas opened fire June 28 on a train carrying tourists in an
undisclosed location in southeastern Turkey, injuring six people.  It was not
clear if any foreigners were hurt.  The attack comes a day after the suspected
PKK attack on two tourist hotels in Antalya.
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Philippines - June 30, 1993 - Bomb on Cotabato bus
An unclaimed bomb attack destroyed a bus in Cotabato on the southern
island of Mindanao on June 29.  The passengers had just alighted, and no one
was injured in the blast.
Angola - July 1, 1993 - At least 19 die in railway attack
At least 19 civilians were killed and two others seriously wounded June 27
when a mine planted by rebels of the National Union for the Total
Independence of Angola (Portuguese acronym: UNITA) exploded on a
railway track in southern Angola.  The blast occurred between the towns of
Matala and Olivenca in Huila province.  The victims worked for Caminhos de
Ferro do Namibe company, which runs Angola's southernmost rail line.   This
is the second attack in little over two months on the same railway line.  On
May 27, UNITA attacked a train carrying 3,000 people, killing between 300
and 600 passengers.  Most of Huila is held by the government, but UNITA has
been staging sporadic attacks there since the renewal of the civil war in
October 1992.
United Kingdom - July 15, 1993 - Bombing at Central Station in Belfast
On July 15, a 60-pound car bomb blasted a large hole in front of Central
Station in the center of Belfast.  The explosion also caused superficial damage
to a nearby leisure center.  Bomb exploded minutes after a man claiming to
represent the IRA phoned a warning.
Colombia - July 19, 1993 - Bus bombed in Medellin
On July 16, a gunman in Medellin forced the driver off a privately owned
bus and drove away. A short time later, the gunman placed a dynamite bomb
in the vehicle and destroyed it.  No one claimed responsibility for the attack
and its motive is unknown.
Russia - July 14, 1993 - Explosion derails Caucasus train
An explosion late July 13 on a rail line 28 miles outside Vladikavkaz, the
capital of the republic of North Ossetia, derailed a freight train en route to
Prokhladnoy.  No one was injured, but authorities suspended rail traffic to
clear the wreckage.  Ossetian separatists are suspected.  The Caucasus
mountain region erupted in fighting in 1991, when secessionists in Georgia's
South Ossetia tried to unify with Russia's North Ossetia.  A peacekeeping
force led by Russia essentially ended the fighting last year, but insurgents
have not given up the war.
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Bangladesh - July 20,1993 - Six injured in bomb attacks on school
On July 19, picketers enforcing an opposition Awami League-led general
strike against government corruption hurled at least eight home-made bombs
at Krishnapur Government Girls School in the northern town of Pabna,
injuring six students.  School authorities had reportedly ignored calls by
activists to close.  In Dhaka, the capital, picketers stoned cars and damaged
hundreds of bicycle rickshaws, and attacked a bus in the Gulistan commercial
area as it defied the strike.  Security forces were sent in to guard key centers in
the city and the ports of Chittagong and Mongla.  The streets in Dhaka,
Chittagong, and other main towns were largely free of traffic during the strike.
Trains and ferries were unaffected, but some flights were canceled or delayed.
United States - July 27, 1993 - Bomb threat on bridges near Niagara Falls
A caller who claimed to represent the Islamic Jihad warned that the group
had planted explosives on all bridges leading to Canada on the Niagara
Frontier, near Lewiston-Queenston, Buffalo.  No explosives were found.
Egypt - July 26, 1993 - Bomb explodes in Ismailia bus depot
A bomb exploded July 26 in a bus station in the city of Ismailia, 70 miles
northeast of Cairo, causing slight damage.  Police denied the explosion was
caused by a bomb and said a mine left from the October 1973 Arab-Israeli war
went off by mistake.  But bus drivers on the scene said they saw a masked
man toss the bomb near a garbage dump in the station lot.  They immediately
alerted the police and moved out their buses.
Philippines - July 26, 1993 - Three hurt in bomb blast
Three people were injured early July 26 when an unidentified man hurled a
homemade bomb at a Manila bus terminal.  The man escaped, and police say
they know of no motive for the attack. They are not linking the incident to
recent bombings at a domestic airport and a Manila railway station in April
and May, which they blame on Muslim fundamentalists.
Cambodia - August 4, 1993 - Railway line ambushed
On August 2, at least 10 people were killed and 30 injured when attackers
laid mines on a railroad track and fired on a train about 14 miles east of the
southern provincial town of Kampot.  A senior railway official blamed
guerrillas of the fanatical Khmer Rouge for the attack, saying they attacked
the train to steal motorcycles it was carrying.  It was the second train attack
this month and since the May elections Khmer Rouge guerrillas are suspected
of multiple attacks on road and rail bridges in their operational areas.
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Cambodia - August 16, 1993 - 2 killed in Khmer Rouge train ambush
Khmer Rouge guerrillas ambushed a train bound for northwestern
Cambodia, killing two people and injuring five, the state railway director said
on August 16.  About 30 Khmer Rouge attackers ambushed the train 60 miles
out of Phnom Penh on the way to Battambang on the morning of August 15.
A locomotive and four wagons were derailed as the guerrillas bore down on
the train with hand grenades, B-40 shoulder-fired rockets, and AK-47 assault
rifles after first detonating a mine laid on the track.  The attack lasted about 25
minutes before the guerrillas retreated at the arrival of government soldiers.
The ambush was the second attack on a train by Khmer Rouge guerrillas in
less than two weeks.
Kenya - August 17, 1993 - Bandits attack bus in tourist zone
About 30 armed bandits intercepted a bus August 15 between Lamu Island
and the coastal town of Malindi, shot the driver dead, and then drove the 50
passengers into an isolated area and robbed them.  The road where the bus
was intercepted is used by tour buses, but it is not clear if any foreigners were
aboard.  Three of eight policemen riding as guards on the bus were injured
when they jumped off the vehicle as the bandits hijacked it.
Turkey - August 19, 1993 - Grenade in Istanbul injures tourists
On the afternoon of August 18 , a teen-aged boy threw a grenade at an
empty Hungarian tour bus parked in front of a hotel in Istanbul's Laleli
district, injuring eight people, including two tourists.  Police believe the
assailant escaped in a waiting car.
Thailand - August 24, 1993 - Muslim separatists attack train
On August 22, members of the Muslim militant Patani United Liberation
Organization, armed with assault rifles and rockets, attacked a train in
southern Thailand, killing two people and injuring seven.  The train was en
route from Bangkok to Sungakolok when it was attacked.
Thailand - August 24, 1993 - Bomb kills five in bus terminal
A powerful bomb exploded August 22 at a bus terminal in Roi-et
province, 320 miles northeast of Bangkok.  The blast killed five and injured
11 others.  The bomb consisted of TNT and was hidden in a travel bag.  No
one has claimed responsibility for the explosion.
Singapore - August 27, 1993 - Luxury train service link faces possible
PULO attacks
A luxury train service linking Bangkok and Singapore is due to commence
in September. However, a resurgence of terrorist activity in the Muslim-
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dominated southern Thai provinces through which the service -- nicknamed
the "Eastern and Oriental Express" -- will travel may pose a risk for
passengers.  On August 22, terrorists attacked a train as it traveled on the main
railway line linking Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore, killing two people and
injuring seven. Notes left at the scene in the Rangnae district about 30 miles
from the Malaysian border were signed by the Pattani United Liberation
Organization (PULO), the best-known Muslim secessionist guerrilla group in
the area.  One letter said the attack was to underline demands for an
independent state in Thailand's Pattani province, another said the attacks
showed "what will happen to tourists who travel by train and bus if the
government does not give justice to the Pattani Muslims."
South Africa - August 27, 1993 - Luxury bus attacked
Early August 27, gunmen armed with assault rifles shot at a bus in the
town of Beaufort West, 280 miles northeast of Cape Town, wounding eight
people.  The bus was traveling from Cape Town to Johannesburg.  The attack
appears to be racially motivated:  Six of the victims were white, and the long-
distance luxury bus is normally used by whites.  This latest incident came two
days after a mob of black youths stabbed to death a white American woman in
a black township near Cape Town.  She was the first American killed in South
Africa's violence.
Egypt - August 30, 1993 - Three time bombs defused in Ismailiya
On August 28, bomb specialists from the Egyptian Second Army defused
three time bombs, each weighing five pounds, 30 minutes before they were set
to explode.  The bombs had been left on a busy footbridge at the railway
station which links the old and new parts of Ismailiya.  The explosives had
been set to detonate in the evening, when three trains arrive one after the other
from Cairo, Alexandria, and Port Said.
Poland - August 31, 1993 - Tourist bus robbed outside Warsaw
Armed robbers held up a busload of tourists in Swiecice, a small town
about 15 miles from Warsaw on August 25.  No other details were available.
Thailand - August 31, 1993 - Tour bus attacked in Yala province
Unidentified gunmen opened fire on a tour bus in the southern province of
Yala on the night of August 28, spraying the vehicle with bullets.  No one was
injured in the incident, which occurred between Hadyai and Yala, and
eventually the bus was able to evade the ambush.  Muslim separatists are
suspected.
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Israel - September 13, 1993 - Peace accord signed
Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Palestine Liberation Organization
(PLO) Chairman Yasser Arafat agreed to an Israeli-PLO peace accord
September 13 in Washington.  Over the weekend, dissident Palestinian groups
had staged several attacks in the Occupied Territories to protest the peace
agreement.  Some of the assaults included:  a September 12 ambush in Gaza
by militants of the fundamentalist Hamas (Zeal) movement that left three
Israeli soldiers dead; an attempted suicide car-bombing of an Israeli military
vehicle in Gaza; and a hijacking of an Israeli bus near the Gaza border by a
Palestinian extremist armed with explosives and a knife -- the man killed the
bus driver before being shot dead by a soldier.  September 13, a rally in Beirut
by militants of the Hezballah (Party of God) protesting the accord turned
violent, leaving at least two protesters dead and more than a dozen wounded.
Colombia - September 14, 1993 - Guerrillas target Medellin bus station,
army base
On September 11, authorities discovered 33 pounds of dynamite and a
grenade in front of Medellin's inter-city bus terminal.  The explosives were
inside a burlap sack and apparently had been abandoned there, presumably by
leftist guerrillas.  The guerrilla group which most often carries out terrorist
attacks in Medellin is the National Liberation Army (Spanish initials: ELN).
The same day, urban militants belonging to the ELN-linked "Bolivarian
Militias" attacked an army base in Medellin's Villas Tina neighborhood.  One
soldier was killed in the assault.
Pakistan - September 16, 1993 - Bomb on bus kills 2, injures 9
A bomb exploded aboard a bus in Sherookana village about 15 miles south
of Lahore on September 15, killing two people and seriously injuring nine
others.  Police said the attack may have been part of a campaign to sabotage
general elections set for October 6.
Italy - September 21, 1993 - Explosives found aboard Palermo-Turin
overnight train
Police acting on a report that apparently came from the SISDE intelligence
service halted the crowded Palermo-Turin overnight train September 21
during a stop at Rome's Ostiense station and searched it for three hours until
they found between nine and 18 pounds of ammonium nitrate and TNT
explosive hidden in the lavatory of the last carriage.  Reports so far have
varied as to the amount of explosive found and whether or not a detonator was
present.
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United Kingdom - October 2, 1993 - Three PIRA bombs explode in North
London
Three PIRA bombs exploded in north London.  Two of the bombs were
near a Domino's pizza place, where a warning had been called in.  The third
bomb exploded opposite a railway station.
Germany - October 8, 1993 - Bombing at train station
A bomb exploded at the main train station in Saarbruecken midday October
7, seriously injuring one man.  No one claimed responsibility for the attack,
but Revolutionary Cells (German initials: RZ) said it was responsible for an
explosion October 3 that destroyed a transformer station at the Frankfurt
headquarters of federal border guards.  The blast knocked out for several
hours the control system that monitors the German-Polish border.
Comment:  The ultra-leftist RZ has been very quiet since the arrest of key
leaders in the late 1980s. However, the death of Red Army Faction (RAF)
militant Wolfgang Grams in June, mysteriously shot to death in a train station
during a police raid, has galvanized the left and may have invigorated RZ.
Colombia - October 8, 1993 - Bogota bombing kills three
A police bus was bombed as it drove through the Chapinero district of
Bogota on October 7, killing three policemen and wounding some 30 others.
The police bus was virtually destroyed in the explosion, which was apparently
set off by remote control.  Another two bombs exploded about four hours
later.  No one was injured in the later bombings, one of which targeted a
campaign office of Liberal Party presidential candidate Ernesto Samper.  No
one immediately claimed responsibility for the attacks.
Thailand - October 13, 1993 - Homemade bomb on railway track
Police on October 11 defused a homemade bomb found under railway
tracks between Khok Pho and Na Pra Doo stations in southern Pattani
province.  The bomb was planted in the same area where Muslim separatists
have been blamed for several recent attacks.  In August, two passengers were
killed and seven injured when bandits attacked an express train in an adjoining
province.
Bangladesh - October 18, 1993 - 150 hurt in train robbery
On October 16, armed robbers removed a section of railway track and
derailed a train on a hilly pass near northeast Shamshernagar town, looted
money and goods from passengers and beat those who resisted.  Five carriages
and the engine of the Upaban express were derailed in the incident, which
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caused the suspension of train service between Dhaka and northern areas for
more than 12 hours.
Guatemala - October 19, 1993 - URNG guerrillas blow up key bridge
Guerrillas of the National Revolutionary Unity of Guatemala (Spanish
initials: URNG) blew up the Siguacan Bridge near Rio Bravo, department of
Suchitepequez, on October 14.  Two powerful explosions destroyed the bridge
carrying the main road to the Pacific coast, and traffic has had to be diverted
to other area roads.  The attack came one day after the URNG rejected the
government's latest peace plan.
France - October 19, 1993 - Bandits rob tourist bus on Corsica
Two masked gunmen halted a tour bus traveling a mountain road on
Corsica October 17 and robbed passengers of $3,500 in francs before
escaping.  Crime is an increasing problem on the Mediterranean island, in part
because the Corsican National Liberation Front and like-minded separatists
often fund their activities with banditry.
India - October 29, 1993 - 15 injured in Bombay train blast
At least 15 people were injured October 29 when a bomb exploded on a
commuter train in Bombay.  The blast occurred at about 1:40 p.m. -- a busy
time -- when the train was stopped at Matunga station in the city's central
district.  No one has claimed responsibility for the blast.  Police have ordered
a security alert in Bombay because of the November 13 date for Diwali, the
Hindu festival of lights -- the biggest Hindu festival of the year.  In March,
Bombay was rocked by a series of bombs that killed more than 250 people
and were at first attributed to religious violence.
Spain - November 22, 1993 - ETA, Iparretarrak attacks
Two gunmen shot and seriously wounded a Basque police sergeant early
November 22 as he was waiting at a traffic light in northern Bilbao.  The
attack is trademark Basque Fatherland and Liberty (Basque acronym: ETA),
still waging its quarter-century war for an independent Basque homeland.  On
November 20, a bomb damaged an empty high-speed train in a railyard in the
French border town of Hendaye.  ETA's French counterpart, Iparretarrak, is
suspected.
South Africa - November 30, 1993 - Bomb kills 1, injures 6 in Durban
One person died and six were injured when a bomb exploded on a bus in
the coastal city of Durban, Natal province.  No one has claimed responsibility
for the blast.
184 A Chronology of Terrorist Attacks – Brian M. Jenkins
Norman Y. Mineta International Institute for Surface Transportation Policy Studies
Israel - December 5, 1993 - Gunmen fire on public bus
Extremist Islamic Jihad Palestinian gunman fired on a public bus and killed
a passenger.  Israeli Defense Force reservists shot and killed the attacker.
India - December 6, 1993 - Train blast kills 1, injures 22
A series of bomb blasts on four express trains killed one person and injured
20 December 6. One fatality and 16 injuries occurred on the Andhra Pradesh
Express on the outskirts of Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh, as the train set out for
New Delhi.  A total of six people were injured in other blasts that occurred on
express trains bound for New Delhi from Calcutta and Bombay, and on a train
heading from the western port of Surat to Bombay.  No one has claimed
responsibility, but police say the explosions are likely linked to the first
anniversary of the demolition of the mosque at Ayodhya, Uttar Pradesh, by
Hindu militants, or are the work of Muslim militants fighting Indian rule in
the northwestern state of Jammu-Kashmir.
Philippines - December 13, 1993 - Nine Filipinos killed in bus ambush
On December 13, about 40 gunmen stopped a bus in the southern
Philippines, separated the Christians from the Muslims, then killed nine
people and injured 11.  The bus was traveling from Sultan Kudarat province,
570 miles south of Manila, to Davao province.
United Kingdom - December 14, 1993 - Blast disrupts rail traffic
An explosion on rail lines between Woking and West Byfleet, 20 miles
southwest of London, disrupted train traffic and forced the closure of nine
stations in the area.  It is unclear if a bomb was involved, but bomb threats by
the Irish Republican Army (IRA) closed four stations in southern England
December 13.  In Northern Ireland, police in central Belfast defused a 1,000-
pound van-bomb parked near a security forces facility.
Italy - December 20, 1993 - Small bomb explodes on railway
A small bomb exploded at a railway station in Florence.  A Senegalese
citizen was injured.  A Spaniard was arrested.
United Kingdom - December 21, 1993 - IRA bombs and bomb scares in
London
Incendiary devices exploded December 20 in a north London post office
and a pub near Victoria train station, causing no injury and slight damage.  A
third was disarmed at a mail-sorting office in the City of London financial
district.  Police said the bombs bore "all the hallmarks" of the Irish Republican
Army (IRA).  This morning, just before rush hour, authorities acting on coded
warnings used by the IRA shut 40 train stations in southeast England and
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searched 200 miles of track for bombs.  The bomb threats also closed the
Central and Northern lines of the London Underground, two of the busiest
routes into business and shopping districts.  Meanwhile, Sinn Fein, the IRA's
political wing, is demanding amnesty for imprisoned guerrillas as a
precondition for discussing the Anglo-Irish peace formula for Northern
Ireland.  At the same time, the Ulster Unionist Party, the largest of the three
loyalist political parties, endorsed the peace initiative.  Leader James
Molyneaux said for the first time both London and Dublin had recognized
"the will of the greater number of people in Northern Ireland must prevail in
all circumstances."  The IRA said it will not comment on the "complicated"
peace formula until the first of the year.
Egypt - December 27, 1993 - Tour bus attacked in Cairo
Suspected Muslim militants opened fire December 27 on a tour bus
carrying 18 Austrian tourists in Cairo, wounding eight of them, two seriously.
About eight Egyptians were also wounded when the gunmen fired randomly
while making their escape.  The incident took place near the Amr Ibn al-As
mosque in the Old Cairo section of the city.
El Salvador - January 4, 1994 - U.S. tourists robbed
The U.S. Embassy reports that a bus carrying 21 American tourists was
intercepted by five heavily armed men in a pick-up truck December 31 on a
main highway in the tri-border area of El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala.
The bus, owned by Megatours of San Salvador, was taken by the gunmen to
an isolated area off the highway, where some of the tourists were robbed of
luggage and personal belongings.  The tour group was en route to the Mayan
ruins of Copan in northern Honduras.
Colombia - January 10, 1994 - ELN attacks tourist bus
On January 7, National Liberation Army (Spanish initials: ELN) guerrillas
blew up a van carrying Colombian tourists near San Jose village, some 100
miles northeast of Bogota, killing two passengers and injuring eight others.
Guerrillas detonated a bomb as the van passed.  Troops have been dispatched
to the area in search of the guerrilla unit responsible.
Sri Lanka - January 19, 1994 - Bomb on bus kills 15 in central north
A bomb exploded January 19 on a crowded, privately owned bus about 140
miles from Colombo, killing 15 people and injuring at least 30 others.  The
blast, thought to be the work of separatist Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
guerrillas, occurred at Rambewa Junction as the bus was about to stop at a
military checkpoint.  The vehicle was traveling from the northeastern town of
Pulmoddai to Anuradhapura.  No one has claimed responsibility for the blast.
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India - January 24, 1994 - Six injured in Uttar Pradesh train blasts
Six people were injured early January 21 when two bombs exploded on an
express train near Hardwar in the northern Himalayan foothills.  The train was
en route from Allahabad to Dehra Dun in Uttar Pradesh state.  Police are
searching for two youths who got off the train and left luggage on board.
Turkey - February 14, 1994 - Bomb in Istanbul train station
A bomb placed in a garbage can exploded February 12 in a suburban
Istanbul train station packed with military academy students, killing five
people and injuring at least 26.  The separatist Kurdistan Workers Party
(Kurdish initials: PKK) claimed responsibility.
Egypt - February 14, 1994 - Gunmen ambush bus carrying Romanians
Two suspected Muslim militants opened fire February 14 on a bus carrying
Romanian and Egyptian engineers near the city of Asyut, 200 miles south of
Cairo, but the engineers escaped injury.  The men are employed by the Asyut
Cement Company.  It is the first attack on foreigners following warnings that
the Muslim extremist al-Gamaa al-Islamiya (Islamic Group) will renew a
terrorist campaign against "tourism and investment."  The last attack on
foreigners was reported December 27 when al-Gamaa gunmen ambushed a
tourist bus in Cairo, wounding eight Austrian tourists and eight Egyptians.
Pakistan - February 20, 1994 - School bus full of Children Hijacked
Three Afghani men hijacked a school bus full of children in Peshawar.
They drove unhindered to Islamabad where they took refuge with five
students and a teacher held hostage in the Afghan Embassy.  From there they
demanded $5 million and food to be sent to Kabul.  The three men were killed
when Pakistani commandos stormed the Embassy.  The children had been
released earlier that evening.  They were not injured.
Egypt - February 22, 1994 - Militants attack luxury train
Militants of the al-Gamaa al-Islamiya (Islamic Group) opened fire
February 19 on a luxury sleeper train traveling from Cairo to Luxor,
wounding four people, including two foreign tourists.  According to
witnesses, at least six gunmen wielding automatic weapons riddled the train
with bullets at about 1:30 a.m. near the Upper Egyptian town of Asyut, a
stronghold of Muslim extremists.  Investigators at the scene found spent
cartridges inscribed with slogans such as "Islam is coming."  The officials also
said that the train-driver's cabin was fired upon in such a way as to indicate
the assailants wanted to kill the driver, which would have brought the train to
a halt.  They speculate that the militants planned to stop the train and kill some
of the passengers aboard.
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Cambodia - February 23, 1994 - Khmer Rouge attacks train
A senior railway official advised that Khmer Rouge guerrillas attacked a
train sometime during the week of February 13 in the northwest province of
Pursat, killing three passengers and wounding eight.  There was no indication
as to the exact date of the attack, merely that it occurred.
Egypt - February 24, 1994 - Bomb on train wounds six tourists and five
Egyptians
A bomb exploded February 23 in the first-class section of a train traveling
from Cairo to the southern city of Aswan, wounding six tourists and at least
five Egyptians.  The tourists were identified as two Australians, two New
Zealanders and two Germans; the wounded Egyptians included two army
officers.  Police say the bomb was placed on a luggage rack shortly after the
train left the Asyut train station.  Asyut is a well-known stronghold of Muslim
militants.  Al-Gamaa al-Islamiya (Islamic Group) claimed responsibility for
the attack and warned fellow Egyptians to avoid tourists and tourist sites as
they are "targets for our legitimate holy struggle."
Thailand - March 8, 1994 - Bomb damages train in south
A bomb planted on a railway line near the southern city of Hat Yai, 750
miles south of Bangkok, exploded under a train March 8, damaging the engine
and track but causing no injuries. Muslim guerrillas demanding autonomy in
the south are thought to be responsible.  In August 1992, a bomb at Hat Yai
railway station killed three people.
Egypt - March 7, 1994 - Trains attacked in Upper Egypt
The Muslim militant Al-Gamaa al-Islamiya (Islamic Group) is suspected of
firing on three trains in Upper Egypt early March 7, wounding 12 passengers.
The attack occurred at around 2 a.m. as the trains passed through the village of
Sanabu in Asyut province, 200 miles south of Cairo.  Six men were wounded
on the Cairo-to-Aswan luxury train, and two others were hurt on a Cairo-to-
Luxor train.
India - March 10, 1994 - 10 soldiers wounded in Tripura bomb attack
At least 10 soldiers were wounded March 9 when a bomb was hurled at a
state-owned bus carrying army personnel in the northeastern state of Tripura.
The Tripura state government blamed state opposition Congress (I) Party
members for the bombing.  The attack came during a violence-marred daylong
strike called by Congress (I), which was protesting the killing of its youth
leader, allegedly by Marxists  Also during the strike, two other people were
injured in a separate bomb attack.  The strike closed government offices,
banks, schools, and colleges and halted road transportation.
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Israel - March 13, 1994 - Commuter bus bombed
A bomb exploded on a commuter bus at the Hadera Central Bus Station
killing five people and injuring 30.  Hamas claimed responsibility for the
bombing to avenge the machine gun attack against the Hebron mosque.  The
bomb was carried on board by a suicide bomber.  A member of Hamas was
sentenced to death in Nov.  94 for plotting the attack.
United Kingdom - March 15, 1994 - IRA bomb found near rail line
An IRA bomb was found near the rail line in Kent.  It is suspected that the
bomb was planted months before and had failed to explode.
Azerbaijan - March 19, 1994 - Subway bombed
A large bomb was planted under a seat in the first car and thought to have
been detonated by remote-control.  The government had recently cracked
down on opposition groups.
Algeria - March 21, 1994 - Gunmen hold up train in tunnel
Gunmen held up a train in a tunnel on the coastal line near Boumerdes
about 30 miles east of Algiers on March 18 and set it ablaze after forcing
about 300 passengers to disembark.
India - March 28, 1994 - Bomb at Jammu-Kashmir bus station kills 2
A bomb exploded late March 27 at a bus station in Jammu, in northwestern
Jammu-Kashmir, killing two people and wounding 14.  No one claimed
responsibility for the blast, which occurred when passengers were about to
board two night buses for nearby towns, but Muslim militants are the most
likely culprits.
Thailand - March 30, 1994 - Train derails after explosion
A powerful bomb exploded beneath rail tracks early March 30, causing a
15-carriage passenger train traveling from Bangkok to the Malaysian border
town of Sungai Kolo to derail near Chana station in Songkhla province,
injuring some passengers.  The bomb appeared to have been homemade, but
was sufficiently powerful to severely damage the tracks, the locomotive and
two carriages. No one has claimed responsibility, but authorities blame
"separatists."
Israel - April 6, 1994 - Suicide bomber blows up bus
A Hamas suicide bomber blew up a bus in Afula in Northern Israel.  The
young West Bank resident crashed his car, which was carrying 385 lbs. of
explosives and nails, into the bus.  Eight people were killed including four
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teenage boys.  Most of the injured were high school students.  The bombing
was in reprisal for the Hebron massacre.
Cambodia - April 11, 1994 - Guerrillas kidnapped three westerners from
a taxi
Khmer Rouge guerrillas kidnapped three westerners from a taxi as they
headed towards Sihanoukville.  One was Australian (a woman) and the other
two were British (a man and a woman).  Their remains were found in July
1994 at a Khmer Rouge camp near Sre Amble.  It is believed that they were
beaten to death a few days after being kidnapped.  The Khmer Rouge had
demanded a huge ransom but did not produce evidence that they were alive.
Russia - April 14, 1994 - Train blast kills 4 in south
An explosion early April 13 ripped apart a passenger train carriage in the
south Russian province of Dagestan, killing four persons.  The blast occurred
at Dagestanskiye Ogni station, 30 miles from the border with Azerbaijan.  The
area has been the scene of a series of bombings over the last year linked with
ethnic conflict.  About 20 people were killed last year when a bomb exploded
on a train at the border between Azerbaijan and Dagestan.
Egypt - April 18, 1994 - Gunmen fire on train near Asyut
Suspected Muslim militants fired on an Aswan-to-Cairo sleeper train as it
approached the city of Abu Tig in Asyut governate late April 16, damaging
several rail cars but causing no injuries. The train had several foreign tourists
aboard.  At least eight sleeper trains have been attacked this year in the Asyut
region by al-Gamaa al-Islamiya (Islamic Group), which is probably
responsible for this attack as well.
Thailand - April 25, 1994 - Bomb kills 3 at southern railway station
A bomb exploded April 23 at a railway station at Nakhon Sri Thammarat,
some 400 miles south of Bangkok, killing three people and wounding 22.
Police, who found an unexploded grenade at the site, are looking for a man
who left a parcel at a restaurant in the station.  Police have determined the
explosive was an M-26 hand grenade which went off when the plastic tape
holding the pin down dissolved after being soaked in diesel fuel, police chief
Pratin Santiprapob told a meeting of top military officers.  Authorities say the
blast appeared to have been timed to coincide with the departure of a
Bangkok-bound train, when the station platforms were especially crowded.
After initial investigations, police are saying the bomber was motivated by a
frustrated love affair.
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Venezuela - May 3, 1994 - Bomb on Caracas Metro wounds 5
A leaflet-scattering device exploded just before 7 a.m. May 2 inside a
carriage of a Caracas Metro train stopped at the Parque del Este station in the
Palos Grandes area.  Five passengers were slightly injured by the blast, which
also damaged the carriage roof and blew out several windows.  The leaflets
found at the scene claimed responsibility for the terrorist incident -- the first
ever on the Venezuelan capital's underground railway, which opened in 1982 -
- on behalf of the hitherto unknown "Urban Commando Union of the Popular
Resistance Front."
Venezuela - May 4, 1994 - Metro blast a teenage prank
The small explosive device that slightly injured five people early May 2
inside a carriage of a Caracas Metro train turns out to have been a dangerous
prank by teenagers using high school laboratory equipment.  Police reportedly
have two middle-class high school students under arrest, and they reportedly
have confessed.  The teenagers, apprehended after witnesses gave police
detailed descriptions, had taken their "joke" to the length of scattering leaflets
at the scene claiming the attack in the name of the nonexistent "Urban
Commando Union of the Popular Resistance Front."
Turkey - May 17, 1994 - Bombs on train and telecommunications center
Two people were slightly wounded late May 15 when a bomb they were
going to plant on the "Blue Train" in Istanbul's Haydarpasa station exploded
prematurely.  The Blue Train travels between Istanbul and the capital Ankara.
On May 16, one person was killed while planting a bomb that exploded in a
bathroom of a telecommunications center in Istanbul.  Both bombs follow the
May 14 blast at Istanbul's popular Galleria shopping center, which caused
minor damage and no injury.  The separatist Kurdistan Workers Party is
suspected.
Algeria - May 19, 1994 - Bus attacked
A bus with 25 Russian citizens was attacked near Ziam as it was traveling
to the airport.  Three Russians and 11 Algerian guards were killed.  Five
others were injured.  The attackers were all killed.
Germany - May 19, 1994 - American killed in train robbery
A decorated American Vietnam veteran was fatally shot during an armed
robbery May 17 on an overnight Stuttgart-Hamburg train.  The conductor told
police William Bledsoe, quality control administrator for the U.S. Army
hospital in Heidelberg, was alive as the train approached Bremen, where he
was to change trains.  Minutes later, the conductor noticed a credit card on the
floor in front of the compartment.  He investigated and found Bledsoe shot
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and the compartment ransacked.  Bledsoe was carrying about $5,000 in
German marks, which was missing.  It was the first slaying on a German train
in recent memory.
Egypt - May 23, 1994 - Gunmen fire on tourist train
On May 21, suspected Muslim militants fired on a train carrying tourists as
it passed the southern city of Manfalout, injuring a railroad employee.
Following the attack, al-Gamaa al-Islamiya (Islamic Group) vowed to step up
attacks against the security forces to avenge the recent police killings of two
al-Gamaa supporters.
Turkey - May 25, 1994 - Bombs at Istanbul bus station wound 2
Four bombs exploded early May 25 in Istanbul's Harem bus station,
wounding at least two people.  The separatist Kurdistan Workers Party is
suspected.
Colombia - May 27, 1994 - Guerrillas torch buses and disrupt traffic
Leftist guerrillas in Medellin set fire to 10 buses May 26 in the latest
attacks before May 29 presidential elections.  The incidents disrupted morning
traffic and other bus drivers refused to put their vehicles on the roads for fear
of further attacks.  Troops were deployed at bus depots and traffic later
returned to normal.  It was the second guerrilla attack in Medellin this week.
On May 22, rebels exploded a remote-control bomb near a police patrol,
killing six officers.
Russia - May 27, 1994 - School bus hijackers hold hostages
On May 26, four men armed with guns and a grenade hijacked a bus
carrying 26 children, parents, and teachers in southern Mineralniye Vody,
releasing eight of their hostages in exchange for submachine guns, bullet-
proof vests, ammunition, and morphine.  The hijackers demanded $10 million
and a crewless helicopter.  Authorities supplied the helicopter and $8 million
and the gunmen flew off with four hostages.  Police in Bachayurt, about 30
miles east of Grozny, stormed the aircraft when it landed, arresting three
hijackers and fatally wounding the fourth.  It is the second incident in six
months in which gunmen have seized schoolchildren in southern Russia. In
December, police captured four criminals after a five-day ordeal in which
teenagers and their teacher were held captive.
India - June 6, 1994 - Bomb on train kills 2
Two people were killed and 25 injured June 5 when a bomb exploded on a
Delhi-bound express train in the central state of Madhya Pradesh.  The blast
occurred just after the train left the station at Rajnandgaon.  Maoist Naxalite
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guerrillas have been blamed for the attack.  The Naxalites, an outlawed Maoist
movement that originated in Naxalbari in eastern India, were mostly
suppressed in the early 1970s but still sporadically launch attacks in a few
stonghold states, where they hope to spark a revolution against wealthy
landlords.
United Kingdom - June 6, 1994 - Bomb discovered at a railway station
A bomb was discovered at a railway station in Kent after the IRA called in
a warning.  It took the police five hours to locate the bomb.  It was safely
detonated.
Russia - June 29, 1994 - Bus passengers freed
Police June 29 captured three gunmen who hijacked a bus on the Rostov-
to-Baku highway June 28 and held 40 passengers hostage for ransom.  The
trio seized control of the bus near Mineralniye Vody airport in southern
Russia and demanded $5.8 million and a helicopter for an escape flight. The
gunmen forced one passenger to play dead to convince authorities they were
serious about their threat to kill hostages.  Early June 29, they were given
about half of the money demanded, automatic rifles and a helicopter and crew.
They flew off with seven hostages, landed in Chechnya, infamous for general
lawlessness, and abandoned the aircraft and hostages.  The hijackers boarded
a bus headed for the Chechen capital of Grozny, where they were arrested.  It
was the third such hostage-taking in southern Russia in seven months, all of
which have ended in the capture of the criminals without harm to the victims.
Cambodia - June 29, 1994 - Bridge destroyed
Khmer Rouge guerrillas are suspected of destroying a major road bridge
located about 60 miles south of the capital.  The 65-foot Kaong bridge,
situated on Cambodia's strategic Route Four, was destroyed by insurgents
early on the morning of June 27, according to a general in the ministry of
interior.  One Phnom Penh-based businessman said the bridge demolition
would result in petroleum shortages.  Petroleum is normally hauled overland
from bulk depots in Sihanoukville.
South Africa - July 7, 1994 - 11 die in highway ambush
At least 11 people were killed July 6 and another eight wounded when
gunmen ambushed eight vehicles during the evening rush hour near Kathelong
township, east of Johannesburg.  Authorities say about 10 black gunmen took
part in the "well-orchestrated attack."  Other officials blamed the continuation
of "taxi warfare" between rival taxi operators in the area as the cause of the
ambushes.  The attack is one of the bloodiest since President Nelson Mandela
assumed power in June.
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Algeria - July 12, 1994 - Seven foreigners killed in Algiers
A total of seven foreigners, not five as previously reported, were killed in
two separate attacks July 11 in Algiers.  Two Algerian officials also died in
the attacks.  In the first incident, gunmen posing as police officers stopped a
bus in the Algiers suburb of Oued Ouchayeh carrying employees of the state
oil company Sonatrach, took four Russians and one Romanian engineer off
the bus and "machine-gunned" them.  The foreign engineers lived at a hotel
near the coastal town of Boumerdes, 25 miles east of Algiers, and every day
followed the same route, at the same time, to work in Algiers.  In a separate
attack July 11, Islamic militants opened fire on patrons of the restaurant at the
zoological gardens, six miles from central Algiers, killing two citizens of the
former Yugoslavia and two Algerian officials who were reported to have
"important posts" with the government.  The zoological gardens restaurant is
popular with diplomats, foreign businessmen, and wealthy locals.  The attacks
bring to 49 the number of foreigners killed in Algeria since September 1993.
Kenya - July 22, 1994 - Tourists robbed on Mombasa-Lamu road
About 20 heavily armed bandits on July 18 intercepted a bus full of tourists
traveling from the coastal city of Mombasa to the resort of Lamu.  The bandits
fired shots in the air to scare the foreigners and then robbed everyone on the
bus.  No one was injured in the incident.
Israel - July 26, 1994 - Bomb found on train
A bomb was found aboard a train traveling from Naharitta to Tel Aviv.
Cambodia - July 28, 1994 - 100 held after Khmer Rouge ambush train
Three foreigners, thought to be French, are among at least 100 people still
being held hostage after a Khmer Rouge guerrilla ambush July 26 on a train in
the Kampong Trach district of Kampot province, 80 miles south of Phnom
Penh.  Nine people, including four members of the security forces, were killed
in the incident in which the guerrillas detonated two mines on the lines, hitting
the locomotive and a carriage.  After the attack, the guerrillas took 300
passengers to a major guerrilla base but freed the women and children July 27.
Following the breakdown of peace talks last month, the government outlawed
the Khmer Rouge and closed down its offices in Phnom Penh.  The guerrillas
responded by declaring a "provisional government" in the northwestern
province of Preah Vihear.
Cambodia - July 29, 1994 - Three foreign hostages tentatively identified
An Australian, a Briton, and a Frenchman may be among the 100 hostages
being held by Khmer Rouge guerrillas after a train ambush July 26 in
Kampong Trach district, 80 miles south of Phnom Penh.  Rumors have
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surfaced in the capital that the attack on the train may have been the work of
government soldiers, not Khmer Rouge guerrillas. Reportedly, railway
authorities have been paying off the guerrillas to secure safe passage for
trains.
Turkey - August 15, 1994 - Lethal bombing at Istanbul bus
A time bomb exploded August 12 at a bus station in Istanbul's Topkapi
district, killing one person and wounding six.  The station services routes to
other European cities.  The Kurdistan Workers Party, which has been striking
at tourist targets in recent months, is suspected.
India - August 25, 1994 - Bomb on bus kills 5 children
Police report a powerful bomb exploded in the northern state of Jammu-
Kashmir August 25.  The bomb was in a van used to transport children to
school in the winter capital of Jammu.  The blast killed seven people and 31
people were injured.  Muslim Kashmiri separatists are suspected. Jammu-
Kashmir is the only predominant Muslim state in otherwise Hindu India and
has been the scene of violent clashes since a rebellion against Indian rule
erupted in 1990.  There have been over 17,000 deaths in the sectarian
violence.
Egypt - August 26, 1994 - Gunmen fire on tourist bus, kill Spanish child
Muslim militants opened fire August 26 on a tourist bus in the southern
Egyptian town of Nag Hammadi, 280 miles south of Cairo, killing a Spanish
child and injuring two other foreigners. Al-Gamaa al-Islamiya (Islamic
Group) is suspected.
India - September 6, 1994 - Bombs found on express train in Uttar
Pradesh
Five unexploded bombs were found late September 3 on an express
passenger train in the northern state of Uttar Pradesh.  The devices, hidden in
one of the train's toilets, were discovered as the train neared Allahabad after
an anonymous caller tipped police.  Uttar Pradesh was hit by violence last
week as a rural separatist group held rallies to establish a new state within the
union.
India - September 9, 1994 - Security forces fire on bus, 9 dead
Members of the paramilitary Border Security Force (BSF) September 9
opened fire on a passenger bus in Bandipore in northern Jammu-Kashmir
state, killing at least nine passengers. Witnesses and local police say the
shooting was unprovoked, but the BSF says it opened fire after shots were
fired at them from the bus.  Government officials have reportedly
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acknowledged in private that BSF troops involved in the incident were drunk
at the time.  In the past, the BSF has come under criticism from human-rights
groups and is believed to be one of the most trigger-happy of the Indian
security forces.
Ireland - September 13, 1994 - UVF bombs Belfast-Dublin train
A small bomb exploded under the seat of a train that had arrived in Dublin
from Belfast September 12, slightly injuring two passengers.  The Ulster
Volunteer Force UVF) claimed the attack and said it had planted six other
bombs, though a search turned up nothing.  Northern Ireland police warned
Irish authorities last week to expect attacks by Protestant extremists to
retaliate for the decision by Irish Prime Minister Albert Reynolds to meet with
Sinn Fein, the political arm of the Irish Republican Army (IRA).  The meeting
came after the IRA declared a cease-fire September 1 but before the minimum
three months without attacks insisted on by the British.  Loyalist
paramilitaries have staged four attacks in Northern Ireland since the cease-
fire, but Monday's explosion was the first in the Republic since May, when
gunmen attacked a Dublin pub.
Greece - September 20, 1994 - ELA claims deadly bombing
Revolutionary Popular Struggle (Greek acronym: ELA) claimed
responsibility for the remote-control bombing of a bus that killed a top police
officer, saying it attacked the bus because police were "local representatives
of the CIA."  The statement vowed to continue to strike at police.
Egypt - September 28, 1994 - Gunmen attack tourist train
Muslim militants hiding in sugar and maize fields opened fire September
28 on a tourist train passing near the town of Mallawi, 140 miles south of
Cairo.  At least 40 rounds struck the train, injuring two Egyptians.
Israel - October 5, 1994 - Tourist injured in hand grenade attack
Four Tourists, including an Italian and a Spaniard, were wounded in a
hand-grenade attack near the Church of Lazarus on the occupied West Bank
yesterday.  A fragmentation grenade was thrown at the tourist bus parked near
the church.
Cambodia - October 10, 1994 - Khmer Rouge sabotage key railway line
Khmer Rouge guerrillas on October 8 blew up two key bridges severing
rail links to northwest Battambang province.  The Battambang line, one of two
railway lines in the country, is a major transport and trade link.  Authorities
say the damaged bridges can be repaired within days, but ongoing security
problems have forced a temporary suspension of rail services.  The
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government has stepped up security in southern Kampot province since a July
26 Khmer Rouge ambush on the rail line there left 13 people dead.  Three
Westerners traveling on the train were taken hostage.
Germany - October 19, 1994 - Peruvian stabbed in Berlin subway
A drunk with a pocket knife stabbed a Peruvian waiting for a train in
Berlin's Karlshorst subway station October 17.  Police recently have tightened
security on Berlin's rail network. Earlier this month, "skinhead" gangs rioted
on two Berlin trains and tried to throw a man off a train.  Last month, police
arrested four neo-Nazi youths for pushing a Ghanaian refugee from a moving
train.
Israel - October 19, 1994 - Suicide bomber attacks bus
A bus on Disengoff Street in Tel Aviv was blown up by a suicide bomber
killing 23 people and injuring 45.  The bus was filled with commuters when
the bomb exploded at 9 am.  Hamas claimed responsibility for the bombing.
The attack occurred two days after Israel and Jordan agreed on a peace treaty.
India - October 20, 1994 - Separatists kill 34 in bus attack
On October 20, heavily armed separatist guerrillas in the northeast state of
Manipur attacked a commuter bus, killing 34 passengers and injuring 11
more.   The militants reportedly stopped the bus, told several passengers to get
off, fired at the vehicle and then pushed it off a cliff.  According to some
reports, the militants were from the Kuki tribe and the victims were identified
as Naga rebels.  Guerrillas from two major regional tribes, the Kukis and
Nagas, have been fighting for independence in Manipur and its neighboring
state, Nagaland.  In addition, both groups often operate from across the
Myanmar border, fighting over a lucrative heroin smuggling route.  Late last
year, Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao imposed direct central rule over
Manipur in a bid to curb continued violence.
Egypt - October 24, 1994 - Militants kill tourist, wound 4
Muslim militants opened fire on a tour bus near the town of Naqada in the
southern province of Qena October 23, killing a British tourist and wounding
three others and a local driver.  The bus reportedly was on a road not
designated for tourist vehicles and the driver had not notified police of his
journey.  The bus was traveling from the tourist village of Korna to Naqada
when the incident occurred.  The attackers escaped after coming under police
gunfire that wounded at least one.  The death brings to 11 the number of dead
tourists since specific attacks on foreigners began in the spring of 1992.
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Cambodia - October 31, 1994 - 6 die, 15 hurt in bomb attack on train
At least six people were killed and 15 injured early October 28, when a
time bomb exploded on a crowded train in the northwestern province of
Battambang.  The device, which detonated after the train had left for
Sisophon, was hidden in a vegetable basket.  Khmer Rouge guerrillas, who
have warned people to travel on trains at their own risk, have been blamed for
the attack. Meanwhile, observers are increasingly pessimistic about the fate of
three Western tourists kidnapped by Khmer Rouge guerrillas in a July train
ambush.  Local police October 31 began searching an area where, according
to some reports, the three were buried.
India - November 7, 1994 - Bomb on bus kills 2, injures 13
A bomb exploded November 6 on a bus in the northern city of Jammu,
killing two people and injuring 13 others.  Police say Sikh militants were most
likely responsible.  Security forces have been successful in expelling Sikh
terrorists from neighboring Punjab, the traditional Sikh region, and now
believe some extremists have forged links with Muslim militants in Jammu-
Kashmir.
Lithuania - November 8, 1994 - Explosion demolishes bridge
An explosion described as "a serious act of sabotage" destroyed a bridge 20
miles southwest of Vilnius November 6.  Residents warned a passenger train
due to pass shortly after the blast and no injuries were reported.  The
government called for public vigilance to "prevent criminals from disrupting
the security of the state."
India - December 1, 1994 - 15 hurt in bomb blast in Jammu-Kashmir
At least 15 people were hurt November 30 when a bomb on a commuter
bus detonated in the city of Jammu, in Jammu-Kashmir.
China - December 8, 1994 - 27 die in explosion on bus
An explosion aboard a bus at Yunzhou, central Hunan province last month
killed 27 people and injured 10, including three passersby.  The blast occurred
November 22 when 370 pounds of gunpowder exploded, apparently set off by
a lit cigarette.  The owners of the gunpowder loaded it onto the bus in six
bags, telling the driver it was rice.
India - December 12, 1994 - 3 killed in bus bomb blast in north India
A bomb explosion in a bus killed three people and injured 15 December 10
in the northern state of Jammu-Kashmir.  The agency said the bomb exploded
at Parmandal More on the Jammu-Pathankot expressway, about 20 miles from
Jammu, the state's winter capital.  No one claimed immediate responsibility
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for the blast.  Last month, seven Hindu pilgrims on their way to a major shrine
in the state were killed in a bomb blast in a bus.  Hindus are a majority in
Jammu, in the southern part of the state.  Authorities say Muslim and Sikh
separatist militants operate there.
United States - December 15, 1994 - Bomb explodes on subway
A bomb exploded on a subway in Manhattan.  Two people were injured.
The bombing was part of a campaign of subway bombings to extort money
from the city.
United States - December 21, 1994 - Bomb explodes on subway
A bomb exploded on a subway in lower Manhattan.  It was the second such
bombing that was determined to be part of a campaign to extort money from
the city.  The bomber was seriously injured when the bomb exploded too
soon.
Colombia - December 23, 1994 - ELN attacks buses in Cartagena
On December 22, guerrillas of the National Liberation Army (Spanish
initials: ELN) firebombed three buses in the tourist city of Cartagena, killing
eight people and wounding four.  One of the buses was attacked near the
fortified wall of the colonial part of the city, Cartagena's most popular tourist
attraction.  Police suspect the ELN attacked the vehicles to punish the bus
company's refusal to pay an extortion demand.  They described the attack as
the worst in years in Cartagena and posted a reward for information leading to
the capture of the assailants.
China - December 23, 1994 - Explosion on bus
A young man was killed and two others injured December 23, when
flammable material he was carrying exploded aboard a bus in central Beijing.
In November, 27 people were killed in an explosion aboard a bus at Yunzhou,
central Hunan province, when 370 pounds of gunpowder exploded, apparently
set off by a lit cigarette.  The owners of the gunpowder loaded it onto the bus
in six bags, telling the driver it was rice.  Bus travel is not recommended.
Israel - December 25, 1994 - Suicide bomber explodes bomb at bus stop
A Hamas suicide bomber exploded a bomb at a Jerusalem bus stop full of
Israeli soldiers waiting for buses back to their base.  He was protesting the
killing of Hamas members.  The bomber was on the Palestinian police force.
He had probably intended to carry the bomb on to a bus filled with Israeli
soldiers.
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Turkey - January 3, 1995 - Assailants kill 2 in bus attack
Four assailants, three men and a woman, boarded a bus traveling from
Ankara to Istanbul December 31, stopped the bus near Izmit, then opened fire
on passengers and hurled a grenade before escaping in a taxi.  The attack left
two bus passengers dead and 22 wounded.  Police said they are unsure of the
identity of the assailants, who could be Islamic, Kurdish or leftist militants.
South Africa - January 12, 1995 - Tourists robbed and thrown from train
Two German tourists traveling by train from the University of Natal to
Cape Town were robbed January 11 and then thrown from the moving train
by their assailants.  One of the tourists suffered a fractured skull and is listed
in critical condition, the other escaped with minor injuries.
Egypt - January 12, 1995 - Gunmen open fire on train
Two Argentineans and four Egyptians were injured when suspected al-
Gama'a al-Islamiya gunmen opened-fire on the train traveling from Luxor to
Cairo
Turkey - February 2, 1995 - Bombings in Istanbul
A woman died February 1 while planting a bomb on the main bridge
crossing the Golden Horn, an inlet on Istanbul's European side.  Police
disarmed a second device on the bridge.  Two other bombs exploded February
1, one outside a McDonald's restaurant and another at a bank branch on
Istanbul's outskirts.
India - February 27, 1995 - Bomb on train kills 27
Twenty-seven soldiers have died since two bombs exploded on a passenger
train in the northeastern state of Assam February 25.  The soldiers were
returning to their base after election duty in nearby Manipur, when the bombs
exploded in their reserved compartment.  At least 30 others were injured in the
blasts, suspected to be the work of the outlawed separatist Nationalist Socialist
Council of Nagaland.  RDX explosives are thought to have been used in the
bombs -- the first time, officials say, such sophisticated devices have been
used in the area. The bombs may have been planted aboard the train in
Dimapur in Nagaland, bordering upper Assam, an area where several militias,
mostly tribal, operate.
Japan - March 20, 1995 - Sarin nerve gas in Tokyo subway
Several toxic gas containers, apparently planted deliberately, flooded
subway cars and stations with fumes in morning rush hour March 20, killing
eight people and injuring thousands.  More than 4,700 people were sickened
in 16 stations.  At least one American businessman was affected, but is
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recovering.  Two main subway lines were shut down and 26 stations were
closed in the incident.  Among the hardest hit was Tsukiki station in central
Tokyo.  Preliminary reports are sketchy about how the attack began, but
suggest the substance -- tentatively identified as the nerve gas sarin -- was
planted in wrapped containers in at least five subway cars on three train lines.
Sarin is an extremely toxic and volatile nerve gas developed by Nazi scientists
in the 1930s and has been the villain in a number of recent, unexplained cases:
Earlier this month, a similar but more minor incident was reported on a
subway in Yokohama.  Eleven passengers were hospitalized but police never
found the source of the gas or made any arrests.  In another unresolved case
last June, sarin seeped through several houses and apartments in the central
resort city of Matsumoto, killing eight people and poisoning about 200 others.
The source of the gas was never identified.  However, in this case,
investigators believe sufficient residue from the gas may remain in the
carriages for them to identify its "signature" and therefore its origin.
Bangladesh - March 23, 1995 - More than 40 hurt in transport blockade
More than 40 people were injured March 23 when opposition parties tried
to shut down inter-city transport in their latest attempt to force an early
election.  More than 30 were injured as police used truncheons to disperse
activists demonstrating in the capital, Dhaka.  A dozen activists were hurt in
Lalmanir Hat and Mymensingh, in the north.  Police outnumbered protestors
in and around the capital.  Opposition activists attacked a train in the northern
region of Lalmanir Hat and halted several others across the country.  Buses
and trucks did not operate at all, while ferry services were disrupted.
Israel - April 10, 1995 - Suicide bombers kill 6, wound 46
Islamic militants claimed responsibility for two suicide bomb attacks in the
Gaza Strip April 9 that killed six soldiers and wounded 46 people.  The
Palestinian Islamic Jihad took responsibility for the attack on a bus in the
village of Kfar Darom, 10 miles south of Gaza City.  The Islamic extremist
group Hamas claimed it carried out the other attack on a military jeep near the
settlement of Netzarim.  It was the deadliest attack since a double suicide
bombing killed 21 north of Tel Aviv in January.  Since the peace accord
between the Palestine Liberation Organization and Israel was signed in
September 1993, 123 have died in terrorist violence.
Israel - April 9, 1995 - Suicide bomber drove car into convoy
Gaza.  A suicide bomber drove a car bomb into a convoy of Army jeeps
and settlers cars.  One person was killed and at least three injured Hamas
claimed responsibility.
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South Korea - April 17, 1995 - Exercises for chemical attack
Anti-chemical and anti-biological warfare exercises were staged in Seoul
and its suburbs April 14 to practice dealing with any toxic gas attack like that
on the Tokyo subway. Civil-defense drills have been practiced periodically,
mostly with reference to a possible invasion by North Korea.  "What is noted
in the civil exercise this time is that we had stepped up drills against possible
chemical and biological warfare in Seoul and surrounding areas," an interior
ministry official said.  He said South Korea faced no immediate danger of a
chemical attack but wanted to make sure it was prepared for any incident like
that on the Tokyo subway last month in which 11 people were killed and more
than 5,000 injured.  Military personnel and members of the emergency
services practiced evacuating buildings and treating victims of a chemical
attack.
Sweden - April 18, 1995 - Bomb found on Stockholm subway
A crude bomb -- dynamite packed into a metal pipe -- was found April 17
at central Stockholm's Hotorget subway station.  An unknown man handed the
device to a security guard but disappeared before he could be questioned.
Japan - April 19, 1995 - Mystery gas detected in Yokohama
A mystery gas was detected April 19 in a basement walkway connecting
the west and east entrances and exits of Yokohama station.  Shortly thereafter,
a train originating from Yokohama station and traveling south was stopped
and evacuated at Kannai station, the second stop from Yokohama, after the
detection of an offensive odor.  Station officials inspected the train, found no
unusual substances on board and the train was allowed to continue.  Several
passengers got off the train complaining of throat and eye irritation and
nausea.  None of the injured lost consciousness, but more than 200 people
reportedly were sent to the hospital after the incident. No positive cause was
immediately established, but bystanders theorized the odor may have been
emitted by newly operating train air conditioners.  Police are treating the
incident as a criminal case.  By mid-afternoon, the National Defense Agency
issued a statement indicating the chemical was not sarin, although they were
not immediately able to identify the cause of the odor, which one passenger
said resembled that of sulphur.  However, so far they have not linked the
incident and last month's sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway system for
which the doomsday cult Aum Shinrikyo has been blamed.  A local news
report noted two individuals were arrested close to the scene in a car
registered to the sect, but that has not been confirmed.
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Japan - May 8, 1995 - Another attempted poison gas attack on subway
Late May 5 in Tokyo, Shinjuku subway station employees discovered and
extinguished two burning plastic bags of chemicals left in a men's toilet.  One
of the bags contained sodium cyanide, the other diluted sulfuric acid.  Had the
vapors combined correctly, they could have formed enough hydrogen cyanide
to kill thousands of people in seconds.  Shinjuku is one of the city's busiest
stations, with more than a dozen train and subway lines converging there to
service the district's department stores, restaurants, and nightclubs.  Police are
looking for a man who alerted station employees to the fire but then
disappeared.
Pakistan - June 1, 1995 - Bus crash after across border shooting
On May 31, a bus in eastern Pakistan tumbled into a ravine, killing 25
people, reportedly after it came under fire from Indian troops across the
border.  The bus driver turned off the headlights in the predawn darkness to
avoid detection by the Indian forces.  The accident occurred in the Neelum
Valley, 100 miles northeast of Islamabad.
Chile - June 7, 1995 - Groups threaten sarin attack
Paramilitary groups who support convicted Gen. Manuel Contrera have
reportedly threatened to release sarin nerve gas in the Santiago subway system
if Contreras is sent to prison.   The general, the former director of the once-
feared secret police, was recently sentenced to seven years for his role in the
1976 murder of former Chilean foreign minister Orlando Letelier in
Washington. Contreras, who has warned he will not spend a day in prison, has
barricaded himself in his farm and is protected by several former subordinates
from the DINA.  The paramilitary groups reportedly have also announced they
will attack government and congressional officials if the sentence is not
revoked.  According to local news media, DINA and a dozen former aides of
the general, who were being watched by the police, have disappeared.  Some
fear they could stage attacks in support of Contreras.
Cambodia - June 27, 1995 - Khmer Rouge blow up northwest rail link
Khmer Rouge guerrillas have destroyed extensive sections of the railway
linking Phomn Penh to northwest Battambang.  The Battambang train has
been out of service since June 14 due to Khmer Rouge attacks and sabotage.
On June 15, insurgents destroyed a major 110-foot rail bridge in Pursat, 85
miles northwest of Phnom Penh.  Railway investigators have found at least
108 land mines used to destroy sections of the railway in the northwest
provinces of Kampong Chhnang, Pursat and Battambang.  According to a
spokesman for the Cambodian Railways, the destruction of the northwest rail
links are the most serious attacks by the Khmer Rouge against transport
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infrastructure so far this year.  Railway workers are expected to restore service
on the line "within 10 days."
Japan - July 5, 1995 - Cyanide devices found in subway
In the latest scare to hit the public since the March 20 subway nerve gas
attack, police July 4 discovered a device designed to release cyanide gas in a
Tokyo subway.  The device, hidden in a women's lavatory at the Kayabacho
subway station in the city's center, had a timing device and vinyl bags
containing two liquid agents -- cyanide soda and sulfuric acid -- which could
react to form cyanide gas.  A second device was found six hours later in a
men's toilet at Shinjuku, the city's busiest rail station.  Earlier in the day, rush-
hour subway trains on the Hibiya line were stopped briefly at Kayabacho
station, near the Tokyo Stock Exchange, after the discovery of a mysterious
package that turned out to be harmless.  Also late July 4, noxious fumes were
reported at two other major stations, Ginza and Tokyo.
Investigators say the fumes were probably the work of pranksters.
However, this scare resembles an incident in early May, when authorities
narrowly averted a cyanide-gas attack at Shinjuku.  The abortive attack was
blamed on the doomsday Aum Shinrikyo cult, whose leaders have been
charged with the March 20 gassing that killed a dozen people and sickened
thousands.  Since the March case, posters warning passengers to report
suspicious persons and items have been displayed prominently in every Tokyo
subway station.
South Africa - July 12, 1995 - 2 killed in train station explosion
A bomb exploded Monday night in a train station on the border of South
Africa and Mozambique, killing two people, one of whom may have been the
bomber.  The device, made from a land mine and an AK-47 ammunition clip,
caused extensive damage to the station, located 450 miles east of
Johannesburg and 250 miles west of Maputo.  Authorities believe the blast
was meant to ruin a week-long celebration by South Africa's state transport
company Transnet and the Mozambique Railway System marking its
centenary.
United Kingdom - July 14, 1995 - Ulster bus depot firebombed
Militants hijacked a bus in a republican area of Belfast July 13, ordered the
driver and two others off, and then firebombed the vehicle.  Police who
responded also met a barrage of firebombs. Officers arrested five people.
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Israel - July 24, 1995 - Suicide bomber kills 7 near Tel Aviv
A suicide bomber from Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement) blew up a
commuter bus in the Tel Aviv suburb of Ramat Gan July 24, killing at least
seven people and wounding more than 30.  The blast comes on the eve of a
deadline in talks between Israeli and PLO leaders on expanding the
Palestinian's self-rule in the West Bank beyond the town of Jericho.  Hamas
condemns the peace talks and any deals made with Israel.
Pakistan - July 25, 1995 - Bus bomb kills 3 in Punjab province
On July 23, a bomb blew up a bus near Kasur town in the central province
of Punjab near the Indian border, killing three people and injuring 25, when
the bus was traveling east to the nearby town of Kot Radha Kishan.  There
was no information about who set off the bomb.
France - July 27, 1995 - Bombing on Paris commuter rail line kills 7
A large bomb triggered by a timer exploded on an RER commuter train
stopped at the St. Michel-Notre Dame station in Paris' Latin Quarter during
evening rush hour July 25, killing seven people and injuring some 60 others.
The bomb had been placed under a seat on the suburban transit train which
had been headed south toward Saint-Remy-les-Chevreuse; it exploded while
the doors to the carriage were still closed, sparking a fire that hampered rescue
efforts carried out in one of the most popular tourist districts in Paris.  The
bombing was the worst terrorist incident since the Iranian-sponsored bombing
campaign in 1985/86 that killed 13.  Interior Minister Jean-Louis Debre met
with the government's anti-terrorist advisory group late July 25 and ordered
tightened security at Orly and Charles de Gaulle-Roissy International
Airports.  The government also deployed 1,000 extra policemen at
government facilities, tourist sites, and railroad stations in Paris and another
800 officers in other major cities, including Marseilles, Lyons, and Nice.
Officers carried out random security checks on highways and at borders, while
bomb scares July 26 led to the evacuation of a number of public places in
Paris, including the shopping complex Les Halles and the Louvre, from which
about 8,000 visitors had to leave.  Police also urged theaters, museums, and
large stores to increase security.
Panama - August 8, 1995 - Protests continue in Panama City and Colon
Dozens were injured and hundreds arrested August 7 as the worst
demonstrations in Panama since the era of Manuel Noriega continued.
Simultaneous protests were reported at several points throughout Panama
City, and demonstrations also blocked roads in Colon.  At least three people
were injured when a homemade bomb exploded in a bus in which they were
riding.
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Algeria - August 8, 1995 - Bomb on passenger train kills 7 people
A bomb exploded on a passenger train killing seven people and injuring 20
near the town of Braza.
Switzerland - August 14, 1995 - Arsonists hit French TGV train
Arsonists firebombed an empty French high-speed train parked at a depot
in Bern early August 13.  The attack, the second on a French TGV train,
caused about $835,000 in damage and is believed to be a protest of French
plans to resume nuclear testing in the South Pacific.
Turkey - August 18, 1995 - PKK ambushes bus
Kurdistan Workers Party (Kurdish initials: PKK) guerrillas opened fire on
a bus traveling from southeastern Diyarbakir to Istanbul August 17, killing
two civilians and injuring nine.
France - August 18, 1995 - Bombing near Arc de Triomphe injures 17
A bomb packed with nails and bolts exploded in a garbage can outside the
Charles de Gaulle Metro station a block from the Arc de Triomphe during
evening rush hour August 17, injuring 17 people, three seriously.  The victims
at the tourist-packed district included four Hungarians, four Italians, a Briton,
and a German.  The blast shattered nearby windows, and police halted traffic
around the monument and shut off subway lines to launch a search for more
explosives. The device, packed into a butane canister, resembled the bomb
that killed seven on a Paris commuter line July 25.  The Armed Islamic Group
(French initials: GIA), the fiercest of Muslim militant groups waging war on
the Algerian government, is the prime suspect in the commuter train bombing
as well as the August 17 blast.
Israel - August 21, 1995 - Suicide bomber kills 4 in Jerusalem attack
A suicide bomber from the extremist group Hamas (Islamic Resistance
Movement) blew up a commuter bus and damaged another early August 21 in
Jerusalem, killing at least four people and wounding 100 more.  Prime
Minister Yitzhak Rabin temporarily put on hold peace talks with the Palestine
Liberation Organization (PLO), who condemned the bombing, and closed the
nation's borders with the West Bank.  A group of 100 right-wing Jews
opposed to the peace talks with the PLO demonstrated at the scene of the
blast, throwing rocks at police and demanding an end to the negotiations.
Hamas opposes a negotiated settlement with the Israeli government regarding
Palestinian self-rule in the Occupied Territories and has been responsible for a
wave of suicide bombings since the two sides signed a peace accord in
September 1993.  The most recent such bombing occurred on July 24 in Tel
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Aviv in which six people were killed.  Since the signing two years ago a total
of 77 people have died in bombing attacks.
France - August 26, 1995 - Unexploded bomb found on train
An unexploded bomb with faulty mechanisms was found on the railway
line north of Lyon.  It was made from a 25 kg. gas canister packed with
explosives.  There was no claim of responsibility for the bomb.  It is part of a
bombing campaign by Algerian Muslim extremists.  The fingerprints of an
Algerian-born suspect, Khaled Kelkal, were found on the bomb.  The suspect
was shot and killed by police on September 29, 1995.  Authorities believe that
he was under orders from the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) of Algeria and was
thus involved in the July assassination in Paris of Sahraoui, founder of Islamic
Salvation Front in Algeria.  They also believe that he was involved in the
Paris Metro station bombing of a train in July.
Angola - September 4, 1995 - UNITA rebels ambush bus
Suspected UNITA rebels ambushed a bus and killed 25 passengers
including three Britons and five Filipinos near Lucapa in Lunda Norte
province.  A UNITA representative denied responsibility for the attack.
France - September 5, 1995 - 2 attempted bomb attacks in Paris
A massacre was narrowly averted in a crowded outdoor Paris market
September 3 when a powerful bomb packed into a pressure cooker misfired
but injured three shoppers.  A second device located next to the Convention
subway station in southwestern Paris was successfully disarmed.  Local
officials believe Algerian militant Yahian Rihane, known as "Krounfil," a
member of the Armed Islamic Group, is avenging the death of four Islamic
extremists who hijacked a French airliner in December.
Russia - September 21, 1995 - Hostages rescued
Anti-terrorist forces stormed a hijacked bus in the southern republic of
Dagestan September 20 and freed 18 hostages held by gunmen demanding
$1.5 million and a helicopter.  The hijackers said they needed money to help
drug-addicted friends.
Algeria - September 28, 1995 - Railway bomb kill 5, injures 11
A bomb exploded under a locomotive near Algiers September 28, killing
five people and injuring 11.  The locomotive had been sent to recover the
wreckage of another train attacked by Islamic extremists September 26 that
was blocking the main rail line between Algiers and Blida. In that attack,
militants stormed the train, ordered the passengers off and burned the
carriages.
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Mexico - September 29, 1995 - Angry policeman kills 3 in subway shoot-
ing
A policeman who was rebuffed when he attempted to start a conversation
with train passengers opened fire in a Mexico City subway car today, killing
three people and wounding six.
Georgia - October 1, 1995 - Bus hijacking results in 2 deaths and 10 inju-
ries
Two people were killed and 10 injured in a bus hijacking.  The incident
began some 125 miles from Kutaisi in western Georgia and ended at the edge
of Tbilisi.
Algeria - October 2, 1995 - 18 killed in extremist violence
Islamic extremists opened fire on a passenger bus October 1 in the town of
Laghouat killing 18 passengers and wounding 15.  In an incident September
30, a car bomb exploded at a security forces housing compound in the town of
Tipaza, killing two people and injuring 10.
France - October 9, 1995 - 2 GIA bomb attacks over the weekend
A bomb detonated in a trash can in Paris October 6, slightly wounding 13
people.  The attack came hours after the burial of the main suspect in the wave
of bombings blamed on Muslim extremists.  Police sealed off the area after a
mailman spotted the bomb outside the Maison Blanche (white house) Metro
train station -- the same name as the village where gendarmes shot dead
Algerian-born Khaled Kelkal a week ago.  Another bomb exploded before
dawn October 9 on a deserted suburban railway line west of Paris, causing
light damage but injuring no one.  Officials say the bomb, which sent shrapnel
up to 100 yards, was a gas canister filled with nails and bolts, similar to
devices used by the Armed Islamic Group (French acronym: GIA).  An
anonymous caller claimed responsibility for the attack for the GIA general
command.
United States - October 10, 1995 - Terrorist sabotage possible in Amtrak
derailment
Federal officials are investigating leads of anti-government terrorists who
may be responsible for the October 9 Amtrak train derailment in southwest
Arizona that killed at least one and injured 65 more, 20 critically.  The train,
en route from Miami to Los Angeles carrying 248 passengers and 20 crew
members, crashed October 9 around 1:30 a.m. as it crossed a bridge near the
town of Hyder, 60 miles southwest of Phoenix.  Two sleeping cars and a
dining car plunged 30 feet into a gully after crossing a sabotaged rail
connector.  In addition, two locomotives and eight of the train's 12 cars
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derailed.  Authorities found two messages at the scene referring to the deadly
government sieges at Waco, Texas, and Ruby Ridge, Idaho, focal points for
right-wing, anti-government extremists.  The letter was signed by the
previously unknown "Sons of Gestapo."  Also, authorities say an electrical
wire had been rigged up to the rail's connecting joint to prevent the track's
warning system from detecting a break in the line.  Amtrak notified all freight
and commuter railroads carrying its passenger trains to be on alert for more
sabotage.
In addition to right-wing militants, federal investigators are looking into the
possibility the crash could have been the work of a former employee with a
grudge against the railroad or an associated business.  In any event, the
sabotage was well-planned, as those responsible had extensive knowledge of
the computer warning system attacked to the rail.  Amtrak has increased its
security recently after a generalized warning issued by the U.S. Department of
Transportation concerning possible terrorist attacks.
Russia - October 16, 1995 - Bus hijacker killed
The hijacker of a bus carrying South Korean tourists was killed October 15
when security forces stormed the vehicle and freed the hostages unharmed.
The operation ended a 10-hour hostage drama in the heart of Moscow after the
lone hijacker seized the bus with 25 South Korean tourists near the Kremlin
residence of President Boris Yeltsin.  The seizure was the first mass hostage-
taking in Moscow and a blow to the prestige of law enforcement agencies as it
took place so close to the Kremlin.
France - October 17, 1995 - GIA bomb blast in central Paris, 24 hurt
A bomb blast injuring 24 occurred during rush hour October 17 on a
suburban subway train as it passed through a tunnel between the stations of
Musee d'Orsay and Saint Michel in Paris' Left Bank area.  The device had
been hidden under a seat and the blast destroyed the car.  Officials say the
bomb appeared to have been manufactured from a propane gas canister, a
technique used in most of the recent bombings that have occurred in the city
and in Lyon.  The Armed Islamic Group (French initials: GIA) is suspected.
India - October 30, 1995 - 4 killed in Assam bomb blast
On October 29, four people were killed and 15 injured when a bomb
exploded on a bus in the eastern state of Assam.  The blast occurred while the
bus was at a public terminal in the town of Diphu.  Officials say no one has
claimed responsibility for the explosion, but it is probably linked to ongoing
unrest in the region -- Bodo tribes people in Assam, who have been fighting
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for an autonomous homeland within the state, are blamed for dozens of
terrorist attacks in recent years.
Israel - November 2, 1995 - 11 Israelis injured in 2 suicide attacks
Two Palestinian suicide bombers slightly wounded 11 Israeli bus
passengers November 2 in separate attacks within minutes of each other in the
Gaza Strip.  The attacks come one week after the killing of Palestinian Islamic
Jihad (PIJ) leader Dr. Fathi Shqaqi in Malta, which the PIJ blamed on Israeli
agents.  Today also marks the first anniversary of the killing of PIJ activist
Hani Abed.
Egypt - November 9, 1995 - Islamic extremists fire on train
Islamic extremists opened fire on a train en route from Aswan to Cairo in
the south of Egypt near Farshut village about 600 kilometers from Cairo,
injuring two foreign tourists -- one French and one Dutch as well as an
Egyptian.  The next day the Tal'at Yasin group of al-Gama'a al-Islamiya
issued a statement claiming responsibility and warning all tourists to leave
Egypt.
Egypt - November 18, 1995 - al-Gama'a members fire on tourist train
Suspected al-Gama'a al-Islamiya members opened fire on a tourist train
about 250 miles south of Cairo.  The train was en route from Aswan to Cairo.
One Egyptian train worker was killed and another injured.  Several other
passenger were injured and taken to the hospital.
United States - November 27, 1995 - Subway token booth set on fire, clerk
seriously injured
A New York City subway clerk suffered burns over 70 percent of his body
November 26 after two attackers sprayed a flammable liquid inside his token
booth and set it ablaze.  Police found a rifle at the scene but did not know if
anything was taken from the booth.
Egypt - November 30, 1995 - Another attack on tourist train
Suspected al-Gama'a al-Islamiya members opened fire on a tourist train
about 160 miles south of Cairo.  The train was en route to southern Egypt.
Eleven rounds were fired causing minor damage to the train.  There were no
injuries.  The Islamic Group has threatened the safety of any foreigners
refusing to leave the country.
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Pakistan - December 1, 1995 - Bus bomb kills 3, injures 14
A bomb hidden in the baggage hold of a passenger bus exploded in Lahore,
Punjab province December 1, killing three people and wounding 14.  It was
the third bomb attack on a bus in the province in less than three weeks.
Kenya - December 18, 1995 - 7 tourists robbed in bus hijack near Masai
Mara game park
Gunmen December 14 hijacked a tourist bus and robbed seven Danish
tourists en route to the Masai Mara game park.  The gunmen shot out the front
window, assaulted the bus driver and then robbed the tourists.  Kenyan
officials have attempted to heighten security for visitors by forming a special
tourist police unit.
India - December 19, 1995 - Guerrillas attack bus, 2 killed, 10 injured
Separatist guerrillas in the northeastern state of Manipur December 19
attacked a school bus owned by the paramilitary Border Security Force,
killing two schoolgirls and a soldier and injuring 10 others.  No group has
claimed responsibility for December 19's attack, but the tribally based, Maoist
People's War Group and the National Socialist Council of Nagaland, from
neighboring Nagaland, are the most prominent extremist groups active in
Manipur.
Pakistan - January 8, 1996 - Bus bomb kills 7, injures 35
A bomb exploded on a government bus during the January 7 afternoon rush
hour on the Shahra-e-Faisal road in the southern port city of Karachi, killing
seven people and injuring 35 others.  A Bomb Disposal Squad official said the
blast was caused by a homemade bomb weighing at least six pounds that was
placed beneath a seat in the center of the vehicle, which was carrying 70 to 80
passengers.  The blast follows one on January 2 near government offices in
Karachi that wounded three people.
Italy - January 15, 1996 - Attach threats on trains and aircraft found
A message threatening attacks on Italian trains and aircraft was illicitly
inserted onto the computer system of the ASCA press agency, based in Rome.
Police increased security but no explosive devices were found.  The threat was
signed by the "Falange Armata" (Armed Phalanx), an obscure organization
that had interfered with Italian press agency computer systems in the past.
Egypt - January 26, 1996 - One person wounded in train attack
One Egyptian man was wounded January 26 when Islamic extremists
opened fire on a passenger train traveling through the dangerous Asyut
governate of southern Egypt.  The train, which often carries tourists through
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the area, was traveling north from the southern town of Aswan to Cairo. It is
unknown if there were any tourists on board.  Militants from al-Gamaa al-
Islamiya (Islamic Group), who stage such attacks on a regular basis in
southern Egypt, are suspected in this ambush.
Macedonia - January 29, 1996 - Bomb threat halts train
Police halted a train traveling between Skopje and Belgrade January 26
after receiving a telephonic bomb threat.  Authorities searched the train at the
Macedonia-Serbia border crossing of Tabanovce but found nothing.
Estonia - February 2, 1996 - Bomb explosion on bus
On February 1, a bomb explosion on a bus traveling between Oru and
Johve in the predominantly Russian northeast region killed one person and
injured 10 others.  The bus company had received several extortion threats
from local organized crime gangs and had refused to pay.
Papua New Guinea - February 8, 1996 - Villagers blow up bridge in East-
ern Highlands
On February 3, villagers used a World War II bomb to destroy a bridge on
the Eastern Highlands highway in a dispute over a $150,000 compensation
claim for a road accident death. Police responded by attacking villagers'
property.  The road, a vital link connecting the coastal city of Lae to the
highlands and some of the country's major resource projects, including the
Porgera gold mine and Kutubu oil project, was reopened under heavy guard
February 5 with a temporary crossing replacing the destroyed bridge.
United Kingdom - February 12, 1996 - IRA bomb blast kills 2, injures 100
in London
An Irish Republican Army (IRA) bomb detonated under a railway bridge in
Surrey Quay in the Docklands area east of London late February 9.  At least
two people died, seven others were seriously hurt, and more than 100 suffered
slight injuries.  The explosion coincided with a report from Ireland's semi-
state RTE radio it had received a coded statement from the IRA saying its 17-
month cease-fire was over.  Gerry Adams, head of the IRA's Sinn Fein
political wing, said the attack was intended to get Britain to drop its insistence
on calling elections in Northern Ireland and to convene all-party talks to reach
a negotiated settlement.
United Kingdom - February 20, 1996 - IRA bomb blast kills 1, injures 8
The Irish Republican Army (IRA) said February 19 it planted the bomb
that exploded on a London bus February 18, killing one person and injuring
eight.  Police say the lack of warning for February 18's attack in the Aldwych
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area near Covent Garden indicates the bomb may have accidentally exploded
while being taken to its intended target.  The explosion is the third IRA action
in London in 10 days following a declaration by the IRA ending its 17-month
cease-fire. Irish media reported a new commander has taken over the IRA's
bombing campaign against Britain. He is described as believing "violence is
the only answer Britain will understand."  British and Irish security forces fear
the new leadership will ignore political pressure and intensify attacks in the
short term.
Greece - February 22, 1996 - Bomb destroys train
A bomb detonated February 21, destroying a train carriage in a rail station
in the northern city of Thessaloniki.  The train had arrived from Sofia,
Bulgaria, one half-hour before the blast.  No injuries were reported.
Israel - February 26, 1996 - 26 killed, 82 injured in 2 Hamas suicide
bombings
On February 25 at around 6:45 p.m. local time, a 22-pound TNT bomb
packed with nails and ball bearings and carried by a Palestinian militant
exploded on a crowded bus in downtown Jerusalem, killing at least 24 people,
including two American students, and injuring 49 others.  About 45 minutes
later, a second bomb detonated at a hitchhiking stop for Israeli soldiers in the
coastal town of Ashkelon, about 30 miles south of Tel Aviv, killing two
people and wounding another 33. The second device was also detonated by a
Palestinian suicide bomber allegedly dressed as an Israeli soldier.  Combined,
the two explosions account for the deadliest day of terrorist activity by
Palestinian extremists since the Middle East peace process began.
Responsibility for the actions was claimed by the Palestinian militant group
Hamas and were meant to avenge the death of the organization's leading
bomb-maker, Yahya Ayyash, known as "The Engineer," killed in the Gaza
Strip January 5 by a booby-trapped cellular phone.  Although no organization
claimed responsibility, the assassination was widely attributed to Israeli
intelligence forces.  A Hamas leaflet said "the attacks were a painful blow to
those who ordered the assassination of Yahya Ayyash" and that Hamas would
cease its violence if Israel stopped targeting its leaders and released those in
detention.  Since February 12, which marked the end of a 40-day Palestinian
mourning period for Ayyash, Israeli security forces have received numerous
warnings of an impending attack.  February 25's blasts also fell on the second
anniversary of the deadly Hebron mosque massacre in which Israeli Baruch
Goldstein opened fire with an automatic weapon on a group of worshippers in
the West Bank town, killing 29 Palestinians before being beaten to death by
survivors.
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Israel - March 4, 1996 - Another bus bombing in Jerusalem kills 19, Peres
declares war on Hamas
In a near carbon copy of the February 25 bombing that killed 26 people,
another suicide bomber from the militant Palestinian group Hamas early the
morning of March 3 exploded a 22-pound bomb on a Jerusalem bus, killing at
least 19 people and injuring 10 others. Hamas, once again claimed the
bombing.saying it was revenge for the January 5 assassination of its master
bomb-maker Yahya Ayyash, also known as "The Engineer."  Hamas said this
would be the last attack against Israel for three months if Peres does not seek
retribution against its members.  Peres demanded Palestinian President Yasir
Arafat work harder to crush Palestinian terrorist organizations in regions he
controls or face indefinite suspension of peace negotiations.  He also said
Israel's demobilization of troops from the West Bank town of Hebron --
scheduled for the end of this month -- will be canceled if Arafat does not fully
comply.
Pakistan - March 7, 1996 - Four killed in bus blast in Azad Kashmir
Dynamite on a bus exploded March 6 in the Poonch district of Azad
Kashmir, killing four people and wounding five others.  Police say the
explosives belonged to a passenger, but people in the region say it was an
intentional bomb blast.  On March 2, three bomb blasts occurred in the area,
but no casualties were reported.  The district is close to the line of control
dividing Kashmir between Pakistan and India, and is always tense.
Algeria - March 13, 1996 - GIA train bombing kills 12
At least 12 people were killed and 20 injured March 12 when explosives
placed on railroad tracks between the northwestern towns of Oran and
Tlemcen destroyed a locomotive and two cars. Meanwhile, gunmen March 12
shot to death a photographer for the French-language Algerie Actualite in the
Algiers suburb of Ain Naadja.  Authorities blame extremists of the Armed
Islamic Group (French initials: GIA) for the attacks.
India - March 13, 1996 - Five killed in Assam bomb blasts
Three policemen and one soldier were killed March 11 night when a bomb
planted under a bridge in western Assam's Kokrajhar district exploded.  The
victims were part of a police convoy sent to check the bridge to ensure it was
safe for vehicular traffic.  In a separate incident March 12, a bomb exploded
outside a cinema, killing one person.  Bodo tribal guerrillas from the Bodo
Security Force, which often targets Muslim immigrants and other settlers and
which is fighting for a separate homeland within the state, are suspected.
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Russia - March 18, 1996 - Time-bomb discovered on Moscow bus
A powerful time-bomb was discovered on a Moscow bus March 17 and
was defused just 15 minutes before it was to detonate.  No one was injured.
Police said the driver found the bomb in a parcel on his bus which was
traveling in the Kuntsevo district, one of Moscow's nicest.  Experts from the
Federal Security Service, a branch of the former KGB said the bomb
contained nine pounds of explosive wrapped in nails and bolts.  Officials
suspect the device was planted by separatist Chechen rebels.
Jordan - March 26, 1996 - Three arrested for bus bomb plot
Authorities March 24 arrested three men accused of planning bomb attacks
against tourist buses that transport Israelis into Jordan, and confiscated a cache
of explosives and mines stolen from an army depot.  Officials announced a
state of emergency on the border area with Israel and have placed troops on
full alert to prevent infiltrations into Jordan from points other than legal
border crossings.  Security forces have tightened measures around Palestinian
and Iraqi refugee camps to prevent possible attacks within the nation as well
as possible infiltration attacks into Israel.
South Africa - March 28, 1996 - 3 killed, 5 wounded when gunmen fire on
train
Three people were killed and five wounded March 28 when gunmen
opened fire on a commuter train in Umlazi township in the violence-plagued
KwaZulu-Natal province.
Slovakia - April 3, 1996 - Bus hijack fails
An ex-convict with a package containing explosives tried to hijack a bus to
Austria April 2 but was arrested after the bomb detonated in his hands.  No
other injuries were reported.  Police say the driver managed to evacuate all the
passengers from the bus.  Authorities then surrounded the bus but took no
action until after the package accidentally exploded.  Officials said the
package contained six pounds of SEMTEX and that only the blasting element
detonated.
Israel - April 8, 1996 - 5 injured in bomb attack, mass rally
Five people were injured April 7 when two firebombs were thrown at an
Israeli commuter bus near Hebron.  Earlier the same day, thousands of Jewish
settlers participated in a rally outside the Tomb of the Patriarchs in Hebron
protesting a withdrawal of Israeli troops from the town.
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Greece - April 15, 1996 - Bomb explodes in empty train car
A home-made bomb detonated April 14 in an empty train car in Salonika.
The train, with no passengers on board, had just arrived from Sofia, Bulgaria's
capital.  Officials say the bombing is linked to a similar attack on February 21
and suspect Bulgarian gangsters vying for control of the drug trade in
Salonika.
Algeria - April 17, 1996 - Car bomb
A car bomb exploded April 16 on a bridge linking Algiers with the nearby
town of Blida, causing major damage and forcing the closure of the roadway.
No casualties were reported. Muslim extremists are almost certainly to blame.
Colombia - April 18, 1996 - Powerful car bomb found at Bogota bus ter-
minal
An elite police bomb disposal unit rendered safe a 110-pound car bomb
discovered April 17 outside the Bogota Transportation Terminal in the
southwestern sector of the capital.  The terminal handles buses from around
the country and is usually crowded with travelers.  Police say the bomb,
composed of dynamite and another more powerful explosive, would have
caused massive damage and many deaths had it detonated.  There has been a
recent upsurge in guerrilla activity nationwide and it is entirely possible the
car bomb was the work of insurgents.
United Kingdom - April 25, 1996 - IRA bomb blast in London
Two bombs detonated under the Hammersmith Bridge in west London late
the night of April 24, following a coded telephone warning from the Irish
Republican Army (IRA).  No one was injured. The bridge had been cleared
and a search was under way when the bombs detonated.  The attack occurred
only hours after the IRA's political wing, Sinn Fein, ended weeks of
uncertainty by confirming it will contest Northern Ireland elections planned
by the British as a prelude to peace talks.  Britain reacted by saying Sinn Fein
will be barred from the June talks.
United Kingdom - April 26, 1996 - Failed IRA bombing UK's largest
Police said late April 25 bombs in two briefcase-style boxes under
Hammersmith Bridge in southwest London discovered earlier in the day
contained more than 30 pounds of SEMTEX.  The detonators went off
without setting off the bombs.  Police say the bombs would have brought the
bridge down if they had been properly detonated.
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India - April 29, 1996 - 15 die in bus bombing
In Modinagar town in Uttar Pradesh state, 30 miles north of New Delhi, a
bomb on a bus tore the roof off the vehicle and killed 15 people April 27.
Two separatist groups from Jammu-Kashmir and neighboring Punjab issued a
statement saying they targeted the bus because politicians were among the
passengers.  Voting in Uttar Pradesh will be held next week.  Five people
were killed elsewhere and scores injured in other election-related violence.
Voting took place Saturday in nine states, two territories and two island chains
-- approximately a third of the country. Preliminary results are not expected
until May 8.  Voting is being staggered over several weeks to give police and
paramilitary troops adequate time to minimize election violence.
Philippines - April 29, 1996 - 2 killed, 11 wounded in Mindanao bomb
Two children were killed and 11 wounded the night of April 27 when a
bomb exploded on a mini-bus as it was about to leave a terminal in Tubod
town, Lanao del Norte province, on the southern island of Mindanao.  It was
the 11th bombing incident in the southern Philippines in the past month, but it
is not clear if April 27's blast is linked in any way to the 10 previous incidents.
Pakistan - April 29, 1996 - Bomb on bus kills 40
A bomb hidden in the gas tank of a passenger bus detonated April 28 in a
marketplace some 20 miles from Lahore, killing some 40 people.  The bus, a
private transport vehicle, was overcrowded with passengers traveling from
Lahore to the nearby town of Patoki for the one-week Eid al-Adha holidays
that began April 28.  No one claimed responsibility for the blast, which was
the second in as many weeks in Punjab state.  Six people were killed April 14
when a bomb detonated at the outpatient department of a cancer hospital in
Lahore.
Germany - April 30, 1996 - High-speed train link closed after bomb
threat
Police closed a main high-speed train link on the Hanover-Goettingen line
for 90 minutes April 30 after receiving a bomb threat from anti-nuclear
activists.  There have been a number of sabotage attempts on the line in recent
weeks by activists protesting against a delivery of nuclear waste from the
French La Hague processing plant expected to take place between May 6 and
9. After closing the line, authorities found a suspicious container on the tracks
that turned out to be a fake bomb.
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Algeria - May 6, 1996 - Bus stop bomb kills 2, injures 14
A homemade bomb exploded May 4 at a bus stop near an elementary
school in Tizi-Ouzou, 50 miles east of Algiers, killing two people and
wounding 14.
Bahrain - May 8, 1996 - Bomb blast injures 2, insurance companies hit
hard
A bomb detonated May 7 at a bus stop on the island of Muharraq, injuring
two people. Insurance companies covering local entities recently hit by arson
and bomb attacks are reporting huge losses -- this week's attacks alone
reportedly cost insurance firms some $5 million.
Pakistan - May 8, 1996 - Bomb kills 6, injures 38
A bomb detonated on a bus outside a hospital in Sheikhupura some 50
miles from Lahore in Punjab province May 8, killing at least six people and
injuring 38.  No one has claimed responsibility for the blast, the latest in a
series in the past month that have killed more than 50 people and injured some
100.
Bulgaria - May 20, 1996 - Gunmen hijack bus, rob passengers
On May 17, five masked gunmen hijacked a bus carrying 16 Ukrainian
tourists in the Hainboaz pass, 150 miles east of Sofia near the border with
Serbia.  One person was shot in the leg when he attempted to resist and the
hijackers stole an estimated $40,000.  The assailants were able to hijack the
vehicle by pretending to be police and flagging it down.  Crime has surged
five-fold in the country since the collapse of communism in 1989.
India - May 23, 1996 - 14 killed in bus bomb
A bomb exploded May 22 on a bus traveling from Agra, home of the Taj
Mahal, to Rajasthan, killing at least 14 passengers.  No one has claimed
responsibility for the blast.  On May 21, at least 12 people were killed and 38
injured when a bomb exploded in a New Delhi market.
Myanmar - May 23, 1996 - 9 killed in train attack
Nine people were killed and seven others injured the night of May 21 when
a landmine exploded under a train on the main railway line between Yangon
(Rangoon) and the country's second-biggest city, Mandalay.  Officials blamed
the blast on Karen National Union (KNU) guerrillas, who have been fighting
the central government for autonomy since 1949.  The KNU is the last major
ethnic minority guerrilla army yet to sign a cease-fire with the military
government.
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Venezuela - June 4, 1996 - Buses firebombed in Caracas
On June 3, eight heavily armed men firebombed six buses in the La Pastora
area of northern Caracas, destroying the vehicles and killing two teenagers
who were sleeping aboard one of the buses.
Venezuela - June 6, 1996 - More buses attacked in Caracas
On June 5, masked assailants set fire to seven buses in Caracas, causing no
injuries but damaging all of the vehicles.  The attack follows a similar one that
took place the morning of June 3 in which six buses were attacked with
incendiary bombs, killing two people who were sleeping aboard one of the
buses.  Authorities say both attacks are connected to the June 3's 30 percent
rise in bus fares in the city.  The bus drivers' union has declared a work
stoppage until authorities improve security for city buses.
Russia - June 12, 1996 - Subway bomb blast kills 4, injures 12
A bomb detonated June 11 in the Moscow subway system, killing four
people and severely injuring 12.  The blast destroyed one car a few hundred
yards from the Tulskaya metro station, five miles south of the Kremlin.
Police say a pound of TNT had been attached to the underside of one of the
seats in the subway car.
Pakistan - June 17, 1996 - 2 killed, 18 injured in bomb blast
Two people were killed and 15 injured June 16 in a bus bombing in the
town of Kharian in the Punjab province.  In another explosion, three doctors
were injured when a bomb went off in a government hospital in Abbotabad,
located 50 miles north of the bus incident.  Authorities claim the bombings
were the work of the Indian secret service. Pakistan and India frequently
accuse each other of terrorist incidents.
Ethiopia - June 21, 1996 - Train bomb kills 1, injures 5
One passenger was killed and five wounded June 21 when a bomb
exploded on a Djibouti-bound train 14 miles from the town of Dire Dawa.  No
group has claimed responsibility.
Pakistan - June 28, 1996 - Bomb kills 3 and injures 5
At least three people were killed and five injured June 27 when a bomb
exploded near a bus station in the city of Faizabad, near Islamabad, destroying
a small restaurant and barber shop. No one claimed responsibility.
Russia - June 28, 1996-Explosion in Nalchik kills 5
An explosion June 28 on a bus in the city of Nalchik, Russia killed five
people and injured 32 others.  The blast completely destroyed the bus as it
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arrived at the station in Nalchik, the capital of the Kabardino-Balkaria region.
Authorities are not certain if a bomb caused the explosion.
Russia - July 11, 1996 - Bomb on trolley injures 5
A homemade bomb hidden in a bag of vegetables detonated on a trolleybus
in central Moscow the morning of July 11.  At least five people, including the
driver, were injured.  The blast occurred around 9 a.m. as the trolley
approached Pushkin Square, a popular meeting place in the capital about a
half mile from the Kremlin.  Minutes earlier, the bus had passed by the
Parliament building on its regular route.  The driver's compartment, which is
separated from the rest of the bus, took the brunt of the blast.  The front of the
trolley was destroyed and the roof ripped off.  A minivan nearby was also
heavily damaged and the windows of surrounding buildings were blown out.
Police say the incident, the second bombing targeting public transportation in
Moscow in one month, was a terrorist attack.
Russia - July 12, 1996 - Another trolley bombing
A bomb hidden in a cloth bag on a trolley in central Moscow detonated the
morning of July 12, injuring more than 27 people.  Police say today's bomb
was the same type as the one that detonated on a bus in Pushkin Square on
July 11, but stronger.
July 12's attack was the third on Moscow's public transportation system
since a blast in the subway killed four people on June 11, five days before the
first round of voting in the country's presidential election.  This attack may be
yet another signal from the Chechens to the Russians to curtail their recent
military activities in Chechnya -- which the Chechens claim violate the pre-
election agreement between Russia and the Chechen rebels.
Sudan - July 11, 1996 - Group claims responsibility for destruction
On Wednesday, a Sudanese rebel group based in Eritrea claimed
responsibility for the July 3 destruction of two critical bridges linking the
Sudanese capital, Khartoum, with Port of Sudan on the Red Sea.  The group,
The Beja Congress, also said it killed two government officers in the same
operation.
Russia - July 23, 1996 - Bus passengers robbed
On the night of July 19, passengers on a bus en route from Rostov to
Moscow were robbed by armed men near the town of Voronezh.  The men
robbed the passengers of about $97,000 in roubles, despite additional security
in the region following the discovery of a bomb in the Voronezh airport on the
same day.
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Sri Lanka - July 25, 1996 - At least 70 killed, 200 injured in train blast
Two bombs exploded the evening of July 24 on a commuter train in
Dehiwala, a town six miles south of Colombo, killing at least 70 people and
injuring more than 200.  Reportedly, the blasts occurred in two separate train
compartments.  Police suspect Tamil separatists.
Russia - August 6, 1996 - Bomb found on train
A bomb, which did not detonate, was recently found on a passenger train in
the Caspian Sea city of Astrakhan; the second such device found on the
Volgograd-Astrakhan route.  In June, a bomb exploded on the Moscow
subway system, killing four people and severely injuring 12, and in July, two
bombs detonated on two separate Moscow trolleys, injuring 33 people.
Algeria - August 12, 1996 - Train derailed by Muslim militants
A fuel train was derailed by Muslim militants August 9 when they blew up
the track with a homemade bomb in Naciria, 18 miles northeast of Algiers.
The blast caused massive damage but no casualties.
Russia - August 13, 1996 - Bomb on Volgograd-Astrakhan train
A bomb exploded August 12 in a passenger train stopped at the railway
station in Trubnaya, some 10 miles south of Volgograd, injuring at least nine
people.  The bomb was the third to be found on Train 606, which travels from
Astrakhan on the Caspian Sea to Volgograd, a city about 550 miles south of
Moscow.  The first of the two bombs destroyed an empty passenger car sitting
on the sidings July 25, the second failed to detonate.  Another bomb was also
found in a military waiting room of the Astrakhan station on July 26 and
rendered safe.  No one has claimed responsibility for the latest bombing.
Uganda - August 13, 1996 - Guerrillas kill travelers
A total of 14 people were killed and more than 30 wounded last week in
the Gulu area.  Two people were killed when a bus in which they were
traveling was ambushed by members of the Lords Resistance Army near Bobi,
14 miles from Gulu.  Another 12 were killed when their vehicle struck a land
mine, also near the town of Gulu.
South Africa - August 14, 1996 - Bombing at Pretoria's Properitas Rail-
way Station
On August 12, a bomb detonated at Pretoria's Properitas Railway Station,
causing no casualties but damaging property.  Authorities said trains will
continue to run on the line.  In another incident on August 8, gunmen walked
into a bar in south Johannesburg killing five patrons and wounding three
others.  No motive has been established for the attack.
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Turkey - August 16, 1996 - 2 killed in PKK attack
Suspected Kurdistan Workers Party (Kurdish initials: PKK) terrorists
August 14 attacked a bus in the eastern province of Sivas, shooting and killing
a policeman and another man.  Reportedly the gunmen, who were passengers
on the bus, issued propaganda statements about the PKK before killing the
two victims.  The attack took place two days after PKK militants killed eight
railway workers in the city of Sivas.
Philippines - August 16, 1996 - Explosives found at Zamboanga bus ter-
minal
Security officials on the night of August 14 discovered some 820 pounds of
chemicals that could be used in making explosives, along with solid rocket
propellants, at a bus terminal in Zamboanga City on the southern island of
Mindanao.  The chemicals were odorless ammonium nitrate crystals, and
officials say they are part of an arsenal used by terrorists in 13 homemade pipe
bomb attacks in the area in March and April.  At least 10 people were injured
in those attacks.
Sweden - August 19, 1996 - Neo-Nazi rallies
Neo-Nazis commemorating the death of Rudolph Hess marched in
Germany and Sweden on August 17.  The German government banned neo-
Nazi rallies on August 16, and on August 17 police broke up an illegal march
in the southwestern city of Worms.  Leftists staged a counter-demonstration,
but police reported no significant rioting or injuries.  However, in Sweden,
demonstrators turned violent.  Neo-Nazis and counter-demonstrators both
clashed with police in the city of Trollhattan.  The neo-Nazi demonstrators
came from Sweden, Denmark, Germany, and Norway.  Both sides threw
bottles and rocks at police, and a bus driver found a bag containing what were
described as 18 small explosives in the baggage compartment of his bus,
which had carried leftist counter-demonstrators.
Turkey - August 26, 1996 - Bombs at Istanbul bridge
Security officials early August 25 discovered four time-controlled
explosive devices planted on each of the footings of the 1,570-foot Unkapani
Bridge spanning the Halic river.  Three of the devices were rendered safe, but
the fourth exploded, slightly damaging the structure but causing no injuries.
Traffic across the bridge was not halted by the incident, which has been
blamed on autonomy-seeking Kurdistan Workers Party (Kurdish initials:
PKK) rebels or outlawed leftists.
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Philippines - September 16, 1996 - Mindanao bus company bombings tied
to extortion
At least 18 people were injured the evening of September 13 when a bomb
exploded on a Weena Bus Company bus traveling from Davao City to
Cotabato on the southern island of Mindanao. Officials reported the explosive
device was hidden in a pile of egg trays.  Meanwhile, the driver of another bus
was injured in a similar incident on September 12.  On August 26 just before
closing time, a bomb exploded in a bus parked at the company terminal.
Police say an extortion group is demanding about $75,000 to end the bombing
campaign against the company.
Turkey - September 25, 1996 - PKK kidnaps three foreigners
Early on September 23, Kurdistan Workers Party (Kurdish initials:  PKK)
rebels kidnapped an Iranian and two other foreigners from a passenger bus
near the eastern province of Bingol, en route to the city of Van near the
Iranian border.  Original newspaper reports said the second and third hostages
were German, but the German Embassy suggested they might be Polish.  The
PKK frequently kidnaps foreigners in the southeastern provinces, usually
holding them for propaganda purposes and then releasing them without
ransom.
Switzerland - September 27, 1996 - Train hijacked
An unidentified man making confused demands hijacked a Swiss train
September 27 as it traveled from Chur to St. Moritz with more than 200
passengers on board.  The incident ended without injuries in the town of
Reichenau when the hijacker surrendered after four hours of negotiations with
police.
United Kingdom - September 30, 1996 - IRA had planned Chunnel
blackout
British security sources said September 29 that Diarmiud O'Neill, the Irish
Republican Army (IRA) suspect shot dead by British police September 23,
had been part of a team planning to blow up the electricity supply to the
Channel Tunnel between England and France.
Hungary - October 7, 1996 - Bomb on bus injures 4
On October 5, a bomb injured four people on a bus en route from Budapest
to the northern city of Esztergom.  The bomb detonated in Piliscsaba, a small
town 12 miles northwest of Budapest. Police said they did not know what kind
of explosive had been used, although a gas cylinder construction had been
ruled out.
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Algeria - October 8, 1996 - 9 passengers on bus killed by Muslim mili-
tants
On October 7, Muslim militants killed nine passengers on a bus in Ksar el
Hirane, 212 miles south of Algiers.  Authorities suspect the Armed Islamic
Group (French initials:  GIA) staged the attack.  The GIA has staged a series
of brutal raids against passengers on buses or trains.
Algeria - October 10, 1996 - 34 killed in ambush
On the night of October 7, after establishing a roadblock near the town of
Hassi R'mel, Muslim militants stopped a bus and slit the throats of 34
passengers.  Initial reports indicated nine people were killed.  Hassi R'mel is a
government-restricted zone, some 200 miles south of Algiers, where many
expatriates working for multinational oil and gas companies reside.  The
attack was apparently sanctioned by a local chief, Mokhtar Mokhtari, a
veteran of the Afghan war, who in July split with Djamel Zitouni, leader of
the radical Armed Islamic Group (French initials:  GIA) and started his own
organization.
Hong Kong - October 14, 1996 - Anonymous threat of gas attack on Hong
Kong subway
On October 11, a Mandarin-speaker reportedly called the police
threatening a gas attack would be staged the night of October 15 on the MTR
subway network.  Police said October 14 they are on high alert and have
designed inter-agency security measures to handle the situation.  Local
Chinese-language media accuse the Japanese sect Aum Shinrikyo, that was
responsible for the sarin gas attacks on the Tokyo subway in 1995, for the
threats.
Germany - October 24, 1996 - Railways sabotaged
On October 23, sabotage on two major railway lines in northern Germany
forced hundreds of trains to be re-routed.  Grappling hooks were hung on
power lines overhanging the tracks on the Hamburg-Bremen and Hamburg-
Neumuenster routes, bringing down the lines and damaging trains that crashed
into the hooks.  One injury was reported.  Authorities suspect anti-nuclear
activists were responsible for the damage.  The activists periodically use
violent means to protest the shipment of nuclear waste to a dumpsite at
Gorleben, 75 miles from Hannover.  Authorities in the state of Lower Saxony
said a shipment of waste scheduled for next month would be postponed until
next year, arguing that the state did not have the financial resources to
adequately protect it. Full train service resumed later in the day.
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Algeria - October 28, 1996 - Train bombing kills 8 and injures at least 30
On October 26, eight people were killed and at least 30 others were injured
when bombs planted under train tracks exploded as a passenger train passed
over them.  The incident occurred between Baba Ali and Oued Smar, 10 miles
south of Algiers.
Australia - October 31, 1996 - Bomb in toilet of Sydney subway station
A bomb that officials said appeared to be a home-made device blew up a
stall in a men's restroom in Sydney's St. James Cityrail station October 31,
injuring no one but causing extensive damage to a row of toilets.  Local media
reported the bomb was constructed using plastic bottles filled with a chemical
accelerant such as fertilizer.  In the last week, similar attacks have been made
on other railway station toilets.  City officials said they will close all toilets on
the City Circle and eastern suburb lines and increase security patrols.
Colombia - November 1, 1996 - Bombs explode in Medellin and Bogota
On October 31, two bombs exploded in Medellin and one in Bogota,
causing moderate damage and injuring one person in the capital.  The two
bombs in Medellin exploded outside two separate betting offices, one of them
located in the main bus terminal.  The bomb in Bogota, consisting of about 23
pounds of dynamite, exploded in a southern commercial area, shattering
windows for a one-block radius and injuring one person.  The explosions
come as Congress considers legislation to end the country's ban on extradition
of drug traffickers.
Pakistan - November 4, 1996 - Explosion on passenger train kills 5 people
On November 3, an explosion on a passenger train en route from Karachi
to the northeastern city of Rawalpindi in Punjab province killed five
passengers and injured 20 more.  The train, Tezgam Express, was passing
Tandoi village, some 40 miles south of Rawalpindi, when a bomb planted in a
toilet compartment of the second car exploded.
Japan - November 19, 1996 - Gas attack on Tokyo train
On the night of November 15, several teenagers sprayed gas on a
commuter train in Tokyo, forcing about 40 people to get off the train
coughing.  The attackers got off one train, sprayed more gas on a second train,
and then fled.  The attack temporarily suspended service on the train line.
Police said they do not know who released the gas or the nature of the
substance.
A Chronology of Terrorist Attacks – Brian M. Jenkins 225
Norman Y. Mineta International Institute for Surface Transportation Policy Studies
India - December 2, 1996 - 12 killed, 37 injured on train blast in Punjab
Early December 2, 12 people were killed and 37 injured when a bomb,
reportedly made from RDX, exploded in a sleeper car of the Jhelum Express
traveling from Pune in the western state of Maharashtra to Jammu in the
northern state of Jammu-Kashmir.  The explosion occurred shortly before
3:00 a.m. as the train sat in the Ambala cantonment station near the Punjab
capital of Chandigarh.  No one claimed responsibility for the blast but police
said it could be part of an escalation of violence in the lead up to next
February's state assembly polls in Punjab.
Mexico - December 2, 1996 - U.S. and Mexican volunteers' bus attacked
On November 29, a lone gunman fired on a bus carrying U.S. and Mexican
volunteers of a Minnesota-based group delivering food, medicine, and other
supplies to small villages in Chiapas state.  No one was injured.  The motive
for the attack is not known, and it is not clear if the gunman knew who was on
the bus.  It may have been an isolated random attack.  Nevertheless, Chiapas
state is unstable with the Zapatista insurgency and ongoing land disputes
between peasants and ranchers.
Algeria - December 4, 1996 - 12 Muslim militants killed
On December 4, security forces shot dead 12 Muslim militants whom they
allege were responsible for the deaths of 38 bus passengers at a fake
roadblock in Ghardaia in October.  Many of the passengers had their throats
slit.
France - December 4, 1996 - Bomb at Paris RER station kills 2 people,
injures 83 others
At about 6 p.m. Paris time on December 3, a 28-pound gas canister bomb
packed with nails in the fourth carriage of an evening commuter train
exploded while the train was stopped at the Port Royal RER station in the
Latin Quarter, on the Left Bank.  The bomb killed 2 people and injured 83
others, 7 of them seriously.  Both passengers and waiting commuters on the
platform beside the train were injured.  Last July, a bomb at the Saint-Michel
station on the same line killed eight people and injured nearly 100 others.
President Jacques Chirac and Prime Minister Alain Juppe announced the
Vigipirate anti-terrorist security measures implemented last summer, which
have since been relaxed, would be fully re-implemented.  Some 1,800 soldiers
have been assigned to Paris to assist police.  Police and troops will also be
sent to provide security in major regional centers such as Lille and Lyon.
Security will be tightened at railway stations and airports, and trash bins
around the city will be sealed.
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India - December 5, 1996 - Bombs rendered safe along train track in
Jammu-Kashmir
Late December 2, a man riding a motor scooter near the town of Samba, 25
miles southeast of Jammu, the winter capital of Jammu-Kashmir, found two
unexploded bombs wrapped in a bag near the railroad track.  These explosive
devices were found the same day a bomb exploded on a train in the Ambala
cantonment station near the Punjab capital of Chandigarh, killing 12 people.
India - December 10, 1996 - Guerrillas kill 30 and wound 24 rival tribe
members
On December 9 in the northeast Nagaland state near the India-Myanmar
border, guerrillas from the Naga tribe attacked a bus load of the rival Kuki
tribespeople, killing 30 passengers and injuring 24 others.  The incident
occurred in the town of Maiamnala, some 60 miles from Kohima, the state
capital.  At least 20 gunmen armed with grenades stopped the bus carrying
some 60 passengers, ordered the exit of ethnic Naga tribesmen, and fired on
the bus.  An ongoing feud between Naga and Kuki tribes since 1993 has killed
more than 1,000 people in the state.  The tribes are reportedly fighting for
control of drug trafficking routes near the India-Myanmar border.  On
December 10, national security forces increased patrols along strategic
highways to stem further violence.
Algeria - December 11, 1996 - Muslim militants kill 20 passengers aboard
bus
Muslim militants slit the throats of 20 passengers, whose bus they forced to
stop in the Benhamdani area, Blida province December 11.   The province,
some 30 miles south of Algiers, is the headquarters of the Algerian army and a
Muslim militant stronghold.
Poland - December 13, 1996 - Robber sentenced
On December 12, a man who gave drinks laced with drugs to at least 26
train passengers in order to incapacitate and rob them was sentenced to 15
years in prison.  The drinks, a mixture of vodka and potent drugs, resulted in
the deaths of two people.
Switzerland - December 13, 1996 - Train robbery
Late on December 11, five armed robbers boarded a train en route from
Zurich to Geneva and forced the driver to bring it to a halt between Bern and
Lausanne.  They stole some 20 sacks from a postal car attached to the train
and fled into nearby getaway cars.  No one was injured in the incident.
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Russia - December 16, 1996 - Bus hijack attempt
On the night of December 12, three men hijacked a chartered bus en route
from Naberezhnye Chelny, in the middle Volga region, to Moscow, stealing
approximately $13,000 in cash and escaping in a waiting car.  The criminals
were later arrested by police, but one escaped.
France - December 23, 1996 - Bomb rendered safe in Marseilles
On December 21, police in Marseilles rendered safe a powerful explosive
device that had been left in front of the post office near the St. Charles train
station.  A customer found the package at 8:15 a.m. in a plastic bag leaning
against the front wall of the building.  Police evacuated the building and
rendered safe the 7.5-pound device, which was made of dynamite and set to
have exploded between 4 and 5 a.m.  Security officials said no one claimed
responsibility for the bomb.
India - December 31, 1996 - Bomb on passenger train kills at least 50
people; bombed bridge may be linked
On December 30, a bomb exploded on a passenger train in the northeastern
Assam state killing at least 50 people on board.  The New Delhi-bound
Brahmaputra Express train carrying some 1,200 passengers was passing
through the town of Kokrajhar when the blast ripped through the train.  At
least three coaches were badly damaged and three others derailed before the
train came to a halt.  The explosion destroyed two sleeper coaches carrying
some 160 people, none of whom are expected to have survived the blast.  By
early December 31 some 50 bodies were recovered and more bodies are
expected to be found, although it is likely the death toll would be less than the
initial estimate of 300.  Reportedly there was more than one blast, one of
which blew a nine-foot crater in the ground and completely destroyed a 20-
feet section of the railroad, which is the main link between the northeast
region and the rest of the country.  No one has claimed responsibility for the
attack yet.  Authorities speculate, however, the train blast is linked to
December 29's bombing of a bridge that links the state of Assam to the rest of
the country across the small Rakhaldubi river, near the town of Bijni.  The
tribal guerrilla group Bodoland Army, which has been fighting for a separate
nation, has been blamed for the bridge attack and is suspected in the latest
bombing as well.  Rescue efforts for the train victims are hampered due to the
bombed bridge.
India - January 2, 1997 - Bomb on railroad bridge in Assam state
On January 1, a remote-controlled bomb exploded on a railroad bridge near
the town of Goreswar, some 60 miles north of the Assam state capital
Gauhati, heavily damaging the bridge but causing no injuries.  The blast
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destroyed a 26-foot section of the railroad and damaged two spans of the
bridge over the Bornodi river, cutting the link to the northeastern state of
Arunachal Pradesh.  This bombing follows two bombings in the state in four
days.  A bomb destroyed a road bridge December 29, injuring several people.
On December 30, a bombing of a passenger train, some 100 miles away from
the latest bombing, killed some 50 people and injured many others.  No one
has claimed responsibility for the series of bombings.  Police blame Bodo
separatist rebels for the attacks.
Syria - January 3, 1997 - Bomb blast kills 9
A bomb blast aboard a bus in the capital Damascus killed nine people and
injured 44 others on New Year's Eve.  The bus was headed for the northern
city of Aleppo.  Syrian authorities have accused Israel of staging the attack.  A
series of bomb blasts that occurred in Damascus and the Mediterranean port of
Latakia in May last year prompted the U.S. Department of State to issue a
warning to American citizens to be cautious while in Syria.  Of late, Syrian
interests have been targets of bombing incidents in Lebanon.  One person was
killed and two others were injured in Lebanon two weeks ago in bomb attacks
that targeted Syrian facilities.  Syria has an estimated 40,000 troops in
Lebanon whose presence is opposed by the local Maronite Christians.  No
group has claimed responsibility for the attack.
India - January 6, 1997 - 10 injured in Delhi bomb blasts
Two bombs exploded, one in a bus and the other in a taxi, in New Delhi
January 4, injuring at least 10 people.  No one has claimed responsibility for
the blasts, which occurred moments apart in the Samaipur Badli section, some
15 miles northwest of Delhi's center.  The first bomb exploded in a state-
owned bus at around 5:00 p.m.  The conductor saw a plastic bag with a jar
inside when the bus departed from the Delhi terminal.  After no one claimed
the bag, he placed it behind the driver's seat and began to drive the 60
passengers to Sonepat in neighboring Haryana state.  The second explosion,
which destroyed a taxi some two miles away carrying 10 people, was also
traveling to Sonepat.
Israel - January 10, 1997 - Bomb blast in Tel Aviv injures 13
On January 9, two bombs hidden in garbage cans detonated near the old
central bus station in Tel Aviv within minutes of each other, injuring 13
people. All the victims were slightly injured.  The explosions occurred in a
lightly populated commercial center that is home to Tel Aviv's large
community of foreign workers.  Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu broke
off talks with U.S. special envoy Dennis Ross and rushed to the scene.  He
warned of severe consequences if an investigation pointed towards
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Palestinians in territory under Yasser Arafat's rule.  He added, "it should not
be automatically assumed that we will carry on with peace talks in that event."
He was referring to the stalled but ongoing peace talks between the Jewish
state and Palestinians over the issue of self rule for the Palestinians.  Both
Israeli and Palestinian officials fear radicals would launch attacks to abort the
peace agreement.  Last week, a mentally ill Israeli soldier opened fire at
Palestinians in a Hebron market, injuring five people.  In both cases, the light
nature of the injuries seems to have averted a crisis.  There has been no
terrorist bombing in Israel since a series of attacks in the winter and spring of
last year killed 63 people.
South Korea - January 16, 1997 - Man holds 34 hostages on bus for an
hour
January 16 in Seoul, a man wielding a seven-inch knife held 34 passengers
hostage on board a bus for over an hour, complaining the country was "full of
communists."  He demanded the bus driver to drive the vehicle to the
presidential Blue House.  The driver refused and drove to a government
complex instead, where police fired tear gas into the bus and seized the man.
The driver was slightly injured in the incident and none of the passengers
were injured.
Russia - January 16, 1997 - Chechen rebels attack train
On January 14, some 50 Chechens launched two attacks on a train en route
from Makhachkala, the capital of the region of Dagestan, to Moscow.  One of
the policemen guarding the train was killed and several others were wounded,
but no passenger casualties were reported.  The attackers broke into one of the
coaches and freed some prisoners held there and then fled the scene.
Germany - January 17, 1997 - Pylon damages train in extortion attempt
On the night of January 15, a pylon crashed down on a train in central
Germany but injured no one.  Police said the incident was caused by sabotage,
and that attackers had sawed through the pylon.  Although anti-nuclear
environmentalists have been responsible for a number of attacks on trains in
the country, police say the motive in this case is extortion.  A letter titled
"extortion note to German railways" has reportedly been found by authorities.
India - January 17, 1997 - 4 killed on a bus
On January 16, four people were killed when unidentified gunmen opened
fire on a bus near the town of Sopore, 30 miles north of Srinagar, the summer
capital of the state of Jammu-Kashmir.
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Russia - January 17, 1997 - Bomb threat in 2 train stations
On January 16, police searched Moscow's Kazansky railway station for
two hours after receiving an anonymous bomb warning, but discovered no
device.  The Kursky station was also closed for two hours due to a similar
false threat.
Turkey - January 21, 1997 - Bomb in Istanbul rendered safe
On January 20, police rendered safe a 22-pound bomb at the Sirkeci train
station in Istanbul after receiving a warning call.  The bomb had been left at a
bank cash machine and set to explode at 10 p.m.  The Turkish press reported
the warning call was made by passers-by who found the device.  No one has
claimed responsibility for the bomb.
India - January 29, 1997 - Train robbers in Bihar kill four and others ab-
ducted
On January 28, four people were killed when they resisted thieves on a
passenger train in the eastern state of Bihar.  Officials said the robbers
boarded the train at a station and began robbing passengers at gunpoint once
the train began to move.  The robbers then pulled the emergency brake to
escape, taking with them four women passengers.  Police launched a search of
the nearby areas in an attempt to secure the release of the abducted women.
India - February 3, 1997 - Bomb blast kills one, injures 18 in Haryana
state
On February 1, one person was killed and 18 others injured in Panipat town
in the northern state of Haryana when a bomb exploded as passengers were
disembarking from a privately-owned bus at the town's main bus station.
Officials said the bomb was a low-intensity improvised explosive made with a
mixture of potassium chloride, sugar, and acid.  Blame for bomb attacks in
northern India usually rests with Kashmiri or Sikh militants.   The state of
Haryana imposed a ban on the sale of alcohol last month, however, and some
observers suspect the region's liquor mafia.
Algeria - February 14, 1997 - Rails sabotaged
On February 13, two freight trains smashed into grappling hooks attached
to overhead power cables on the rail line between Stuttgart and Mannheim,
blocking the line for several hours. Police suspect anti-nuclear protesters
sabotaged the line.  Last week, a train carrying nuclear waste through France
derailed, causing concern about methods of transport for nuclear materials.
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India - February 24, 1997 - Grenade attack near bus station kills 1, in-
jures 9
Separatist guerrillas threw a grenade at a security patrol near a bus station
February 24 in Srinagar, the summer capital of northern Jammu-Kashmir
state, killing one person and injuring nine others.  The grenade missed the
patrol and exploded on the road, harming pedestrians nearby.
Germany - February 25, 1997 - Saboteurs attack train lines
Saboteurs on February 25 disrupted several train lines across the country
by throwing grappling hooks onto overhead power lines, causing damage to
property but no injuries.  One train ran into the hooks near Frankfurt's
International Airport just before 2:00 a.m.  Rail traffic was being re-routed for
several hours.  Similar attacks also occurred near Hamburg and Berlin.  No
one claimed responsibility for the acts but anti-nuclear activists have tried to
block rail transport several times in the past few months to protest a nuclear
waste dumping ground in Gorleben, northeast of Hannover.  Two rail
containers of spent nuclear waste from France and four others from German
power plants are scheduled for transport to the site at Gorleben next week.
Lebanon - March 4, 1997 - Angry driver fires at Japanese tourist bus
A car driver fired at a bus carrying Japanese tourists near the city of
Baalbek, 55 miles east of Beirut, on March 4 after a traffic dispute.  No one
was hurt in the incident and the tourists proceeded to the ruins of the Roman
temples, the country's biggest tourist attraction.
China - March 4, 1997 - Report of another bus bombing in Xinjiang
province
An exiled spokesman for Uighur nationalists claimed the group had staged
another bombing near the town of Yining in Xinjiang province on March 3, in
retaliation to Beijing's strict measures in the area in recent days.  Last week,
when  three bombings on buses resulted in seven deaths and some 60 injuries,
the Chinese government deployed security forces and arrested hundreds of
Uighur nationals.  The government March 4 denied the report of the latest
bombing.
China - March 10, 1997 - Bus bomb in downtown Beijing injures at least
10
A homemade bomb exploded the evening of March 7 on a Number 22 bus
as it drove down North Xidan Street in a highly congested central shopping
district of Beijing, seriously injuring at least 10 people.  Reuters news agency
reported two people were killed by the blast, although police officials said no
one was killed.  Police immediately closed off the area to remove the debris.
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A few checkpoints were reportedly opened around the city to allow police to
search vehicles, but witnesses report authorities tried to make everything
appear normal.  Security in the city was already increased because the
National People's Congress is in the middle of its two-week long annual
session.  According to a notice issued by Beijing police and published in the
Beijing Daily newspaper on March 9, the explosive was planted "beside the
left-hand seats three and four rows from the front of the bus."  It also
announced a reward for information leading to the arrest of the bombers.  The
explosion resembled three blasts that occurred February 25 on public buses in
Urumqi, the capital of the northwestern province of Xinjiang where the
Uighurs, a Turkic Muslim population primarily reside.  On March 10, a group
calling itself the Eastern Turkestan Freedom Organization telephoned a
cultural center for Chinese immigrants in Istanbul to claim responsibility for
the bombing.
India - March 14, 1997 - Bomb in Punjab injures at least 6
At least seven people were killed and 10 others injured March 14 in
Jalandhar, a city in the northern state of Punjab, when a bomb detonated
moments after a passenger train en route to Amritsar from New Delhi left the
train station.  Police gave no explanation for the blast and said they are
investigating.
Turkey - March 25, 1997 - 12-pound bomb rendered safe in subway
On March 22, local television reported a 12-pound bomb had been placed
at the Aksaray metro station in Istanbul and was subsequently rendered safe
by police.  No one claimed responsibility for the attack.
Albania - March 27, 1997 - Gunmen fire on bus killing 2 passengers
On March 26, gunmen in a four-wheel drive vehicle fired automatic rifles
at public bus in the town of Sauk, just south of the capital Tirana.  Two
passengers were killed and six others were wounded.
Israel - April 2, 1997 - Suspected firebomb on a bus injures 13 Israeli sol-
diers
On April 2, 13 Israeli soldiers were injured when the bus they were
traveling in overturned down a slope in the West Bank, 12 miles from
Jerusalem.  Observers said a firebomb was responsible for the accident.  The
Israeli army imposed a curfew on the town of Jelazoun and searched the
surrounding areas for terrorists.  On April 1, two Palestinian suicide bombers
died when their effort to bomb a Jewish settlement failed.  Israeli authorities
arrested 30 people, mostly members of the Islamic Jihad, in connection with
the bombing.  The Islamic Jihad denied responsibility for the blast.  Also on
A Chronology of Terrorist Attacks – Brian M. Jenkins 233
Norman Y. Mineta International Institute for Surface Transportation Policy Studies
April 1, Israeli security forces killed two Palestinians in the West Bank.  The
crisis began when Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu approved the
construction of 6,500 apartments in disputed Arab East Jerusalem.  Alarmed
at the spiraling violence, U.S. President Bill Clinton has made a pledge to get
involved in the peace process personally.  He will meet with Netanyahu in
Washington D.C. early next week.
Hong Kong - April 4, 1997 - Sarin gas hoax in Tsimshatsui
On April 1, police carried out a controlled explosion of a beer bottle
suspected to have contained the nerve gas sarin that was found in the back of a
city bus during rush hour traffic in the Tsimshatsui district, on the southern tip
of the Kowloon peninsula.  The poison threat turned out to have been a hoax.
A note expressing "discontent about property prices" was attached to the
bottle, according to a police official.
India - April 7, 1997 - Bus bombing kills 2 people, injures at least 14
On the morning of April 6, a crude bomb exploded on a bus traveling near
the town of Pathankot, some 120 miles north of the Punjab capital
Chandigarh, killing two people and injuring at least 14 others.  The bus was en
route to the state of Jammu-Kashmir, which borders Pathankot, when the
explosion occurred.  Authorities suspect Kashimiri militants are responsible
for the attack.
United Kingdom - April 7, 1997 - Bomb threats disrupt Grand National
race, London transportation
On April 5, the Grand National steeplechase horse race at the Aintree
racetrack was postponed due to two telephoned warnings of a bomb on the
grounds.  Both warnings, made a half-hour before the race was to start, used a
recognized Irish Republican Army (IRA) codeword, but the IRA has not yet
claimed responsibility.  Some 70,000 people were evacuated and thousands
were stranded in the Liverpool area overnight as police carried out a search of
the grounds and parking lots. Authorities carried out three controlled
explosions of suspect packages, but found no bombs. Spectators were allowed
to retrieve their cars on April 6, and the Grand National will be held the
afternoon of April 7 amid heavy security.  Authorities had feared April 6's
soccer cup final at London's Wembley Stadium would also be disrupted, but it
was held without incident.  On April 4, police evacuated the King's Cross
subway station, a transfer point for four London subway lines, at the height of
the evening rush hour, in response to a bomb threat.  Threats also prompted
police to evacuate the St. Pancras station and close the Waterloo and Euston
stations. Service at King's Cross and St. Pancras stations was disrupted for
five hours, with regular service not due to resume for 24 hours.  On April 4,
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the M5 and M6 highways, which had been closed to traffic for more than 30
hours due to bomb threats, were reopened.  Prime Minister John Major
warned the public against taking recent bomb threats, which have caused no
injuries, lightly, saying "There's a great danger that people will be lulled into a
false sense of security and then there will be a bomb."
Spain - April 8, 1997 - Disturbances in Basque region, attack on train
Over the weekend, demonstrations in the Basque region were marked by
violence when young Basque separatists attacked vehicles, electric
transformers, and bank branches.  One rioter attempted unsuccessfully to set a
bus on fire.  On April 7, hooded activists threw two firebombs at a train en
route between Barcelona and the Basque city of Irun near the station of
Alsasua, in Guipuzcoa province, but the bombs failed to detonate and caused
no damage or injuries.
Croatia - April 15, 1997 - Mine kills 2 people
On April 12, an anti-tank mine killed two workers clearing mines from a
destroyed bridge near a United Nations checkpoint in the mainly Serb area of
Eastern Slavonia and injured two others. The bridge had formed part of the
dividing line between Serbs and Croats in the enclave, which has been
administered by the U.N. until recently but is due to return to Croatian control.
United Kingdom - April 18, 1997 - 2 explosions and bomb threats cause
rush hour havoc
Early morning on April 18, explosions at railroad stations in Leeds and
Doncaster in northern England caused property damage and severe disruption
to morning rush hour railroad and highway traffic, but resulted in no injuries.
The first explosion took place at Leeds station, destroying a signaling
equipment near a parking lot.  The second explosion damaged a section of the
railroad near North Bridge at Doncaster station.  Police also reported they
carried out two controlled explosions on suspected packages at Stoke station.
Police received a telephone call with a code word used by the Irish
Republican Army (IRA) shortly after 7 a.m., warning bombs had been placed
in Stoke, Doncaster, and Crewe railroad stations, as well as on a section of the
M6 highway.  Police closed off all affected stations and the highway, and
evacuated homes and businesses in threatened areas.
United Kingdom - April 21, 1997 - Bomb threats strand commuters
Commuters were stranded this morning after the Irish Republican Army
(IRA) made a series of bomb threats against subway and train stations and
major highways.  A Royal Automobile Club spokesman said the resulting
delays to commuters caused "some of the worst traffic chaos that we have
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seen in London for many years, if ever."  Rail and subway transportation came
to a standstill, and commuters were evacuated from the King's Cross, Charing
Cross, Paddington, St. Pancras, and Baker Street rail and subway stations.
Service was also severely disrupted at London's Heathrow, Luton, and
Gatwick airports.
United Kingdom - April 29, 1997 - IRA bomb threats cause more trans-
portation chaos
Police closed parts of several main highways in the London area and parts
of Heathrow and Gatwick Airports April 29 in response to telephoned bomb
threats by the Irish Republican Army (IRA).  Police said the threats affected
some 50 miles of highway, including sections of the M-1, linking London
with northern England, the M-25 London ring road, the M-20 and M-26,
which serve Dover and the southeast coast, and the M-3 and the M-27, serving
the south and southwest. Heathrow's terminal for European flights and
Gatwick's two terminals were evacuated.  However, the railway and subway
systems were not directly affected by April 29's alerts.
China - May 14, 1997 - Explosion on bus in Guangdong province kills at
least 5
On May 12, five people were killed and six others wounded when a bomb
exploded in the rear of a local bus in Shunde in the southern province of
Guangdong.  The blast was reportedly set off by a young couple who were
both killed by the explosion.  Officials are investigating.  It is not clear
whether this bomb was intended to explode on the bus or whether the couple
was transporting explosives that unexpectedly detonated.  Both the
anniversary of the June 4, 1989, Tianmen Square massacre and the handover
of Hong Kong to British sovereignty may provide incentives for individuals or
groups to act who seek to discredit Chinese authorities.
Iraq - May 20, 1997 - 2 bus passengers killed; Turkish incursion into Iraq
continues
Two unidentified gunmen killed two passengers and wounded seven others
on a bus near Diyarbakir May 20.  The Kurdistan Workers Party (Kurdish
initials:  PKK) rebels also fired rockets at government buildings in the town of
Derik in Mardin province, and blocked the southeastern Mardin-Sirnak road.
More than 10,000 Turkish troops continue May 20 to wage an offensive
against the PKK in southeastern Turkey and northern Iraq.
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Thailand - May 21, 1997 - Bomb destroys train track in Narathiwat
province
On the evening of May 16, a bomb exploded on a railway bridge in the
Rangae district of the southern border province of Narathiwat.  The explosion
caused no casualties but destroyed part of the track.  No group has claimed
responsibility for the bombing, which police say was "professionally
executed."  Rail links to the province were restored the following day.
India - June 4, 1997 - Naxalites damage railway in Andrah Pradesh
Early June 3, Maoist insurgents known as Naxalites sabotaged a railway
station, locomotive, and telephone station east of the capital Hyderabad in the
state of Andhra Pradesh, forcing the interruption of train service between
Warangal and Vijaywada.  Train service has since been restored.
India - June 6, 1997 - Bomb on bus in Punjab kills 7
A bomb planted aboard a bus traveling from Himachal Pradesh state to the
city of Jammu in Punjab state exploded June 6, killing seven people and
injuring more than 12 others.  An army vehicle traveling behind the bus was
damaged by the blast.  Police suspect either Sikh or Kashmiri separatists in the
attack.
India - June 11, 1997 - Bomb explodes on train track in Jammu-Kashmir
On June 9, a bomb made from RDX exploded near Raya Morh, some 11
miles southwest of Jammu, the winter capital of Jammu-Kashmir state,
ripping up at least 12 feet of track and forcing the suspension of rail traffic
between the states of Punjab and Jammu-Kashmir.  The bomb destroyed seven
cars of a passing cargo train.  Security officials said the bomb exploded
minutes before a crowded passenger train was scheduled to pass.  On June 8,
one kilogram (2.2 pounds) of RDX was found on a passenger bus bound for
Jammu.
Algeria - June 26, 1997 - Bomb explodes on a train
A bomb exploded on June 25 in a train in the south Algiers suburb of al-
Harrach, wounding 40 people.  The homemade device was placed in a railway
coach and exploded about half a mile past al-Harrach station.  The explosion
came two days after three people were killed by a bomb in the southern town
of M'Sila and 18 people massacred in remote areas in rural Algeria.
Algeria - June 27, 1997 - Bomb on minibus kills three in Algiers
A bomb exploded June 26 on a minibus operating between the Algiers
districts of al-Harrach and Oued Smar, killing three people and wounding
more than 20 others.  The explosion came one day after a bomb wounded 40
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people aboard a train in the same al-Harrach district.  Authorities imposed
increased security in the capital, making it compulsory for officials to check
the identification of people going to shops, buses, government and private
business buildings, cinemas and theaters.
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GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS AND INITIALS
Initials Name Locale
ACOG Atlanta Committee for the Olympic Games Atlanta, Georgia
ANC African National Congress South Africa
AOLP Organization for the Liberation of Palestine Palestine
ASALA Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia Context: France
ATF Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms USA
BART Bay Area Rapid Transit San Francisco
BSF Bodo Security Force India
BSF Border Security Force India
CAD Computer Assisted Design
CSPPA Committee of Solidarity with the Arab and
Middle East Political Prisoners
Context: France
DOD Department of Defense USA
DoITT Department of Information Technology
and Telecommunications
New York
ELA Revolutionary Popular Struggle (Greek acronym) Greece
ELN National Liberation Army (Spanish initials) Colombia
EOD Explosive Ordnance Disposal USA
ETA Basque Fatherland and Liberty (Basque acronym) Spain
FEMA Federal Emergency Management Authority USA
FTA Federal Transportation Authority USA
FLNC Corsican National Liberation Front (French initials) Corsica
FPMR Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front (Spanish initials) Chile
FRA Federal Railroad Administration USA
G.B.I. Georgia Bureau of Investigation Georgia, USA
GIA Armed Islamic Group (French initials) Algeria
J.C.C. Joint Communications Center (Atlanta Police) Atlanta, Georgia
KLF Khalistan Liberation Force Punjab, India
KNU Karen National Union Myanmar
LTTE Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam Sri Lanka
M-20 December 20 Movement (Spanish initials) Panama
MARTA Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority Atlanta, Georgia
MNLF Moro National Liberation Front Philippines
MPOC MARTA Police Operations Center Atlanta, Georgia
MTA Metropolitan Transportation Authority New York City
N-17 November Seventeen Greece
NPA New People's Army Philippines
NTSB National Transportation Safety Board USA
NYC New York City USA
NYDEP New York Department of Environmental Protection New York City
NYFD New York Fire Department New York City
NYPD New York Police Department New York City
OEM Office of Emergency Management New York
OSTS Olympic Spectator Transportation System. Atlanta, Georgia
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Initials Name Locale
PFLP Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine Palestine
PFLP-GC Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General
Command
Palestine
PIJ Palestinian Islamic Jihad Palestine
PIRA Provisional Irish Republican Army Northern Ireland
PKK Kurdish Workers Party (Kurdish initials) Turkey
PLO Palestinian Liberation Organization Palestine
PULO Pattani United Liberation Organization Thailand
RAF Red Army Faction Germany
RAP Puerto Rican Armed Resistance Puerto Rico
RATP Régie Autonome des Transports Parisiens Paris
RER Réseau Express Régional Paris
RZ Revolutionary Cells (German initials) Germany
S.O.C. State Operations Center Georgia
S.O.L.E.C. State Olympic Law Enforcement Command Georgia
SISDE Service for Information and Democratic Security
(an intelligence agency, Italian initials)
Italy
SL Maoist Shining Path (Spanish initials) Peru
SNCF Société Nationale des Chemins de Fer Français France
SORT Special Operations and Rescue Team Atlanta
STP Syndicat des Transports Parisiens Paris
TNT Terror Against Terror (Jewish) Israel
ULFA Maoist United Liberation Front of Assam India
UNITA National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
(Portuguese acronym:)
Angola
URNG National Revolutionary Unity of Guatemala
(Spanish initials)
Guatemala
US FEMA Federal Emergency Management Authority USA
UVF Ulster Volunteer Force Northern Ireland
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